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1. Introduction 
From 15 to 20 May 2010, the River Oder burst its bank – an incident which created one of 
Germany’s most serious floods ever (LUGV 2012, p. 11). The floods were a result of heavy 
rainfall of up to 300 l/m² (ZKI 2010). The water level rose to 653 cm in Eisenhüttenstadt, 
the second highest level since weather records began in the country (LUGV 2012, p. 11). 
In the same year, starting in December 2010, La Niña Modoki weather pattern resulted in 
heavy rainfall in Eastern Australia. As a consequence, this month became Queensland's wet-
test in history, with high rainfall totals recorded in 107 locations (Bureau of Meteorology 
2011). It was “one of the most significant floods in Queensland’s history” (Bureau of Mete-
orology 2011), accompanied by the state’s first cyclone of the season, severe thunderstorms 
with large hailstones in the southeast, 16 low daily and low mean maximum temperature 
records and seven high daily and mean minimum temperature records (Bureau of Meteorol-
ogy 2011). 
These two events are clearly extreme weather events. But were they considered to be a con-
sequence of climate change in the media? 
On 27 September 2009, the German political party CDU won an election and built a coalition 
with the FDP. In their coalition agreement, they stated that they intended to tackle climate 
change by promoting a low-carbon economy, they argued that renewable technologies pre-
sented an opportunity for the German economy and that they wanted to reduce global green-
house gas emissions (Neuhoff 2010, p. 134). With these goals, the new government extended 
the coalition agreement drawn up by the former government, a coalition of CDU and SPD, 
which expressed the intention to reduce the costs for the economy related to the European 
Union Emissions Trading System (Koalitionsvertrag 2005, p. 55) as well as emissions due 
to traffic (Koalitionsvertrag 2005, p. 56), that renewable technologies had to be expanded 
and could be a valuable export product (Koalitionsvertrag 2005, p. 42), and that they wished 
to reduce global greenhouse gas emissions by creating an international climate protection 
agreement for the period after 2012 (Koalitionsvertrag 2005, p. 54). 
On 3 December 2007, after 14 years under the same Prime Minister, the Labor Party won 
the election in Australia. With this election, a long period of economic focus in politics ended 
(see, for example, Taylor 2014, Crowley 2007 and Hamilton 2001). This could be seen as a 
turning point in Australian politics, because the central message of the Labor Party’s candi-
date Kevin Rudd’s election campaign was that “climate change is the greatest moral chal-
lenge of our time” (Gurney 2014, p. 3). So climate change became the defining issue in an 
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Australian political campaign after 14 years without a single vote on the issue (see, for ex-
ample, Gascoigne 2008 and Bongiorno 2008). 
What do these short descriptions of the two elections (in Germany and in Australia) show? 
They show that climate change is a political issue and was a topic in the election campaigns 
in the two countries – but each had a different focus. While this was just one of many topics 
in Germany, it was the key issue in the Australian election campaign. But how was climate 
change as a political topic picked up by the media in the two countries? 
Since the 1980s, the decade in which climate change entered the public discourse worldwide, 
discussions about its existence, its causes and consequences have continued. These discus-
sions have resulted in different approaches to how to tackle climate change in countries 
throughout the world and, also in differing coverage of climate change in the media. 
Shortly before this research began, the topic of climate change gained a negative connota-
tion. The United Nations Climate Change Conference 2009 in Copenhagen took place – with 
more than 100 heads of state and government and with more than 40,000 participants this 
was one of the best visited climate conferences ever (Sterk et al. 2010, p. 3) – and failed. 
“Rarely had an event generated so much anticipation, and rarely had there been such a strong 
disappointment… the conference produced even less of a result than even the worst pessimist 
had expected” (Sterk et al. 2010, p. 3). The fact that the participants at COP 15 saw the task 
of tackling climate change as an economic burden and that climate change was still not per-
ceived as an overriding concern (Sterk et al. 2010, pp. 9 f.) resulted in a media environment 
in which controversies about the very existence of climate change emerged. 
“Various actors, some of whom were climate scientists, worked strategically to pro-
mote, maintain, destabilise and repair the scientific consensus at this time. …In so 
doing, these actors drew on coordinated and sophisticated communication strategies, 
using the rhetoric, methods and methodologies of climate science, to make their re-
spective cases” (Hollimen 2012, pp. 3 f.). 
The controversial discussions in newspapers and on radio and television programmes, at that 
time, as well as the public debate that took place after COP 15 (Hollimen 2012, p. 2) once 
again identified the power of the media when it comes to framing climate change.  
Therefore, the key questions of this research deal with media frames/frame sub-dimensions 
connected with climate change, the role of climate scepticism in the discussion as well as 
the question which actors represent the identified frames/frame sub-dimensions.  
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Some of these questions had also been addressed by other scientists. For example, Kaiser 
and Rhomberg (2016) did their research on climate change scepticism in the media during 
the climate change conference in Durban, Brüggemann and Engesser (2017) analysed the 
IPCC stance on climate change in various countries, and Wessler et al. (2016) recorded 
cross-national similarities in multimodal framing during a climate change conference. Thus, 
the findings of this research are comparable to other scientific work that took place around 
the same time. Chapter 7: “Climate change research since 2011” further introduces these 
activities in media science and connects the results of this research with the results of work 
developed by others, after 2011 – so after the research period of this work ends.  
To help readers understand the scientific process of this research, the theoretical approach is 
devided into two parts: chapter 2 consists of a literature review about framing, chapter 3 
introduces literature which explains the concepts of Bräuer and Wolling’s (2014) six sphere 
model (see Chapter 3). Both chapters, thus, introduce the state of research on  climate change 
coverage and its influencing factors at the time when climate change-related coverage of the 
elections and the environmental disasters was published, i. e. between July 2007 and June 
2011. 
The question as to whether events, other than climate change conferences, might affect the 
media coverage of climate change has, nevertheless, only rarely been discussed. Gurney 
(2014) is one of these few examples. She compared the 2007, 2010, and the 2013 elections 
in Australia in terms of climate change coverage during the election periods. 
This research breaks the international topic of climate change down into a discussion about 
climate change coverage in two countries, i. e. Germany and Australia. In this context, the 
two chosen events – the environmental disaster as well as the political election as an event 
that represents climate change in politics – serve as indicators for the prominence of climate 
change in the media: The coverage of the environmental disaster makes clear whether Ger-
many and Australia identify environmental disasters as caused by climate change. The cov-
erage of the elections shows whether and how climate change was discussed by politicians 
as well as by other actors in the two countries around an election.  
Because the examination of climate change coverage mainly refers to the analysis of cover-
age in the context of climate conferences, so far (see Chapter 3), the identification of differ-
ences and similarities in the two countries in the context of an event representing social and 
economical consequences (environmental disaster) as well as an event representing political 
and medial consequences (election campaign) is a new perspective in research on climate 
change coverage.  
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That this new perspective in research of climate change coverage is of interest is supported 
by four aspects: First of all, the different experiences with extreme weather events and dif-
ferences in the way the political elites of the two countries deal with climate change. Most 
Australians say that they do not realise that their weather is getting more extreme because 
extreme weather conditions, such as cyclones and drought, are part of their everyday life: 
Australia has a cyclone season that officially runs from November to April (Australian Gov-
ernment – Bureau of Meteology 2020a) as well as drought maps which monitors three-
monthly rainfall deficiencies for Australia (Australian Government – Bureau of Meteology 
2020b).  Concerning climate change in politics, the impression is that the commitment of the 
public to climate change is very dependend on how the respective Prime minister treats the 
topic during the time, he/she is in office (see, for example, McDonald 2012, p. 579). Second, 
the exemplary function of the two industrial countries Germany and Australia is of interest: 
Germany is the biggest economy in Europe, Australia is the biggest economy in the South 
Pacific region (DeStatis 2018). In addition, the two countries are one of the biggest emitters 
of greenhouse gases in their region with Germany producing about 800 million tonnes (big-
gest emitter in Europe) and Australia producing about 500 million tonnes (second biggest 
emitter in the South Pacific region, after Indonesia) (Länderdaten 2018).  
Third, the geopolitical situation shows considerable differences: on the one hand, it is said 
that Germany is getting more and more Mediterranian with changing seasons, longer heat 
waves and strong rain (see, for example, DWD, Greenpeace). On the other hand, Australia 
is getting hotter and hotter including record heat waves, once-in-a-century floodings, bush 
fires as well as spring tides (Deutschlandfunk 2019).  
And fourth, the two countries have different media systems as Germany’s media landscape 
includes a number of media corporations whereas Australias media system just includes two 
huge media conglomerates, that is to say Fairfax Limited and News Corp (see, for example, 
Lidberg 2018). 
These four aspects make clear that there is not only the question about the differences and 
similarities comparing the two countries, but also the differences and smiliarities of the two 
events as well as of the timeframes within the event. To get profound insights into the climate 
change coverage around the two events, this work analyses which story is narrated around 
the words “climate change” and “global warming” in German and Australian climate change 
coverage, using the following three research questions: 
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1. Which similarities/differences are found in the climate change coverage of Germany 
and Australia when comparing the two countries and how can the observed differ-
ences be explained? 
2. Which similarities/differences are are found in the climate change coverage of Ger-
many and Australia when comparing the election and the environmental disaster and 
how can the observed differences be explained? 
3. Which similarities/differences are are found in the climate change coverage of Ger-
many and Australia when comparing the time before and after the respective events 
and how can the observed differences be explained?  
These three research questions are answered looking at the following three aspects: first and 
foremost, this comparative analysis looks at the framing of climate change in leading quality 
daily newspapers in the two countries. In addition, this work identifies the relevant actors 
involved and how they deal with the issue. Because actors of climate change coverage have 
different interests regarding climate change, all articles were examined in terms of their form 
of expression. Thus, for this research two dimensions of journalistic forms of expression are 
distinguished: commenting and informing.   
Therefore, this research aims on answering three additional qurstions:  
• Do the frames/frame sub-dimensions differ between the quality newspapers in the 
countries?  
• Which actors represent the climate change frames/frame sub-dimensions?  
• Which form of expression (commenting/informing) is more frequently used com-
paring the countries and the two events?  
By taking this broad approach concerning the analysis of climate change coverage, this re-
search fills a gap in climate change research in media science. 
Chapter 2 provides an overview on framing research. It examines different approaches to 
gathering frames, explains the process of framing, and provides a literature review on the 
research of framing climate change in media coverage. Finally, it introduces all identified 
frame sub-dimensions for this research.  
Chapter 3 introduces existing climate change related literature using the “Extended Sphere 
Model” of Bräuer and Wolling (2014) as guideline. So, this chapter provides an overview of 
the state of research on climate change coverage in Germany and Australia during the period 
of this research and oriented towards the six spheres of Bräuer and Wolling (2014). Conse-
1 Introduction 21 
quently, it examines groups that might exert influence on climate change coverage in Ger-
many and Australia, i. e. politicians. Therefore, also the history of German and Australian 
climate change politics, with a focus on the history of this research period, is presented as 
well as the work of lobby groups. It also introduces relevant economic factors in the two 
countries, such as those related to energy supply, natural resources and climate conditions. 
Moreover, Chapter 3 examines possible influences from inside media companies, i. e. that 
of newspaper owners, and provides an overview of the journalistic profession in the two 
countries, including the journalists’ attitude to their work, their socialisation, their self-un-
derstanding and the news values which are evident in the two countries. Finally, it introduces 
the four newspapers which were analysed in this research. 
Chapter 4 connects the theoretical findings from Chapters 2 and 3 with the goals of this 
research and, thus, identifies the central hypotheses as well as sub research questions for this 
study. 
Chapter 5 presents the research sample and shows how the code book for the analysis is 
developed. Moreover, it describes the process of coding. Several examples are given. 
Chapter 6 – the analysis chapter – discusses the hypotheses and sub research questions by 
analysing 1,012 articles from Germany and Australia. It concentrates on the usage of the 
identified frame sub-dimensions and identifies frames used in the climate change debate, on 
actors which have a say, and on the form of expression used. 
In Chapter 7, the climate change studies since 2011, the year in which the investigations 
covered in this research end, are introduced and reviewed. Moreover, a connection is made 
between these research findings and the results of this research. 
Chapter 8 discusses the findings of this research, reviewing the confirmed and unconfirmed 
hypotheses and sub research questions. It draws conclusions and explains how these findings 
may influence further research. In addition, it considers the climate change studies since 
2011 and matches the results of these studies with the theoretical framework. Finally, it dis-
cusses the limitations of this study and makes recommendations for further research. 
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2. Theory: Framing 
This research concentrates on frames as well as frame sub-dimensions of climate change 
spread by the media. For understanding the topic of framing, this chapter explains how fram-
ing works, shows different methods of framing, explains the process of framing, identifies 
frames of climate change from several studies and, finally, introduces the deductively found 
frame sub-dimensions for this research.  
The media apply frames by selecting, highlighting and leaving out aspects of news topics 
(see, for example, Tankard et al. 1991, Reese 2001, De Vreese 2005). Thus, there is a focus 
on a special opinion, a detail of an issue or a selective interpretation. Entman et al. (2009) 
say that framing guides topics in a specific direction by using repetition and moral support: 
“A frame repeatedly invokes the same objects and traits, using identical or synony-
mous words and symbols…to promote an interpretation of a problematic situation or 
actor and (implicit or explicit) support of a desirable response, often along with a 
moral judgement that provides an emotional charge” (Entman et al. 2009, p. 177). 
This kind of guidance referring to media framing was and still is discussed by many re-
searchers (see, for example, Steinberg 1998, Scheufele 2004 and Bach et al. 2012). Steinberg 
(1998) says that “…frames provide a diagnosis and prognosis of a problem and a call for 
action to resolve it” (p. 846). Scheufele (2004) argues that the beliefs, valuations and deci-
sions of the receiver are influenced in the long term by representing a topic again and again 
in the same way (p. 38). Thus, the receiver learns how to classify the information in a mes-
sage and can recall this message when other information has a similar connotation. For Bach 
et al. (2012), framing does not only organise media content and makes it easier to understand; 
it also creates knowledge and the possibility to valuation for the receivers of frames (p. 197). 
Thus, the work of the media facilitates the classification of news topics and makes them 
easier to understand. 
Summarising these statements, media frames: 
• analyse problems, 
• are influential due to repetition, 
• organise media content, 
• create knowledge, and 
• call for action. 
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These characteristics of media framing illustrate the fact that framing is a powerful tool. 
Media frames, however, are not just simply initiated by the media as a socialisation tool. 
Media frames are also the result of political public relations, of public expectations and a 
country’s position, on the one hand, and the result of a journalistic setting and the influence 
of media owners, lobby groups and so on, on the other hand (see, for example, Reese 2001, 
De Vreese 2005, Hänggli 2011). Hänggli (2011), who did her research on how political ac-
tors shape the news, explains: “…The best way to understand the role of the news media is 
to view it as part of a larger contest among political antagonists for the control of the pub-
lic agenda and the public’s interpretation of specific policy issues” (p. 2). 
This makes clear that framing is not only an instrument that makes media content easier to 
understand. The senders of media frames, frequently political antagonists – politicians, po-
litical organisations or the media owner him- or herself – use framing for their own interests. 
This strategy is effective because people prefer quick and easy information, so-called heu-
ristics, which “…are mental rules of thumb which allows us to make simple judgements 
based on complex information” (Pennington 2000, p. 82). And these heuristics are effective 
because media consumers often lack time or suffer from information overload, so that heu-
ristics help to simplify the amount of information by “… [reflecting] your own experience 
of the world and may lead to erroneous or biased inferences or judgements because of this” 
(Pennington 2000, p. 80). This demand for ‘comfortable’ information as well as the lack of 
time makes it easy to influence societal values and beliefs: 
“In many ways, we [the public] are cognitive misers – we are forever trying to con-
serve our cognitive energy. Given our finite ability to process information, we often 
adopt the strategies of the peripheral route for simplifying complex problems; we 
mindlessly accept a conclusion or proposition – not for any good reason but because 
it is accompanied by a simplistic persuasive device” (Pratkanis and Aronson 1992, p. 
62). 
Taking a brief look at how much media framing is able to influence people’s lives, Bennett 
(2002), Carvalho and Burgess (2005) and the Project for Excellence in Journalism (2006) 
discussed the role of media in people’s lives. Bennett (2002) explained that “few things are 
as much a part of our lives as the news…it has become a sort of instant historical record of 
the pace, progress, problems, and hopes of society” (p. 10). Carvalho and Burgess (2005) 
point out that “traditional print and broadcast media, embracing new information and com-
munication technologies, play a central cultural role in modernity through the selective pro-
vision of social knowledge” (p. 1459). And the Project for Excellence in Journalism (2006) 
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concluded that in what are conventionally regarded as ‘developed nations’, many polls have 
found that television and daily newspapers are the primary sources of information. 
That media is the primary source of information is an important aspect, because it means 
that media can also be labelled as a service provider to the public: “Differentiated audiences 
initiate demand and are able to result persuasion and react to what the media offer” (McQuail 
2010, p. 88). So, the creators of media content cannot just publish what they like. When 
creating news, when building frames, journalists have to refer to the predominant ideologies, 
hegemonic structures and the popular culture of the respective country (see, for example, 
Reese 1990, Pan and Kosicki 1993, Steinberg 1998, Cottle 2000, Hermes and Dahlgren 
2006). Reese (1990) argues that news media “…reproduce a consistent ideology without 
being instructed directly by the state” (p. 394) and “… accept the frames imposed on events 
by officials and marginalise and delegitimise voices that fall outside the dominant elite cir-
cles” (p. 394). Pan and Kosicki (1993) explain that “the domain in which the news discourse 
operates consists of shared beliefs about a society” (p. 57) and that frames, consequently, 
show “…how public discourse about public policy issues is constructed and negotiated” (Pan 
and Kosicki 1993, p. 70). Cottle (2000) especially supports the “…culturally mediating na-
ture of news…” (p. 429) saying that the news is “…not just as a cipher of social interests 
and political power but… a cultural medium of communication” (p. 429). Hermes and 
Dahlgren (2006) discuss political debates in the news and explain that “…all the articles in 
this issue… share a notion of the importance of thinking meaning-making and belonging 
from a perspective in which power, power relations and identity construction are important” 
(p. 261). So, framing, besides meeting the requirements of political antagonists, also means 
reflecting the opinions and beliefs of society to achieve acceptance. This is why the assump-
tion is that the content of the chosen four quality newspapers, which all have a great purview, 
also have a high degree of acceptance in society. 
Summarising this short introduction, media frames analyse problems, are influential due to 
repetition, organise media content, create knowledge, and calls for action. As a facilitator of 
frames, the media is, thus, an influential institution in society. This system is socialised by 
powerful interests as well as by a country’s hegemonic structures and its popular culture, as 
the latter two are both represented in and distributed via the media. 
In terms of this work, the decision to use framing for climate change coverage is based on 
three arguments: 
First, climate change coverage is subject to interpretation. Especially those actors who speak 
on behalf of climate change in the media – that is to say mainly journalists and politicians – 
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simplify scientific results; while scientist also refer to uncertainties. Journalists and political 
actors prefer clear messages (see, for example, Boykoff and Timmons 2007, Weingart et al. 
2000). Journalists, in addition, follow professional routines and emphasise for example con-
flics, drama and personalisation in terms of climate change (see, for example, Boykoff and 
Boykoff 2007). So, framing represents the dominant messages of the political elites as well 
as the routines of the journalist.  
Second, framing is the result of these interpretations from dominant actors to create one 
central message in terms of climate change – in this case a central message for a newspaper 
article. Based on that, journalists work out patterns of interpretation which explain the rea-
sons, the process as well as the consequences of certain events considering the cultural con-
text and the political orientation of the respective media company (see, for example, Reese 
2001, p. 11, Badr 2017, p. 178). 
Third, framing includes the concept of “frames within frames” (Goffmann 1974) – so to 
identify different frame sub-dimensions standing for one frame. A frame is, consequently, 
interpreted differently referring to a particular event and, thus, highlights the event differ-
ently referring to the respective conceptional framework (see, for example, Roessler 2005, 
p. 230, Van Gorp 2007, p. 70). This characteristic of framing is relevant for this work due to 
the two events on which this research focuses.  
Matthes and Kohring (2004) agree to Goffmann’s (1974) frame concept on “frames within 
frames”. Building on the definition of framing by Entman (1993), they developed a method-
ology which understands frames as a set of relating sub-frames (Matthes and Kohring 2004, 
p. 61). Thus, frames are not identified holistically via a content analysis, but are identified 
across several texts using the statistical practice of a hierarchical cluster analysis. Accord-
ingly, clusters are a composition of specific frame elements (Matthes and Kohring 2004, p. 
62). For Matthes and Kohring (2004), this method does not fully solve the problem of a valid 
idendification of frames, but the coding of single frame-elements is at least less complicated 
and easier to standardise than coding a full frame (p. 63). In addition, the authors say that 
this method improves the reliability of each frame, because the coder does not know on 
which frame he/she is working while coding (Matthes and Kohring 2004, p. 63).  
In the following, this chapter extends the knowledge about the methodology of framing and 
it introduces media frames which create the dominant ideology about climate change. It, 
therefore, first studies the process of framing and explains how frames are created and re-
ceived by the protagonist of a media process. Second, this chapter discusses framing ap-
proaches and introduces Entman’s (1993) definition of framing as a starting point for this 
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research. Then, third, the framing of climate change is analysed. In the fourth part of this 
chapter the findings are classified into a consistent list of frame sub-dimensions, referring to 
Entman’s (1993) frame elements, to deductively identify climate change frames for the code 
book of this research on German and Australian climate change coverage. 
2.1. Framing as a process 
Although this research is about the creation of media frames and examines just the represen-
tation of one issue in the media – in this case the representation of climate change – this 
chapter explains the process as a whole for a better understanding of how framing works. 
Scheufele (1999) intensively discusses the framing process. He creates a process model of 
framing (see Figure 1) which “…conceptualizes framing as a continuous process where out-
comes of certain processes serve as inputs for subsequent processes” (p. 114). 
For him, there are four major processes influencing framing: “Frame building”, “Frame set-
ting”, “Individual-level effects” and “journalists as audiences” (Scheufele 1999, pp. 115 ff.). 
“Frame building” makes clear which factors, either organisational, media or external factors, 
impact the framing of news content that journalists create (Scheufele 1999, p. 115). “Frame 
setting” refers to the salience of issue attributes, i. e. the accessibility of frames in the mind 
of the receivers (Scheufele 1999, p. 116). “Individual-level effects” have assumed a link 
between media frames and individual-level outcomes, i. e. behavioural, attitudinal and cog-
nitive variables (Scheufele 1999, p. 117). The last part, “journalists as audiences”, say that 
journalists are susceptible to frames set by the news media (Scheufele 1999, p. 117). 
This last aspect of Scheufeles’ (1999) findings is further explained by Bach et al. (2012) who 
use Scheufele’s process model for their own research on media coverage of the financial 
crisis. The authors say that journalists, as receivers of media content, also create new media 
content from their cognitive processing (Bach et al. 2012, p. 198) as well as through profes-
sional interaction with other journalists in the newsroom (Bach et al. 2012, p. 199). The work 
of journalists is, therefore, not only influenced by the elites of a country and by journalistic 
routines, but also by own thoughts about what the journalist has heard.  
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Figure 1: A process model of framing research 
Source: Scheufele 1999, p. 115 
Because this work ist on “frame building”, this process is introduced in more detail in the 
follwing. “Frame building” is a process that is influenced by various aspects. De Vreese 
(2005) says that the frame-building process takes place in a continuous interaction between 
journalists, elites and social movements (p. 52) and says: “The outcomes of the frame-build-
ing process are the frames manifest in the text” (De Vreese 2005, p. 52). Scheufele (1999) 
explains that it is a process “…that influences the creation or changes of frames applied by 
journalists” (Scheufele 1999, p. 115). He, thus, puts the journalist in the centre of the framing 
process.  
Hänggli (2011) explains the mechanism of “frame building” as follows: “Frame building 
uses media frames as dependent variable and investigates the factors that influence the cre-
ation or changes of frames applied by journalists” (Hänggli 2011, p. 1). From Hänggli’s 
point of view, political actors introduce the most important frames into the public discourse 
(2011, p. 3). Nevertheless, although organisations are influential, sometimes those who stay 
incognito for the public are especially successful (Hänggli 2011, p. 4). 
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Matthes and Kohring (2004) say that frames in a media context can be located at four points 
of the communication process: at the sender, at the journalist, in the media content/article, 
and at the receiver of a message (p. 56). The sender as well as the journalist are the builders 
of frames. The sender, for example a political actor, frames strategically a special viewpoint 
on a topic and frames in the context of a competition to other senders who have a different 
viewpoint concerning the same issue (Matthes and Kohring 2004, p. 56). Journalists frame 
in terms of their way of composing a news story and of deciding which news item is news-
worthy (Matthes and Kohring 2004, p. 56). The result of these activities of the senders and 
the journalist is that media content or an article is framed by focusing on one central mes-
sage; it is about the story line (Matthes and Kohring 2004, p. 57). Or as Tankard et al. (1991) 
states: a media frame as the central organising idea for news content supplies a context and 
suggests the central issue by using selection, emphasis, exclusion, and elaboration (Tankard 
et al. 1991, p. 3).  
These short introduction about “frame building” makes clear that it is also of major im-
portance to also identify the actors of frame sub-dimensions, because the coding of actors 
helps to get an impression about 1. the powerful interests in terms of climate change cover-
age and 2. the significance of journalists as authors of climate change coverage.  
2.2. Framing approaches  
This chapter introduces approaches for identifying frames. It thus shows the diversity of the 
method of framing and helps to find the best method for this research. 
One approach that can be taken in a frame analysis is the qualitative-interpretative approach. 
This approach focuses on the interpretative account of media texts and is based on a small 
sample that mirrors the discourse around an issue or event: “Typically, frames are described 
in-depth, and little or no quantification is provided” (Entman et al. 2009, p. 180). Because 
the idea is that metaphors, examples, pictures and so on define a frame, this analysis exam-
ines each paragraph of an article, not the article as a whole, to identify a frame (Entman et 
al. 2009, p. 180). 
The manual-holistic approach assumes that frames are manually coded as holistic variables 
in a quantitative content analysis, either inductively, so ex ante, or deductively (Entman et 
al. 2009, p. 180). Entman et al. (2009) explain that this approach first generates frames by a 
qualitative analysis of a selection of news texts which are then used for a quantitative content 
analysis (p. 180). So, a text is analysed by the list of frames found. Alternatively, frames can 
be identified and defined while analysing a text (Entman et al. 2009, p. 180). 
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For Matthes and Kohring (2004), the deductive approach is useful. First, the researchers 
deduce frames from the literature and, second, code frames using a content analysis (Matthes 
and Kohring 2004, p. 60). Matthes and Kohring (2004) say that it is necessary for this ap-
proach that all previously defined frames can be related to the research topic – so that the 
frames are generic (p. 60). The advantages of this approach are that objectivity as well as 
that reliability are ensured; however, as a disadvantage, Matthes and Kohring (2004) state 
that only frames that have already been defined can be examined (p. 60). 
The manual-clustering approach is a standard quantitative content analysis with variables 
that are subsequently factored and cluster-analysed, which means that there are frames in 
variables or elements that are clustered in frames (Entman et al. 2009, pp. 180 f.). 
The computer-assisted approach neither investigates frames holistic nor single frames or 
variables, but examines specific vocabularies and word families in the text, such as “charity”, 
“charities”, “charitable” and so on, with the help of a computer (Entman et al. 2009, p. 181). 
Matthes and Kohring (2004) call this approach frame-mapping. The authors extend the com-
puter-assisted approach taken by Entman (2004) by not only looking a special word groups 
identified by using computer-based algorithms but say that this quantitative type of exami-
nation also uses computers to extract text material that examines the word diction (Matthes 
and Kohring 2004, p. 59). For Matthes and Kohring (2004), this approach is the only objec-
tive one because human opinion or interpretation cannot influence it (p. 59). Nevertheless, 
this approach might not be able to establish a connection between different words to identify 
a central organising idea, as Tankard et al. (1991) demands from a media frame (see Chapter 
2.1). Moreover, this method might not be able to identify words with transposed letters. 
Another approach is the text academic one. It identifies frames based on the selection, place-
ment and structuring of words and phrases (Matthes and Kohring 2004, p. 57). The ad-
vantage of this approach is that news text can be systematically and empirically analysed as 
well as dismembered; the disadvantage is that this method is very time-consuming and that 
it is not clear which words or phrases represent a frame and that makes it quite a subjective 
approach (Matthes and Kohring 2004, p. 58). 
The interpretative-quantifying approach starts with an inductive selection of frames and goes 
on with a content analysis in which these frames are coded and quantified (Matthes and 
Kohring 2004, p. 58). As a disadvantage of this kind of framing, Matthes and Kohring (2004) 
say that these frames are not explicit and that the criteria for identifying these frames is not 
clear (pp. 58 f.). The authors argue that this approach results in “Forscher Frames [scientist 
frames]”, not in media frames (Matthes and Kohring 2004, p. 59). In addition, Matthes and 
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Kohring (2004) state that the inductive selection of frames at the beginning of such a framing 
approach results in expectations about the appearance of frames and could make researchers 
blind to new frames in the media content (p. 59). 
These framing approaches show that there are four dimensions that must be differentiated: 
1. Inductive versus deductive 
Frames can either be defined while analysing a text (inductive) or researchers deduce 
frames from the literature/theory (deductive). 
2. Complete frames versus frame elements 
Frames can be either information maps (complete frames) or structured words and 
phrases (frame elements). 
3. Qualitative versus quantitative 
Frames can either be identified using an interpretative account of media texts (qualita-
tive) or are factor and cluster-analysed (quantitative). 
4. Manual versus computer-assisted 
Frames can be examined manually with a standard quantitative content analysis or with 
a computer that examines specific vocabularies and word families in the text. 
For this research on German and Australian climate change coverage, a manual deductive-
quantitative approach identifying frame elements is used. Therefore, this research takes the 
definition of communication scientist Robert Entman (1993) as a starting point for its meth-
odology. For Entman (1993), 
“[to] frame is to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient 
in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, 
causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation” (p. 52). 
Thus, for Entman (1993) a frame could consist of four different aspects that include naming 
an issue, defining the responsibility for this issue, giving this issue a moral aspect and calling 
for action. Lately, Matthes (2014) discussed Entman’s (1993) definition and carefully dis-
tinguished between the four characteristics of a frame. He explained that “problem defini-
tion” is a definition of a thematic section, either with a positive or a negative connotation, 
its actors and it emphases relevant information; “causal interpretation” refers to the respon-
sibility of an actor; the “treatment recommendation” defines a solution as well as a call for 
2 Theory: Framing 31 
action; and the “moral evaluation” is a moral/evaluative classification of the basic issue 
(Matthes 2014, pp. 11f.). 
Besides Entman’s (1993) definition, there are also other explanations of framing (see, for 
example, Reese 2001, De Vreese 2005, McCombs 2005). Reese (2001) characterises frames 
as “…organising principles that are socially shared and persistent over time, that work sym-
bolically to meaningfully structure the social world” (p. 11). Reese (2001) further explains 
that the word “organising” stands for the activity in generating meaning (p. 12), the term 
“principle” refers to the abstract quality of frames (p. 14), “shared” decides whether a frame 
is a useful and noteworthy organised device (p. 15), “persistent” means persistent over time 
and instances (p. 15), “symbolic” explains how frames are manifested and communicated in 
their various forms (p. 16), and “structure” says that frames impose a pattern of the social 
world (p. 17). 
Reese (2001) asks “what power relationships and institutional arrangement support certain 
routine and persistent ways of making sense to the social world” (p. 19) and, thus, show that 
“…frames are connected to asymmetric interests” and for framing one needs “…access to 
resources, a store of knowledge, and strategic alliances” (p. 19). So, for Reese (2001) frames 
are always a result of external influence by powerful elites, rules and dominant ideologies. 
He shares this concept with De Vreese (2005), who explains that “frames are parts of polit-
ical arguments, journalistic norms, and social movements’ discourse. There are alternative 
ways of defining issues, endogenous to the political and social world” (p. 53). 
McCombs (2005) says that “a frame is an attribute of the object under consideration because 
it describes the object” (p. 546). For him, the term attribute in terms of framing is, however, 
specially defined: a frame is the predominant attribute in a message (McCombs 2005, 
p. 546). 
Entman’s (1993) definition of framing is the most suitable because it concentrates on the 
connotation and effects of an issue. Because climate change is a matter of interpretation and 
viewpoints about causes and effects, Entman’s four frame dimensions offer a very useful 
way to structure this topic. In addition, this definition is pervasive and, thus, supports the 
claim to integrate different scientific disciplins (Matthes and Kohring 2014, p. 62). 
Based on Entman’s (1993) four frame dimensions “problem definition”, “causal interpreta-
tion”, “moral evaluation”, and “treatment recommendation”, this research, first, collects 
frame sub-dimensions from the literature (see Chapter 2.4) and, second, extends the list 
while coding a sample of climate change articles from Germany and Australia. With the 
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resulting list of frame sub-dimensions, the defined articles are coded in the context of an 
election as well as an environmental disaster. 
2.3. Framing climate change 
This chapter examines media frames about climate change based on the literature. Because 
there is little literature on this issue in Germany and Australia, this chapter also examines it 
at an international level. With this literature review, this chapter has not only the goal to 
provide an overview of the current stage of research on framing climate change in the media, 
but also records climate change frames from previous research as a starting point for this 
study. 
For Germany, the only study during the period of analysis of this research was conducted by 
Arlt and Wolling (2012). They provide a content analysis of the “Press Coverage of the 
Copenhagen Climate Change Conference”. For the authors, these annual climate change 
conferences offer a way to put climate change – a topic which is usually below the attention 
threshold – back on the media agenda and, thus, also back on the agenda of political actors 
(Arlt and Wolling 2012, p. 286). According to Arlt and Wolling (2012), one major task of 
the media coverage during the climate change conferences is that the media transparently 
discusses four aspects of climate controversy. These are “anthropogenic climate change”, 
the “responsibility for the causes of climate change”, the “expecting effects of climate 
change” and the “efficiency of measures (adopted) to tackle the causes and effects of climate 
change” (pp. 287 f.). 
Concerning the “responsibility for the causes of climate change”, Arlt and Wolling (2012) 
define two viewpoints: on the one hand, there is the historic perspective which blames in-
dustrial countries and, on the other hand, there is the perspective which blames the populous 
emerging countries which produce high levels of emissions, such as China, India and Brazil 
(p. 288). Expected results differ from country to country in terms of an increase in average 
temperatures with different consequences – ranging from life-threatening to profitable (Arlt 
and Wolling 2012, p. 288). 
Concerning the “efficiency of measures (adopted) to tackle the causes and effects of climate 
change”, there are two major strategies: mitigation, i. e. measures designed to reduce green-
house gas emissions, and adaptation, such as the protection of coastlines as well as the con-
version of forestry by planting trees which are better able to thrive in the new climate con-
ditions (Arlt and Wolling 2012, p. 288). Based on these definitions of climate controversy, 
Arlt and Wolling (2012) have two research questions: 1. Does the media use the climate 
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change conference as a means to put climate change on the agenda? And, 2., how does the 
media represent the causes and expected results of climate change as well as the efficiency 
of measures used to tackle the causes and results of climate change? (p. 288). 
The authors make a quantitative content analysis of the 15th United Nations Climate Change 
Conference in Copenhagen, reviewing the national quality daily newspapers Süddeutsche 
Zeitung and Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung as well as the three weekly news magazines 
Der Spiegel, Focus, and Zeit (Arlt and Wolling 2012, p. 289). The findings of these news-
papers and magazines are set in contrast to two regional daily newspapers from Thuringia: 
Freie Wort, which is part of Süddeutsche Verlag, and Thüringer Allgemeine, which is part 
of WAZ Group (Arlt and Wolling 2012, p. 289). The research period was between 16 No-
vember and 31 December 2009 – i. e. three weeks before the climate conference started, at 
the time when the climate change conference took place and about two weeks after the cli-
mate conference (Arlt and Wolling 2012, p. 289). All the articles used for this research refer 
to the United Nations Climate Change Conference at least once, which resulted in 600 arti-
cles (Arlt and Wolling 2012, p. 290). Arlt and Wolling (2012) decided that all articles of the 
regional daily newspapers and the weekly news magazines should be coded as well as every 
second article in the national daily newspapers (p. 290). Finally, 394 articles were used as 
the basis for Arlt’s and Wolling’s (2012) research, and these were coded by 21 trained stu-
dents (p. 209). 
Arlt and Wolling’s (2012) results show that the print media not only documented the climate 
change conference, but also the topic of climate change, in general: in 51 per cent of the 
coverage this was the case, while in more than half of all articles the causes of climate change 
were referred to, mainly in the weekly news magazines (p. 291). Non-anthropogenic climate 
change and, thus, the “uncertainty discourse” was rarely mentioned; it appeared mainly in 
the weekly news magazines (Arlt and Wolling 2012, p. 291). Seen as responsible for climate 
change are mainly industrial countries, followed by emerging and developing countries; con-
sequently, the historic perspective dominates (p. 292). As expected results of climate change, 
negative consequences dominate (in more than 50 per cent of all the articles analysed). The 
weekly news magazines in particular report intensively on negative results with differing 
coverage (Arlt and Wolling 2012, p. 292). 
The measure to “tackle the causes and effects of climate change” mainly examines preven-
tion and mitigation at an international level, with a focus on abstract political measures, such 
as the definition of an emission limit and a climate change policy (Arlt and Wolling 2012, 
p. 293). It was mainly daily newspapers that reported on such preventative measures (Arlt 
and Wolling 2012, p. 293). 
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To understand the climate controversy, Arlt and Wolling (2012) also examined which actors 
were part of this controversy and discover that they mainly come from governments; scien-
tists and economic actors only play a minor role in the basic coverage (p. 294). 
Summarising Arlt and Wolling’s results (2012), their examination shows that the media in-
form their readers substantially about the reasons, causes and results of climate change; there 
is no “uncertainty discourse” which could encourage political actors to demand or take 
measures against climate change mitigation (p. 295). In addition, there are few references to 
adaptive measures which could support global disengagement in terms of climate change 
(Arlt and Wolling 2012, p. 295). Moreover, the coverage was differentiated without ques-
tioning the fact that climate change is anthropogenic (Arlt and Wolling 2012, p. 295). They 
also say that, due to the homogenous coverage of climate change in Germany, the country’s 
political actors were able to speak openly about their climate change position (Arlt and 
Wolling 2012, p. 295). As a negative aspect, Arlt and Wolling (2012) say that the coverage 
does not address concrete measures for tackling climate change (p. 295). Actors which ap-
pear are the government, scientists and economic actors. 
Arlt’s and Wolling’s (2012) content analysis provides a good overview of the state of the 
German climate change discussion. However, their results just refer to the context of a cli-
mate change conference and, thus, concentrate on an exceptional situation in which climate 
change is supposed to be a major topic in the media. In addition, Arlt and Wolling (2012) 
just look at single frame elements and do not determine frames. 
One study about Australia was done by McGaurr et al. (2013). In their work they analysed 
risk, uncertainty and opportunity in climate change coverage. The authors investigated the 
newspaper climate science coverage in six countries from 2007 to 2012 (McGaurr et al. 
2013, p. 22). In their comparative study, they looked at four predefined frames which are 
“uncertainty”, “explicit risk”, “disaster/implicit risk” and “opportunity” (McGaurr et al. 
2013, p. 23). 
The international sample which was analysed by McGaurr et al. (2013) comprised around 
350 articles from three newspapers in each of six countries (Australia, France, India, Nor-
way, the UK and the US) – normally one right-leaning, one left-leaning and one tabloid or 
business paper; in the Australian study this included The Australian/Weekend Australian, 
Herald Sun/Sunday Herald Sun (Melbourne) – a tabloid – and The Sydney Morning Her-
ald/Sun-Herald, including the Sunday editions of the newspapers (pp. 23 f.). 
For their content analysis, McGaurr et al. (2013) used the search engine Newsbank, using 
different indicators for defined frames. Indicators of the “uncertainty” frame included ranges 
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of projections, the presence of sceptical voices or conflicting experts as well as words such 
as “may”, “possible” or “uncertain” in the coverage; the “disaster/implicit risk” frame in-
cluded issues such as sea-level rise, more floods, water or food shortages, and population 
displacement, “explicit risk” refers to articles in which the word “risk” was used, where the 
odds, probabilities or chance of something adverse happening are given or where every day 
concepts or language relating to insurance, betting or the precautionary principle are men-
tioned; the “opportunity” frame included two types of opportunities: those accruing from 
doing something to reduce the risks from greenhouse gas emissions (the advantages of any 
move to a low-carbon economy) and those accruing from climate change (such as longer 
growing seasons in the northern hemisphere, or the prospects of new shipping routes and the 
possibility of mineral, gas and oil exploration in the Arctic) (McGaurr et al. 2013, p. 24). 
The different climate change stories McGaurr et al. (2013) examined are the media’s report-
ing of the IPCC’s first two reports in 2007, which include a huge amount of coverage around 
the world, as well as initial coverage in November 2011 of the IPCC’s special report on 
extreme weather and coverage of the report’s official release in March 2012; both are sig-
nificant due to the explicit inclusion of risk, and the authors look at the reporting of the 
decline in Arctic sea ice in the past two to three years (p. 24). 
The Australian results for the coverage of all IPCC reports show that the “uncertainty” frame 
was present in 89 per cent of all articles, in a large proportion in the articles about the IPCC’s 
special report on extreme weather and in 24 per cent of all articles with a dominant tone 
(McGaurr et al. 2013, p. 27). The “disaster/implicit risk” frame was mainly present (96 per 
cent) (McGaurr et al. 2013, p. 27). The “explicit risk” frame was present in 50 per cent of 
the articles – the word “risk” was used frequently (61 times in the 46 articles), while the 
“opportunity” frame was almost absent (McGaurr et al. 2013, p. 28). 
McGaurr et al. (2013) stated: “The sample size is relatively small …” (p. 30). Nevertheless, 
there are some noticeable findings about the way climate change news is covered in Australia 
in their research. For example, there was a high occurrence of the “uncertainty frame”, which 
signifies that Australia’s news media provides space for the climate-change-sceptical posi-
tion. On the other hand , there were a large number of “disaster/implicit risk” and “explicit 
risk” frames, which refer to the consequences of climate change – most of them life-threat-
ening, such as floods, water and food shortages. Discussions about whether climate change 
is happening, in general, on the one hand, and the representation of life-threatening conse-
quences of climate change, on the other, reflect opposing views in the Australian press. Ac-
tors of climate change coverage were not identified. 
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As already stated in the introduction of this chapter, the literature on content or frame anal-
yses of climate change coverage in quality newspapers is relatively scarce in Germany and 
Australia. To identify a broader number of frames for this research, the rest of this chapter 
is about research in other countries. 
In her research “Climate of scepticism: US newspaper coverage of the science of climate 
change”, Antilla (2005) examines the breadth and sourcing of US newspaper coverage re-
lating to climate change and conducts an analysis of the framing of press reports (p. 339). 
To classify her research, Antilla (2005) explains that “…the US federal government is repu-
diating the challenge of anthropogenic climate change… [and] powerful forces within soci-
ety combine to distract both the US public and policy makers from this reality” (p. 383). 
The primary source for Antilla’s (2005) frame analysis was the online database News-Li-
brary.com, with its data collection of 251 US national, regional and community newspapers 
and, in addition, four newspapers that were not included in NewsLibrary.com: the New York 
Times, the Los Angeles Times, the Chicago Tribune, and USA Today (pp. 340 f.). So, 255 
newspapers from 43 states and the District of Columbia are the basis for Antilla’s (2005) 
research on climate science coverage; the research took place from 1 March 2003 to 29 Feb-
ruary 2004 (p. 241). 
All 251 newspapers in the NewsLibrary.com database as well as the electronic versions of 
the New York Times, the Los Angeles Times, the Chicago Tribune, and USA Today were 
browsed using the search terms “climate” and “change” or “global” and “warming”; political 
stories, commentaries, editorials, interviews, book reviews, and letters to editors were ex-
cluded as well as duplicates (Antilla 2005, p. 341). This resulted in 544 climate science ar-
ticles of which 246 are unique articles and 298 (55 per cent) are articles that were published 
in 93 newspapers introducing 32 scientific studies (Antilla 2005, p. 341). Antilla (2005) then 
does a frame analysis that compares themes and frames within the press with the scientific 
texts (p. 341). Therefore, “…using the database LexisNexis, I gathered all wire and syndi-
cated news service articles relating to the 32 scientific studies” (Antilla 2005, p. 341). 
The issues which received the widest degree of newspaper coverage of climate science were 
“2003 was third-hottest year on record” (42 articles), “soot is a factor in global warming” 
(34 articles), and “warming effects on ski resorts” (29 articles) (Antilla 2005, p. 341). Alto-
gether, Antilla (2005) found six broad categories related to climate change and global warm-
ing: “effects predicted”, “effects documented”, “anthropogenic causation”, “causation unre-
lated to CO2 or methane (CH4)”, “clean energy or mitigation”, and “adaptation” (p. 341). 
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For Antilla (2005), these categories stand for four discernible frames which are “valid sci-
ence”, which is the predominant frame in her research, “ambiguous cause or effects (indi-
cating a degree of disregard for the gravity of climate change)”, “uncertain science” and 
“controversial science” (p. 344). The “valid science” frame does not discuss scepticism of 
the research or of climate change, the “ambiguous cause or effects” frame de-emphasises 
scientific findings and – in sardonic articles – the effects of climate change are obscured 
(Antilla 2005, pp. 344 f.). The “uncertain science frame” was referred to, despite the fact 
that the scientific study reported contained no such references, while the “controversial sci-
ence” frame referred to the issue of balanced reporting and included, for example, rhetoric 
from climate sceptics with known fossil fuel industry ties (Antilla 2005, pp. 346 f.). 
As a result of her study, Antilla (2005) made clear that the science of climate change did not 
appear to be a prime news topic in most of the 255 newspapers (p. 350). In addition, she 
discovered that there were a variety of articles that framed climate change/global warming 
in terms of debate, controversy, or uncertainty and that her research, thus, shows that there 
are many examples of journalistic balance that led to bias, giving climate sceptics a word, 
and spreading misinformation via wire or news service providers (Antilla 2005, p. 350). 
With her research, Antilla (2005), thus, demonstrate that controversial discussions about cli-
mate change are also an issue in the US media. Actors of climate change coverage were also 
not identified. 
Good (2008) investigated “The Framing of Climate Change in Canadian, American, and 
International Newspapers: A Media Propaganda Model Analysis” using Herman and Chom-
sky’s propaganda model as a theoretical framework (p. 239). She examined the 40 major 
newspapers of the United States according to Lexis Nexis, the 15 major newspapers in Can-
ada based on the Canadian Newspaper Association, and 70 major international English lan-
guage newspapers according to Benn’s World Media Directory (Good 2008, pp. 239 f.). All 
newspapers were analysed in 2007 because it was “…a turning-point year in which there 
was a general growth in concern about the climate…” (Good 2008, p. 240). Good (2008) 
uses a number of keywords and keyword combinations, such as “climate change”, “global 
warming”, “greenhouse effect” to identify frequency and terminology, “climate change” and 
“science”, “global warming” and “science”, “climate change” and “Kyoto”, “global warm-
ing” and “Kyoto”, “climate change” and “politics”, and so on (pp. 241 ff.). 
Good’s (2008) first finding was that Canadian newspapers included the words “climate 
change” and “global warming” much more often in total and per paper (average of 2,650 
newspapers/177 times per paper) than American newspapers (average of 2,019 newspa-
pers/50 times per paper) and international newspapers (average of 5,102 articles/73 times 
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per paper) (pp. 240 f.). The findings also show that, in the United States, the terms “global 
warming” and “climate change” are used interchangeable (Good 2008, p. 241). 
The second keyword search made by Good (2008) examined “social context frames” and 
identified the fact that in all countries “climate change” and “global warming” are highly 
connected with “science” (Canada: 19 per cent, United States: 25 per cent, international: 
19 per cent of all climate change/global warming stories) (p. 243). So, the dominant role of 
science in the context of climate change/global warming is accepted. The Kyoto Protocol 
only plays a minor role in US-American newspapers (3 per cent, Canada: 12 per cent, Inter-
national: 8 per cent) and “the keywords related to politics and economics were distributed 
quite evenly…” in all countries (Good 2008, p. 243). 
Coming to “causes of climate change”, the third keyword search, Good (2008) detected that 
“greenhouse gases” are most often referred to and again mostly in US-American newspapers 
(21 per cent, Canada: 16 per cent, International: 15 per cent), “car”/”vehicle”/”automobile” 
frames were used likewise in all countries (Canada: 6 per cent, United States: 9 per cent, 
international: 6 per cent) as well as the “fossil fuels” frame (Canada: 3 per cent, United 
States: 3 per cent, international: 2 per cent) (p. 244). 
The fourth keyword search is important for this research. It refers to the consequences of 
climate change, but the percentages show that topics such as extreme weather (Canada: 2 per 
cent, United States: 0 per cent, international: 1 per cent), floods (Canada: 2 per cent, United 
States: 3 per cent, international: 4 per cent), forest fires (Canada: 0 per cent, United States: 
3 per cent, international: 2 per cent), and hurricane/storm (Canada: 3 per cent, United States: 
5 per cent, international: 3 per cent) appeared not to be of relevance for the newspapers 
examined (Good 2008, p. 245). Good (2008) criticises this behaviour of the newspapers, 
concluding that these aspects of climate change are ignored for economic reasons (p. 246). 
This is supported by the keywords related to looking for solutions: “energy conservation” 
(Canada: 0 per cent, United States: 1 per cent, international: 0 per cent), “alternative energy” 
(Canada: 0 per cent, United States: 1 per cent, international: 0 per cent) and “renewable 
energy” (Canada: 1 per cent, United States: 2 per cent, international: 2 per cent) are not 
widely mentioned in the newspaper articles that were analysed (Good 2008, p. 246). And 
she asked: is the central message of the media “… that it is hugely difficult for the story of 
climate change to be framed as one of oil reduction solutions?” (Good 2008, p. 246). 
For Good (2008), one major result of her research is that “when the frames move into more 
potentially threatening territory…, such as the linking…with extreme weather or decreas-
ing/different energy use, the story frequency plummets” (p. 248). The examination carried 
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out by Good (2008) also documents the fact that even in a year which is identified as a 
turning-point year in terms of concerns about the climate, political and economic aspects 
dominate coverage of the issue of climate change by focusing on more “true-to-life prob-
lems”, such as economic growth (p. 248). 
Good’s (2008) research offers new insight in terms of the causes and consequences of cli-
mate change. It shows that “greenhouse gases” are evaluated as the main cause of climate 
change and that the predominant consequence is “extreme weather”. Due to the fact that 
Good (2008) only examined English-language newspapers in her content analysis (p. 249), 
her results might also be reflected in the Australian newspapers, which are examined in this 
research. Actors of climate change coverage were not coded by Good (2008). 
In the article “Global warming – global responsibility? Media frames of collective action 
and scientific certainty”, Olausson (2009) used Entman’s (1993) definition as a basis for her 
research when examining the representation of climate change in the Swedish press (p. 423). 
As a method, she adopted critical discourse analysis “…because of its constructionist, socio-
cognitive, and critical epistemological pillars that harmonise well with the framing the-
ory …”  (Olausson 2009, p. 424). 
Olausson’s (2009) research questions were 1. Which themes and topics are given promi-
nence in the article as a whole and in each paragraph? In this context, she pays special atten-
tion to the headlines and introductions where the overarching theme of the article is ex-
pressed (p. 424). 2. Which categories are given prominence in the article (p. 425)? In this 
context, Olausson (2009) also examined local coherence, implicit information, redundant 
information, choice of quotations, choice of words and rhetoric (p. 425). 
For her research, she chose three newspapers, each with a different character: Dagens Ny-
heter, a national daily broadsheet; Aftonbladet, a national daily tabloid; and the local news-
paper Nerikes Allehanda – all three newspapers have a wide circulation (Olausson 2009, 
p. 425). Her selection consisted of news articles only, and she did not include editorials, 
columns, or commentaries because she saw these as “argumentative items” (Olausson 2009, 
p. 425). As for databases, Olausson (2009) used Mediearkivet and Presstext, looking for the 
search terms “climate change”, “greenhouse effect” and “global warming” (p. 425). In this 
way, she generated a corpus of 334 articles, while 193 were excluded because they were in 
the aforementioned argumentative categories (Olausson 2009, p. 425). Consequently, the 
three major frames she found were based on 141 news items published over a period of 12 
months (1 September 2004 to 6 September 2005) (Olausson 2009, p. 425). 
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Olausson (2009) wrote that her findings “…display the discursive construction of global 
climate change as a social problem” (p. 425). So, here results show that the “collective action 
frame of mitigation” dominates the reporting on climate change which “…reflects the policy 
agenda, where mitigation of global warming has figured for a much longer period of time 
than has adaptation to its effects…” (p. 426). This frame of mitigation strongly refers to 
international political events, for example G8 summits, the Kyoto treaty, emission policies 
and so on: mitigation is framed as a transnational concern (Olausson 2009, p. 426). The 
responsibility for mitigating global warming is, however, attached to the institutions of the 
industrialised countries only (Olausson 2009, p. 426). In contrast to this frame, the “collec-
tive action frame of adaptation” refers to recent dramatic weather situations (Olausson 2009, 
p. 426). 
The “frame of certainty” assumes that human-induced global warming is a direct cause of 
climate change, resulting in dramatic consequences which are already evident (Olausson 
2009, p. 429). For Olausson (2009), this result shows that by constructing global warming 
as a significant issue, there is no room for scientific uncertainties or disputes about the ex-
istence of climate change (p. 430). 
Olausson (2009) argued that her analysis demonstrates numerous similarities between media 
and international policy discourse on climate change; however, there was no connection vis-
ible between the “collective action frame of adaptation”, i. e. action to adapt society to cli-
mate change, and the “collective action frame of mitigation”, i. e. action aiming to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions, in the newspapers that she analysed (p. 432). “The two frames 
exist parallel to each other, in different contexts, hardly ever appearing in the same news 
items, regardless of the fact that they constitute two sides of the same coin…” (Olausson 
2009, p. 432). Thus, for Olausson (2009), one noticeable finding is that there was no con-
nection in the news coverage between the frames of mitigation and adaptation as well as 
regarding the distribution of responsibility for collective action (p. 432). The “frame of cer-
tainty” strengthens the two frames of collective action and comes to terms with climate 
change, which is a key difference between coverage in the Swedish press and studies of other 
European media (Olausson 2009, p. 433). Olausson (2009) concluded with the discovery 
that the tight relationship between political elites, and therefore policymakers, and the media 
does not offer alternative frames or revolutionary insights into the context of global climate 
change (p. 433). 
In her research, Olausson (2009) makes it clear that the main responsibility for tackling cli-
mate change/global warming is delegated to a group of industrialised countries. This result 
conveys the suggestion that each country can discharge responsibility on a national basis, 
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referring to the role of international institutions. Another conclusion is that there is no con-
nection between the action taken by people in society to tackle climate change and actions 
designed to reduce greenhouse gas emissions due to a tight relationship between the political 
elite and the media. This is critical, because it relieves people from the responsibility of 
reducing their personal carbon footprint. An additional finding is that the news media in all 
the countries examined view it as a fact that human-induced global warming is a direct cause 
of climate change; there is no room for scientific uncertainties or disputes about the existence 
of climate change. 
Nevertheless, Olausson (2009) left out editorials, columns, and commentaries, which repre-
sented about 58 per cent of all the articles she found (193 out of 334 articles were excluded). 
Such commentaries might contain critical statements regarding the existence and/or the 
causes of climate change, or even climate-change-sceptical positions. In addition, her meth-
odology was qualitative (based on the researcher’s interpretation). Her results, moreover, 
included only basic aspects of Entman’s (1993) definition of framing. So, Olausson (2009) 
combined “treatment recommendation” with responsibility, introducing “The collective ac-
tion frame of mitigation as a transnational responsibility” (p. 426) and the “The collective 
action frame of adaptation as a national and local responsibility” (p. 428). She also combined 
“problem definition” with consequences, i. e. “The frame of certainty” which claims that 
“…human-induced global warming is a direct cause of climate change, bringing with it dra-
matic consequences already at hand” (p. 429). Entman’s (1993) “moral evaluation” is not 
represented in Olausson’s (2009) study. Actors of climate change coverage were not identi-
fied. 
Shehata and Hopmann (2012) also reviewed the Swedish and the US press to get insight into 
how agenda and frame-building processes work in mediated democracies (p. 176). This was 
interesting to the authors because there is an essential difference between the two countries: 
“While a broad political consensus among government and opposition parties has character-
ised Swedish climate change debate for a long time, this has not been the case in the United 
States” (Shehata and Hopmann 2012, p. 176). 
Shehata and Hopmann (2012), therefore, investigated to what extent such political differ-
ences were reflected in the climate change coverage of two Swedish elite quality national 
newspapers – Dagens Nyheter and Svenska Dagbladet – and two American elite quality 
national newspapers – New York Times and Washington Post (p. 176). Shehata and Hopmann 
(2012) used a content analysis of climate change coverage over a 10-year period between 
January 1998 and December 2007 (p. 184) for their examination, as well as an intensive 
content analysis of the Kyoto (1997) and Bali (2007) summits on climate change (p. 176). 
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Most important for these authors was the investigation of resource use and the presence of 
several issue-specific frames related to the debate on global warming (Shehata and Hopmann 
2012, p. 176). Using Entman’s (1993) definition of framing (pp. 178 f.), Shehata and Hop-
mann (2012) addressed two research questions: 1. to what extent is climate change coverage 
linked to activities taking place within domestic political institutions? And 2. to what extent 
is the climate change frame challenged in news coverage?, defining the following hypothe-
ses: 
Hypothesis 1: News coverage of climate change is linked to activities taking place within 
domestic political institutions. 
Hypothesis 2: News coverage of climate change is dominated by domestic official sources. 
Hypothesis 3: The climate change frame is present in both American and Swedish news 
coverage. 
Hypothesis 4: Climate change counter-frames – the focus lies on the “scientific-uncertainty 
frame” and the “economic consequences frame” – are more prominent in American than in 
Swedish news coverage (p. 181). 
The extensive content analysis of the four papers related to news stories published between 
the Kyoto (December 1, 1997) and Bali (December 31, 2007) climate change summits using 
the search strings ‘‘Kyoto’’, ‘‘climate change’’ and ‘‘global warming’’ was based on Lexis 
Nexis for the American articles, while for the Swedish newspapers the databases Presstext 
and Mediearkivet were searched for ‘‘Kyoto” or “klimatför” or “växthuseffekt” or 
“växthusgas’’ (Shehata and Hopmann 2012, p. 182). Editorials, opinion pieces and stories 
only mentiond climate change in passing were therefore excluded. The result produced 934 
articles in American papers (473 from the New York Times and 461 from the Washington 
Post) and 847 articles in Swedish papers (489 stories from Dagens Nyheter and 358 from 
Svenska Dagbladet) (Shehata and Hopmann 2012, p. 182). 
In order to investigate the general focus of American and Swedish climate change coverage, 
each article was first coded according to its triggering event to identify the extent to which 
news coverage was driven by or connected to activities or events taking place in domestic 
political institutions, at international summits, within the science community or among other 
non-governmental organisations (Shehata and Hopmann 2012, p. 182). Second, they coded 
each Kyoto and Bali climate change summit story per paragraph to capture the relative prom-
inence of various sources and frames in the news (p. 183). Sources and frames were coded 
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on a presence/absence basis for each paragraph of the news stories (Shehata and Hopmann 
2012, p. 183). 
These findings show that the senders of climate change frames are often domestic officials 
(approximately 37 per cent) in the United States – 30 per cent were directly linked to activ-
ities originating from the White House or controlled by members of Congress –, while in 
Sweden only 16.5 per cent of stories were initiated by these actors – only 8.5 per cent of the 
Swedish articles are set by the Swedish government or by members of the Riksdagen, the 
Swedish parliament (Shehata and Hopmann 2012, p. 184). Approximately 40 per cent Swe-
dish climate change coverage was framed as activities taking place abroad, but only 22.5 per 
cent of the US coverage was so framed (Shehata and Hopmann 2012, p. 184). This finding 
makes it clear that the first hypothesis is supported more clearly with respect to American 
than to Swedish news coverage (Shehata and Hopmann 2012, p. 185). 
Shehata and Hopmann’s (2012) results related to news coverage of the Kyoto and Bali sum-
mits show that 22 per cent of all paragraphs in New York Times and Washington Post about 
the Kyoto summit included statements by or quotes from officials working for the Clinton 
administration, but only about 6 per cent of the Swedish paragraphs covering this period 
include statements by or quotes from Swedish government sources; Swedish coverage relies 
mainly on sources from abroad: foreign governments (including the United States), the Eu-
ropean Union as well as United Nations and IPCC actors (p. 185). This supports the second 
hypothesis (Shehata and Hopmann 2012, p. 186). 
The third hypothesis predicted that climate change frames are present in both American and 
Swedish news coverage, which was the case: “The climate change frame is present in be-
tween 50 and 79 percent of the paragraphs” (Shehata and Hopmann 2012, p. 186). 
Shehata’s and Hopmann’s (2012) hypothesis 4 states that the two counter-frames – “scien-
tific-uncertainty frame” and “economic-consequences frame” – are more prominent in the 
American than in the Swedish newspapers which is only partially supported by the data: on 
the one hand, the total absence of the “scientific-uncertainty frame” in the United States is 
surprising due to past research on climate change coverage in the United States (p. 187). 
According to the findings of Shehata’s and Hopmann’s (2012) study, the climate change 
frame strongly dominates American news coverage of global warming and leaves no room 
for climate sceptics questioning the validity of the IPCC’s view (p. 188). On the other hand, 
the “economic consequences frame” was very prominent in American news coverage of the 
Kyoto summit (it appears in 21.1 per cent of the paragraphs), but disappeared almost com-
pletely in 2007 during the Bali summit (it was present in just 0.5 per cent of the paragraphs), 
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a phenomena which could also be seen in the Swedish newspapers (Kyoto: 7.4 per cent of 
the paragraphs to 4.3 per cent during the Bali summit) (Shehata and Hopmann 2012, p. 187). 
Shehata’s and Hopmann’s (2012) research is of value because it not only identifies frames, 
but also addresses a central research question about domestic political factors which influ-
ence how climate change is reported by national news media organisations. The results show 
that not only politics, in general, play a central role in the climate change discussion, but that 
it is the national government that is directly involved in climate change activities (US: 37 
per cent of climate change stories/30 per cent of which showed the involvement of the White 
House, Sweden: 16.5 per cent of climate change stories/8.5 per cent controlled by the Swe-
dish government). Identified actors are the national government, foreign governments as 
well as international actors, such as the EU and the IPCC. 
2.4. Classifying climate change frames 
This literature review results in a list of 11 frame sub-dimensions. In Table 1, the first column 
“Frame from the discussed literature” records the frames the authors of the reviewed litera-
ture (see third column) use in their research. The second column “Frame sub-dimensions 
from the discussed literature” contains the sub-dimensions the authors of the research iden-
tified or defined for their analysis. 
In the fourth column, all frames from the literature discussed (see first column) are set in the 
context of Entman’s (1993) definition. For example, “Climate change uncertainty”, “Frame 
of certainty”, and “climate change frame, scientific-uncertainty frame” refers – in Entman’s 
(1993) sense – to the frame element “problem definition” of the climate change issue. They 
define whether climate change is a problem or not. Identified manifestations such as those 
can be summarised in one or more sub-dimension of “problem definition”. Looking further 
at Entman’s (1993) “problem definition”, the literature examined provided the following 
elements: “Climate change is anthropogenic/is not anthropogenic”, “Ranges of projections, 
the presence of sceptical voices or duelling experts”, “Valid/uncertain/controversial science, 
ambitious cause or effects”, and “human-induced global warming is a direct cause of climate 
change, resulting in dramatic consequences”. 
Coming from different authors, these elements of a climate change problem definition seem 
a bit inconsistent. To make them more uniform, they are redefined. The result is that Ent-
man’s (1993) “problem definition” frame dimension included five frame sub-dimensions, 
i. e. “Climate change exists and is a problem” , “Climate change does not exist”, “Climate 
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change is a subject of controversial debate” , “Climate change exists, but is not a problem”, 
“Climate change is not fully examined”. 
This way, all the results from the literature are set in relation to Entman’s (1993) definition 
of framing including “problem definition”, “causal interpretation”, “moral evaluation”, 
and/or “treatment recommendation”. Because the results from the literature show that there 
are two different kinds of “causal interpretations” – one which prefers to refer to the causes, 
while the other refers to the effects of climate change – this aspect of Entman (1993) is 
divided into two: “causal interpretation (causes of climate change)” and “causal interpreta-
tion (effects of climate change)”. This differentiation is meaningful, because it differentiates 
between the origin of climate change and its consequences. The second meaningful change 
concerns Entman’s (1993) “moral evaluation”: The literature review shows that the moral 
aspect of climate change is connected with responsibility for the issue (see, for example, Arlt 
and Wolling 2012, Olausson 2009). Therefore, the term “responsibility” is more appropriate 
for the issue of climate change than Entman’s (1993) term “moral evaluation”. 
 
Table 1: Clustering of frame sub-dimensions 
Frame from 
the literature 
discussed 
Frame sub-dimension 
from the discussed  
literature  
Authors Refers to Ent-
man’s (1993) 
frame element  
Is used as the follow-
ing frame sub- 
dimension for this re-
search 
Climate change 
certainty/un-
certainty 
Climate change is anthro-
pogenic/is not anthropo-
genic 
Ranges of projections, the 
presence of sceptical 
voices or conflicting ex-
perts  
Valid/uncertain/contro-
versial science, ambitious 
cause or effects  
human-induced global 
warming is a direct cause 
of climate change, result-
ing in dramatic conse-
quences 
the climate change frame 
is present, but there is 
room for climate-change 
sceptics 
Arlt and 
Wolling 
(2012),  
McGaurr et 
al. (2013) 
Antilla (2005) 
Olausson 
(2009) 
Shehata and 
Hopmann 
(2012) 
Problem defini-
tion 
Climate change exists 
and is a problem. 
Climate change does 
not exist. 
Climate change is a 
subject of controver-
sial debate. 
Climate change exists 
but is not a problem. 
Climate change is not 
fully examined. 
46 2 Theory: Framing 
Frame from 
the literature 
discussed 
Frame sub-dimension 
from the discussed  
literature  
Authors Refers to Ent-
man’s (1993) 
frame element  
Is used as the follow-
ing frame sub- 
dimension for this re-
search 
Cause of cli-
mate change 
greenhouse gases, car/ve-
hicle/automobile, fossil 
fuels, extreme weather, 
floods, forest fires, hurri-
cane/storm 
Good (2008) Causal interpre-
tation (causes of 
climate change) 
Emission of green-
house gases 
Natural causes,  
Destruction of forests 
Disaster/ 
implicit risk, 
explicit risks 
Sea-level rise, more 
floods, water or food 
shortage, population dis-
placements 
(Betting that) something 
adverse happens, insur-
ance issues, precaution-
ary issues 
McGaurr et 
al. (2013) 
Causal interpre-
tations (effects 
of climate 
change) 
Effects on nature: 
sea-level rise 
Effects on nature: re-
sults of warming, 
such as floods, 
drought etc. 
Effects on humans: 
water/food supply 
Effects on humans: 
climate change refu-
gees/suffering of the 
poor 
economic con-
sequences 
frame 
Negative consequences 
for the economy result 
from climate change 
Olausson 
(2012) 
Causal interpre-
tations (effects 
of climate 
change) 
Effects on the econ-
omy: huge negative 
effects if we do noth-
ing, less negative ef-
fects if we combat cli-
mate change. 
Effects on the econ-
omy: economic prob-
lems including costs. 
Responsibility  Industrial countries are 
responsible (historic per-
spective), populous 
emerging countries 
(China, India, Brazil) are 
responsible 
Arlt and 
Wolling 
(2012) 
Olausson 
(2009) 
Responsibility Developed countries 
are responsible.  
Everybody is respon-
sible. 
Efficiency of 
measure to 
tackle the 
causes and ef-
fects of climate 
change, oppor-
tunity 
Mitigation, such as pre-
venting greenhouse gas 
emissions, adaptation, 
such as the protection of 
coastlines as well as the 
conservation of forestry  
Opportunities to reduces 
the risks from greenhouse 
gas emissions, 
Opportunities accruing 
from climate change 
Arlt and 
Wolling 
(2012) 
McGaurr et 
al. (2013) 
Treatment rec-
ommendation 
General reduction of 
greenhouse gases – 
national focus, 
General reduction of 
greenhouse gases – 
international focus, 
Take measures to 
mitigate the effects of 
climate change. 
Collective ac-
tion frame of 
adaptation 
Recent dramatic weather 
situations have to be 
avoided 
Olausson 
(2009) 
 Something must be 
done, in general. 
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Frame from 
the literature 
discussed 
Frame sub-dimension 
from the discussed  
literature  
Authors Refers to Ent-
man’s (1993) 
frame element  
Is used as the follow-
ing frame sub- 
dimension for this re-
search 
Solutions  energy conservation  
alternative energy 
renewable energy 
Good (2008) Treatment rec-
ommendation 
Reduction of using 
fossil fuels 
Use of renewable en-
ergy. 
Collective ac-
tion frame of 
mitigation 
reflects the policy agenda, 
refers to international po-
litical events, for example 
G8 summits, the Kyoto 
treaty, emission policies 
and so on,  
mitigation is framed as a 
transnational concern; in-
dustrialised countries are 
responsible 
Olausson 
(2009) 
Treatment rec-
ommendation 
Demand climate 
change policy – na-
tional, 
Demand climate 
change policy – inter-
national. 
Collective ac-
tion frame of 
adaptation 
recent dramatic weather 
situations must be fought 
Olausson 
(2009) 
Treatment rec-
ommendation 
Something must be 
done, in general. 
 
Table 2 provides a summary of all the sub-dimensions which were deduced for this research 
on German and Australian climate change coverage. In the first column, it lists Entman’s 
(1993) defined frame elements, extended for this research on German and Australian climate 
change coverage as explained in the previous paragraphs. And, in the second column, it 
summarises all the frame sub-dimensions developed in Table 1/fifth column to provide a 
better overview. 
 
Table 2: Results from the literature review – frame sub-dimensions for this research 
Frame elements based 
on Entman (1993)  
Frame sub-dimension for this research 
Problem definition - Climate change exists and is a problem. 
- Climate change does not exist. 
- Climate change is a subject of controversial debate. 
- Climate change exists but is not a problem. 
- Climate change is not fully examined. 
Causal interpretation 
(causes of climate 
change) 
- Natural causes 
- Destruction of forests  
- Emission of greenhouse gases 
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Frame elements based 
on Entman (1993)  
Frame sub-dimension for this research 
Causal interpretations 
(effects of climate 
change) 
- Effects on nature: sea-level rise  
- Effects on nature: results of warming, such as floods, drought etc. 
- Effects on humans: water/food supply 
- Effects on humans: climate change refugees/suffering of the poor 
- Effects on the economy: huge negative effects if we do nothing, less neg-
ative effects if we combat climate change 
- Effects on the economy: economic problems including costs 
Responsibility - Everybody is responsible  
- Developed countries are responsible  
Treatment recommen-
dation 
- Something must be done, in general  
- General reduction of greenhouse gases – national focus 
- General reduction of greenhouse gases – international focus 
- Reduction of using fossil fuels 
- Use of renewable energy  
- Demand climate change policy – national 
- Demand climate change policy – international  
- Take measures to mitigate the effects of climate change  
 
What is more, Wolling and Arlt (2012), Good (2008) and Sheheta and Hopmann (2012), 
who analysed the social context of frames, provide a list of relevant senders of climate 
change frames: national government/politicians, scientists, economists and international ac-
tors (for example, EU, IPCC). 
2.5. Summary: framing of climate change 
Chapter 2 provides an overview of framing by examining the process of framing, by looking 
at the different approaches to gathering frames, and by giving an impression of the framing 
of climate change though media coverage. All these aspects identify the methodical frame-
work for this research on German and Australian climate change coverage. 
In reference to the process of framing, this research involved Scheufele’s (1999) “frame 
building” and it examines the salience of climate change issues in German and Australian 
quality newspapers. Besides, this research considers the actors involved in climate change 
reporting. Looking at the studies in this chapter, national government/politicians, scientists, 
economists and international actors (for example, EU, IPCC) are the most considered actors 
in climate change coverage. Moreover, the role of journalists is of special interest. Articles 
which are written exclusively from journalists, i. e. those that do not include any additional 
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quotations by scientists, experts, politicians, and so on, could reveal the influence of jour-
nalists in the process of framing. However, in this research, the actors representing the iden-
tified frame sub-dimensions are coded separately from the frame sub-dimensions. 
Arlt’s and Wolling’s (2012) content analysis provided a good overview of the state of the 
German climate change discussion. When it comes to the framing of climate change in media 
coverage by quality newspapers, the central finding for Germany is that the coverage does 
not address concrete measures designed to tackle climate change, but refers to climate 
change as a problem. In addition, results just refer to the context of a climate change confer-
ence and, thus, concentrate on an exceptional situation in which climate change is likely to 
be a major topic in the media. 
For Australia, McGaurr et al. (2013) also identified the contrast between a high occurrence 
of the “uncertainty frame”, which is in strong contrast to a high number of “disaster/implicit 
risk” and “explicit risk” frames. This is an important finding. Although, the research strategy 
adopted by McGaurr et al. (2013) was only a deductive one, it is of interest for this research 
whether the “uncertainty frame” appears as often when concentrating on special events, such 
as a political change or a flood. 
Considering all articles about framing, the most important findings for this research are: 1. 
Media mostly claim that climate change exists and is a problem (see Arlt and Wolling 2012, 
Olausson 2009, Shehata and Hopmann 2012). This finding is of interest for this research 
because it shows that there is a consensus about the existence of climate change even if the 
political influence on this issue is different in the countries examined. 2. The responsibility 
for tackling climate change/global warming is delegated to the industrialised countries (see 
Arlt and Wolling 2012, Olausson 2009), and 3. Politicians play a central role in the climate 
change discussion (see Shehata and Hopmann 2012). Politicias even prevent society from 
taking action to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, because policy makers separate the action 
society needs to tackle climate change and the action required to reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions (see Olausson 2009). 
The findings in this literature review on framing result in 24 frame sub-dimensions (see Ta-
ble 13), which can be associated with Entman’s (1993) frame elements, whether it is a “prob-
lem definition”, “causal interpretation (divided into causes and effects for this research)”, 
“moral evaluation (renamed: “responsibility” for this research)” and/or a “treatment recom-
mendation”. The frame sub-dimensions which are identified through the literature review on 
framing (see Chapters 2) are extended inductively, analysing a test sample of articles. 
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As it is of major interest in the context of “frame building” , this research also lists the actors 
mentioning the climate change frame sub-dimensions. In this context, it has to be considered 
that some actors communicating climate change messages remain unknown because they are 
not mentioned in the media. One reason for this aspect might be that journalists are audiences 
of other news media and that they are creating new media content based on their own cog-
nitive processing (see, for example, Scheufele 1999, Bach et al. 2012). 
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3. Theory: The Extended Sphere Model of Bräuer and Wolling (2014) 
As the framing literature does not provide the necessary tools to explain the differences in 
the coverage, e.g. the influence of the journalists’ work in the context of climate change 
coverage, a second theoretical tool has to be introduced. Therefore, chapter 3 covers the 
relevant literature using the “Extended Sphere Model” of Bräuer and Wolling (2014) as a 
guideline.  
The “Extended Sphere Model” of Bräuer and Wolling (2014) examines the influences on 
media – in this case climate change coverage – from six perspectives. This thorough study 
of climate change coverage during the research period (years 2007-2011) gives o broad in-
sight on the media landscape, the work of journalists as well as the public opinion on climate 
change at that timeperiod and, consequently on “frame building” (Scheufele 1999) – so, as-
pects which influence the framing of journalists (Hänggli 2011, p. 1). The results of this 
broad overview on climate change related factors based on the six spheres of Bräuer and 
Wolling (2014) are used to identify hypotheses as well as sub research questions for this 
research.  
In chapter 7, research activities published after the year 2011 are introduced to provide in-
sights in the development of climate change coverage after the research period of this work. 
The results of this work on climate change coverage are also compared with the findings of 
this work. This additional view on more currents research in terms of climate change cover-
age helps to classify the results of this work and to identify recommendations for further 
research.  
For understanding the “Extended Sphere Model” of Bräuer and Wolling (2014), first, the 
underlying model of Donsbach (1987) is briefly introduced. Donsbach (1987) distinguishs 
the subject sphere, the institutional sphere, the professional sphere and the societal sphere, 
four spheres that should describe how media content is influenced (p. 112). The subject 
sphere refers to the journalist as an individuum referring to his/her values, attitude and job 
motivation; the institutional sphere looks at the media companies as the environment in 
which the journalist has to act; the professional sphere is about the journalist as part of a 
social group, so the profession “journalist”, and examines, for example, ethical issues, edu-
cation and information procurement; and the societal sphere include aspects which refers, 
for example, to political or legal parameters (Donsbach 1987, pp. 111 ff.). 
In this work, the subject sphere addresses individual key issues of a journalists, such as po-
litical attitudes, topic selection and topic design (news bias, instrumental actualisation). The 
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institutional sphere is about influences within a media organisation, such as organisational 
structure, ownership and editorial goals. The professional sphere pays attentional to journal-
istic routines, such as different prioritisation of news values and quality indicators. And the 
societal sphere refers to cultural values as well as institutional parameters of the political and 
media system, such as the press law. 
Bräuer and Wolling (2014) expanded Donsbach’s “Four Sphere Model” by adding the “Pub-
lic sphere” [Öffentlichkeitsphäre] and the “Sphere of structural conditions” [Sphäre der ma-
teriellen Rahmenbedingungen], which are important spheres for this research. 
The “Public sphere” is concerned with public opinion on a topic as well as with strategic 
communication activities (Bräuer and Wolling 2014, p. 241). It is a significant sphere for 
this research because this research analyses the role of climate change before and after an 
election campaign and, thus, the strategic political information the public is confronted with. 
Thus, aspects such as the influence of political communication on the public in the context 
of climate change as well as whether climate change is taken up as an issue within an election 
campaign are part of this sphere. The “Sphere of structural conditions” refers among other 
things to natural conditions and current events which influence media coverage (Bräuer and 
Wolling 2014, p. 241). Because this research examines and compares the coverage before 
and after an environmental disaster as well as before and after an election, this sphere is a 
major foundation for this analysis. It clarifies whether there is a connection between an en-
vironmental disaster and climate change as well as between an election and climate change 
in the media. The six spheres of Bäuer and Wolling’s (2014) “Extended Sphere Model” are 
explained in the context of climate change coverage reviewed in this research in Figure 2. 
Using these six spheres and their definitions, the first part of this chapter introduces studies 
related to climate change coverage in Germany and Australia from 2007 to 2011. This review 
is mainly descriptive and does not attempt to explain differences and similarities in climate 
change coverage. It does, however, identify the different approaches to climate change cov-
erage in the two countries. Therefore, the structure of this chapter is not organised around 
the six spheres, but introduce different theme groups, for example, political issues in terms 
of climate change or journalistic practices which are then – when summarizing the topic – 
referred to one of the six spheres of Bräuer and Wolling (2014). 
The second part of this chapter studies external influences on journalistic work. This includes 
rules such as news values, “…which provide yardsticks of newsworthiness and constitute an 
audience-oriented routine” (Shoemaker and Reese 1996, p. 106), as well as regulations re-
lating to the interests of media owners, who “…intervene to keep content within appropriate 
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bounds, and they can override normal professionalism and routines” (Shoemaker and Reese 
1996, p. 250). Other factors of influence, which are not part of the newsroom, are, for exam-
ple, political actors, the public and lobby groups. The influence of politicians and lobby 
groups on the climate change debate is examined in detail. The chapter also briefly reviews 
public opinion about climate change; briefly, because this research does not examine the 
opinion of those affected by climate change. Finally, this second part examines environmen-
tal influences such as energy supply, natural resources and the climate conditions of Ger-
many and Australia to get an impression of the relationship between the environment and 
the economy as well as the current state of climate challenges. 
 
 
Figure 2:  Independent variables influencing climate coverage in Germany and Australia 
Source: Bräuer and Wolling 2014, own explanations 
The third part of this chapter examines how journalists’ work is influenced from inside the 
media company. So, it introduces aspects that are imposed by media owners and companies 
on the work in their newsrooms. 
At the heart of climate change coverage, there is the journalist with his/her professional 
practice. The fourth part of this chapter, therefore, takes a closer look at the journalistic pro-
fession in Germany and Australia. Shoemaker and Reese (1996) call this professional prac-
tice “routines” (p. 15) and say that “…these include such things as gatekeeping, the beat 
system, balancing sides in issue stories, and reliance on authoritative sources” (p. 15). It ex-
amines the journalists’ attitude to work in both countries and the socialisation of journalists.  
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The fifth part of this chapter introduces the four newspapers used in this investigation, look-
ing at their ownership, their political position and their coverage. 
With this broad survey on the different influencing factors on climate change coverage in 
Germany and Australia, the “Six Sphere Model” of Bräuer and Wolling (2014) is used, on 
the one hand, to identify hypotheses as well as sub research questions and, one the other 
hand, to contextualize the framing research explained in the last chapter. To understand how 
the “Six Sphere Model” works together with framing, Figure 3 explains the connection be-
tween the two theoretical approaches:  
In the centre of climate change coverage are the journalists who write the articles. The jour-
nalists get aware of the issue – in this case, the issue of climate change in the context of an 
environmental disaster or an election. While writing the article about the issue, the journalist 
is influenced by factors from the six spheres. For example, the institutional sphere predeter-
mines the political orientation of the article. So, the six spheres affect the focus of an articles 
and, thus, also how climate change is framed. 
 
 
Figure 3:  How the “Six Sphere Model” of Bräuer and Wolling (2014) and framing 
interacts 
Source: own figure 
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3.1. German and Australian climate change coverage from 2007 to 2011 
The starting point for this research, 2007, was the year in which “Klimakatastrophe [climate 
catastrophe]” became the word of the year in Germany (GfdS 2016). It was the year in which 
Al Gore – together with Davis Guggenheim – was awarded an Oscar® for the documentary 
“An Inconvenient Truth” (Academy Awards 2007). There was the UN Climate Change Con-
ference in Bali, at which the operational details of the Kyoto Protocol Adaptation Fund as 
well as a road map for negotiations on strengthening the UN climate change regime were 
finalised (Müller 2008). It was the year after Sir Nicolas Stern, a British economist and Pro-
fessor at London School of Economics, had published his “Stern Review on the Economic 
of Climate Change” which had considerable impact on public debate about climate change 
policy in Australia (see, for example, Quiggin 2007, Jotzo 2007, Henderson 2009). And, in 
Australia’s 2007 election campaign, after 14 years without a vote on the topic, climate 
change was the defining issue in the political campaign of Labor candidate Kevin Rudd (see, 
for example, Gascoigne 2008, Bongiorno 2008). So, in Germany as well as in Australia, 
climate change was a central topic on the political and social agenda. But did these discus-
sions and events influence newspapers’ climate change coverage? And if so, how did they 
influence news coverage of climate change? 
To answer these questions, this chapter reviews research carried out between 2007 and 2011, 
the period on which this research concentrates its analysis. It therefore examines the cultural 
values of the media system and, thus, identifies aspects of the Societal sphere (Bräuer and 
Wolling 2014). 
Schäfer et al. (2012) offer a starting point with their comparison of media attention to climate 
change in 27 countries, including Germany and Australia. The authors examined leading 
media from 1996 to 2010 (Schäfer et al. 2012, p. 10). For Germany, they used Süddeutsche 
Zeitung and Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, both newspapers are also part of this research, 
and The Australian as well as The Sydney Morning Herald for Australia (Schäfer et al. 2012, 
p. 12). The latter newspaper is also examined in this research. 
For their full text search in electronic databases, the authors use the term “climate”, which 
has to appear in connection with a word indicating change, such as “change”, “develop-
ment”, “warming”, “cooling”, as well as synonyms such as “greenhouse effect” or “global 
warming” when global change in temperatures is discussed (Schäfer et al. 2012, p. 11). 
Schäfer et al. (2012), moreover, focus on coverage including extreme weather events, 
changes in temperature, events at the international level, such as climate change conferences, 
as well as political activities (pp. 15 f.). Concentrating on the two countries which are of 
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importance for this research, Schäfer et al. (2012) found 13,298 articles in German newspa-
pers and 23,440 articles in Australian ones, from 01/1996 to 06/2010 (p. 12). This initial 
comparison reveals that greater media attention was paid to climate change in Australia than 
in Germany. 
Further findings by Schäfer et al. (2012) show that media attention in both countries peaked 
around specific events, such as climate change conferences, “…probably because of the high 
stakes and the prominent political actors involved…”, and especially around the 2009 Cli-
mate Summit in Copenhagen (COP 15) (p. 20) as well as that extreme weather events do not 
result in a peak of media attention (Schäfer et al. 2012, p. 25). Moroever, the authors found 
out that the national government has strong effects on media attention on climate change in 
Australia and considerable influence in Germany (Schäfer et al. 2012, p. 25). Domestic po-
litical activities are strong predictors of media attention in both countries, in Australia “…the 
Stern Review – dealing with the economics of climate change – results in a significant 
amount of media attention” (Schäfer et al. 2012, p. 27). 
For Australia, the findings show that, in addition, the increase in climate change coverage 
was very strong in the second half of the 2000s, which is a central period for this research 
(Schäfer et al. 2012, p. 20). From 2006 to 2009, 3.61 per cent of all coverage in the Austral-
ian newspapers that were analysed was about climate change, while in Germany there was 
only 0.90 per cent climate change coverage in the same period (Schäfer et al. 2012, p. 21).  
In addition, Schäfer et al. (2012) characterise Australia’s climate change coverage as ‘hot’ 
and controversial as well as extreme politicised, while in Germany the topic was already 
established as a serious problem in the media as well as in politics, which resulted in limited 
controversy (p. 23). 
Concentrating on German climate change coverage, Maurer (2011) discussed how journal-
ists deal with uncertainty (p. 61). He explains that in its regulations, the Deutscher Presserat 
instructs journalists to identify insecurity (Maurer 2011, p. 61); studies, however, show that 
insecurity was not generally conveyed in the media (Maurer 2011, pp. 62 f.). Maurer (2011), 
however, stated that climate change was one of the events that conveys a sense of insecurity, 
an aspect that was particularly prominent during the discussions about future temperature 
increases in the 1990s (p. 64). 
Maurer (2011) explored how the media dealt with feelings of insecurity about global climate 
change and how the coverage changed, using content analysis which examines the coverage 
of the world climate change conferences in the German Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 
Bild-Zeitung and Der Spiegel from 1979 to 2007 (p. 65). These media were chosen because 
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they represent different qualities of climate change coverage (Maurer 2011, p. 65). Maurer 
(2011) argues that existing content analysis shows a high degree of consonance in climate 
change coverage and he wanted to find out whether this was also the case with these very 
different media. For him, a consonance between these three media might be an indication 
for a similar climate change coverage in all German print media (p. 65).  
The focus of Maurer’s (2011) research was on the reporting about prognoses of temperature 
increases as well as the consequences of climate change (p. 66). He coded the central topic, 
the actors, how climate change was described as well as the responsibility for causes and 
solutions in terms of climate change (Maurer 2011, p. 66). The coverage was coded on a 
five-tier scale from “very insecure” to “very secure” (Maurer 2011, p. 66). 
Maurer’s (2011) results show that, in the mid-1990s, the coverage of the world climate 
change conferences became increasingly important, decreased during the 2000s, and came 
back on the agenda in 2007, so was always in the media when a world climate report was 
published (p. 67). All the print media examined represented climate change as negative (97 
per cent), threatening (93 per cent), man-made (93 per cent) and extraordinary (87 per cent) 
(Maurer 2011, p. 67). Surprisingly, the number of scientists as actors related to climate 
change in the basic media was higher in times without a world climate change conference 
than during such events (Maurer 2011, p. 67). 
Insecurity in terms of temperature increases was emphasised using temperature spans (in 
40 per cent of all coverage) or by not mentioning a minimum level (Maurer 2011, p. 68). A 
noteworthy result of Maurer (2011) is that the greater the scientific insecurity in the progno-
ses of the IPCC, the lower the communication of insecurity in the media (p. 68). In addition, 
Maurer (2011) identified the fact that 638 out of 810 articles refer to the consequences of 
climate change, less than 2 per cent of them include positive aspects; insecurities about the 
consequences were rarely communicated (p. 69). This result goes along with the researches 
of Good (2008), McGaurr et al. (2013) and Olausson (2012) (see Chapter 2) who identified 
frames of causes and effects of climate change and did not find any frame with a positive 
connotation. 
Looking at Australia, Manne (2011) analysed news stories and opinion columns about cli-
mate issues published in the newspaper The Australian during the period January 2004 to 
April 2011 (p. 50). He wanted to find out how many articles published during this period 
claimed that climate change was a reality and how many denied it (Manne 2011, p. 50). 
For his content analysis, Manne (2011) examined all articles in the defined research period 
that included the search term “climate change” (p. 50). Editorials were extracted for separate 
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analysis and letters to the editor were excluded, because they represent the opinions of read-
ers rather than editorial views (Manne 2011, p. 50). 
Manne (2011) found three ways in which climate change was represented in the news media: 
the first sample was formed by news items and opinion columns written in support of 1. the 
consensual core of climate change science, 2. the findings of the IPCC, 3. the Kyoto Protocol 
and Australia’s ratification of it, 4. an Australian response at least as “radical” as the Energy 
Trading Scheme mooted by the Howard government in 2007 and the Rudd government be-
tween 2008 and April 2010 (p. 50). This category Manne (2011) called “favourable to cli-
mate change action” (p. 50).  
A second sample was formed by news items and opinion columns that opposed 1. the con-
sensual core of climate science, 2. the findings of the IPCC, 3. the Kyoto Protocol or Aus-
tralia’s adherence to it, 4. to an Australian response at least as ‘radical’ as the Energy Trading 
Scheme prefigured or proposed by the Howard and Rudd governments between 2007 and 
early 2010 (Manne 2011, p. 50). This category was called “unfavourable to climate change 
action” (Manne 2011, p. 50). 
A third category was formed by all climate change-related news items or opinion columns 
that were concerned with other matters or were simply neutral (Manne 2011, pp. 50 f.). 
The result was clear: After the third category was excluded, he “…found that, of the total 
880 items in the sample, only 180 accepted the scientific consensus and the need for action 
on climate change while 700 rejected them” (Manne 2011, p. 51). This result shows that The 
Australian supported a climate-change-sceptical position. This finding is supported by 
McGuarr et al. (2013) who also identified climate sceptic frames in Australian newspapers 
(see Chapter 2). This tendency, of course, cannot be generalised for all Australian newspa-
pers. In this context, it is important to know that the newspaper The Australian is owned by 
Rupert Murdoch’s News Corp., which – as Bacon (2013) represents in the following – is 
generally more climate-change-sceptical than the two newspapers which were analysed in 
this research. Therefore, it would have been of interest to know the amount of climate change 
coverage by Manne’s (2011) third category and how these articles described climate change. 
The discussion of climate-change-sceptical viewpoints is extended by Bacon (2013) who 
also used a content analysis. She looked at the coverage of climate science in ten Australian 
newspapers between February and April 2011 and 2012: The Australian, The Age, The Syd-
ney Morning Herald, The Daily Telegraph, Herald Sun, The Advertiser, The Courier Mail, 
The Northern Territory News, The Mercury and The West Australian (Bacon 2013, Chapter 
4.1). Bacon (2013) retrieved and analyzed all articles which mentioned climate science and 
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related findings from the Dow Jones Factiva database. . Those items that only included in-
cidental mentions of climate change policy such as articles that only included references to 
the ‘Minister for Climate Change’ were not included and if ‘climate change’ merely ap-
peared in a list of items in a story on a different topic, the article was excluded as well (2013, 
Chapter 4.1). The result was a sample of 602 articles (Bacon 2013, Chapter 4.2). 
A general finding by Bacon (2013) is that the number of articles accepting climate change 
as a fact dropped from 70 per cent in 2011 to 60 per cent in 2012 across the sample of articles, 
while, on the other hand, the number of articles rejecting the consensus grew from 8 per cent 
in 2011 to 14 per cent in 2012 (Chapter 4.6). 
In addition, Bacon (2013) found that 65 per cent of articles were produced in a way which 
communicated acceptance of the climate change consensus position to the readers. However, 
for Bacon (2013) “this underrepresents the agreement amongst more than 97% of scientists 
that human activity is a causal factor in climate change” (Chapter 4.6). 11 per cent of all 
examined articles rejected anthropogenic climate change, further 21 per cent suggests doubt 
about it: “In another words, 32% or nearly one-third of all articles either rejected or suggested 
doubt about the consensus position” (Bacon 2013, Chapter 4.6).  
Bacon (2013), in addition, identified that only 10 per cent of articles in Fairfax Media either 
rejected or suggested doubt about climate change whereas 41 per cent of News Corp. articles 
do so (Chapter 4.6). This result is consistent with Manne’s (2011) examination of the News 
Corp. newspaper The Australian. And it also supports the assumption that not all newspapers 
in Australia mainly rejected climate change. 
This way of reporting the climate change as well as the climate sceptic position likewise 
represents the journalism practice of so-called balanced news reporting (see Boykoff and 
Boykoff 2004); however, it does not portray the scientific consensus. In the case of climate 
change, it often presents “balance as bias” (see Boykoff and Boykoff 2004). So, there might 
well be a tendency towards balance-as-bias reporting in Australian climate change coverage. 
Comparing the discussed climate change coverage in the two countries, there are a number 
of similarities: climate change conferences and related events led to climate change coverage 
skyrocketing, whereas extreme weather events did not have any influence on the amount of 
climate change coverage in either country from 2007 to 2011. In both countries, there was, 
in addition, a perceivable increase in climate change coverage in the second half of the 
2000s, even though the increase in Germany was not as large as in Australia. 
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Besides all these similarities, there are also a number of differences which could influence 
climate change coverage in Germany and Australia. One aspect is the powerful influence of 
government in Australia whereas Germany’s national parliament only has considerable in-
fluence on media attention for climate change (see Schäfer et al. 2012). In addition, extreme 
weather events did not appear to have an effect on climate change coverage in the research 
period (see Manne 2011). Australia, moreover, tends to feature balance-as-bias reporting 
(see Bacon 2013), whereas in Germany the coverage mainly identifies human beings (see 
Maurer 2011) as the cause of climate change. 
A critical perspective on all these studies on climate change coverage in Germany and Aus-
tralia reveals some clear deficiencies. First, studies on the amount of the coverage (Schäfer 
et al. 2012) offer a useful comparison between countries; however, due to their size, they 
cannot go into detail. They remain very abstract. Second, the statement that an environmental 
disaster, such as an extreme weather event, does not influence climate change coverage re-
fers to the number of articles but does not look at qualitative aspects, so, the way in which 
the topic is covered (see Schäfer et al. 2012, Maurer 2011).  
This research closes these methodical and knowledge deficits. The methodology of framing, 
which is different from the content analyses in the literature discussed, allows a differenti-
ated examination of the climate change coverage between 2007 and 2011 (see, for example, 
Rössler 2005, p. 230, Van Gorp 2007, p. 70). Thus, this research can investigate the specifics 
of German and Australian climate change coverage. It is able to demonstrate the way in 
which an environmental disaster – in this case a flood – is represented in the climate change 
coverage and further examine the role of climate change in the context of an election cam-
paign. 
Table 3 summarises all the findings of the literature review of German and Australian cli-
mate change coverage. 
 
Table 3: Societal sphere: comparison of German and Australian climate change 
coverage 
Aspect of climate change 
coverage 
Germany Australia 
Media attention peaks around 
specific events, such as climate 
change conferences 
Extremely high  
(Schäfer et al. 2012, Maurer 
2011) 
Extremely high  
(Schäfer et al. 2012) 
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Aspect of climate change 
coverage 
Germany Australia 
The influence of extreme 
weather events on the amount 
of climate change coverage 
Extremely low  
(Schäfer et al. 2012) 
Extremely low  
(Schäfer et al. 2012) 
The influence of domestic 
parliamentary activity on media 
attention given to climate 
change 
Moderate  
(Schäfer et al. 2012) 
High  
(Schäfer et al. 2012) 
Increase in media attention in 
the second half of the 2000s 
Moderate  
(Schäfer et al. 2012, Maurer 
2011) 
High  
(Schäfer et al. 2012) 
Climate change is established in 
the media as a serious problem 
High  
(Schäfer et al. 2012) 
Low (controversial discussion) 
(Schäfer et al. 2012) 
Climate change is characterised 
as politicised 
High  
(Schäfer et al. 2012) 
Extremely high  
(Schäfer et al. 2012) 
Climate change is represented as 
man-made 
High  
(Maurer 2011) 
Moderate  
(pro-climate change versus 
climate-change-sceptical 
position) 
(Manne 2011, Bacon 2013) 
 
3.2. External influences on journalistic work in Germany and Australia 
The representation of climate change issues depends on various authorities that influence the 
work of journalists and, thus, their coverage. These authorities might, for example, affect the 
amount of pro-climate change views as well as climate-change-sceptical positions. Because 
political influence plays a major role in the context of climate change discussions and is, in 
addition, of importance for this research due to the analysis of climate change coverage 
around elections, Chapter 3.2.1 focuses on climate change politics. 
Chapter 3.2.2 provides a brief overview of public opinion about climate change. Thus, it 
makes clear in which way climate change is established as a national issue. 
Moreover, in Chapter 3.2.3, this research reviews the impact of lobbies on climate change 
coverage. This aspect is important because there are various economic interests trying to 
influence the perception of climate change.  
Chapter 3.2.4 provides a short introduction to energy supply, natural resources and the cli-
mate of Germany and Australia. These three aspects are of interest for this research because 
they address environmental as well as economic issues in the two countries. They show the 
current state of environmental issues in the two countries. And they show how environmental 
and economic interests can collide when climate change is on the agenda. 
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With the reviews on politics, public opinion, the influence of lobbies, energy supply, natural 
resources and climate, this chapter explains aspects of the Public sphere (public opinion), 
the Societal sphere (control of lobbies) and the Sphere of structural conditions (politics, 
energy supply, natural resources and climate) in terms of the theoretical model of Bräuer and 
Wolling (2014). Politicial elites are authorities which are able to initiate events – this could, 
for example, be the representation of climate change during an election – that influence the 
discussion on climate change. In addition, new aspects related to energy and natural re-
sources as well as extreme climatic events could do so, as is the case with the environmental 
disaster that is discussed in this research. The work of lobby groups has impact on the polit-
ical work of a country. It influences political decision-making essentially and, consequently, 
the political agenda which is picked up by the media. Finally, the public is able to influence 
the climate change discussion while an election campaign takes place.  
3.2.1. Political influence on climate change coverage in Germany and Australia 
Politics is one of the authorities with a major stake in the climate change discussion. Atten-
tion by politicians, or their ignorance of this issue, influences the amount of climate change 
coverage in the media (see Gelbspan 2005, Rhomberg, 2012, Giddens 2008). So, Gelbspan 
(2005) generally states that “…global warming gains news prominence only when it plays a 
role in the country’s politics” (p. 78). Rhomberg (2012) supports Gelbspan (2005), saying 
that, for a long time, the climate debate was only part of the scientific system but received 
media attention after climate change became a political topic (p. 53). Giddens (2008) exam-
ines the political task to establish policies and explains that “it is conventional to say of the 
modern state that it should be an enabling state and this notion certainly applies to the man-
agement of climate change policy” (p. 8). 
German awareness of environmental topics first emerged in the 1970s. In 1974 the Federal 
Ministry of Education and Research “…started promoting … the use of wind energy with 
the aim of increasing its economic efficiency” (Bechberger and Reiche 2004, p. 27). And the 
Federal Environment Agency first mentioned the “Klimaauswirkungen von Luftverunrei-
nigungen [Air pollutants and their effects on climate]“ officially in its 1978 annual report as 
well as, in 1979, the consequences of climate change (Weidner 2008, p. 5).  
The increasing interest and the need for environmental political strategies resulted in numer-
ous action groups, new environmental protection organisations and, finally, in 1980, in the 
foundation of the Green party (Kern et al. 2003, p. 8). So, the topic of climate change gath-
ered pace during the 1980s, in Germany. In 1986, the news magazine Der Spiegel published 
an article about the current state of climate sciences and placed a picture of the drowning 
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cathedral of Cologne on the title page (Tilly 2007, p. 360). In March 1987, Chancellor 
Helmut Kohl declared that the climate question was the most important environmental issue 
of all time (Weidner 2008, p. 6). Moreover, in the same year, the Climate Enquete Commis-
sion for the “Vorsorge zum Schutz der Erdatmosphäre [Precautions for the protection of the 
earth’s atmosphere]“ was established, which shed light on the German climate debate and 
had a major influence on all political decision makers (Tilly 2007, p. 361). This commission 
also studied the consequences of global warming and made a demand for government action 
on climate change (Tilly 2007, p. 356). In addition, in the late 1980s, all kind of media play 
a central role in terms of informing about climate change (Weidner 2008, p. 8). Environment 
as a topic was given a great deal of prominence in the media, in public debate as well as on 
the political agenda of all parties (Brand 1993, p. 20). 
In the early 1990s, the reconstruction of the new eastern states of Germany and their eco-
nomic stability became first priority (Kern et al. 2003, p. 9). So, Germany created an ambi-
tious climate protection agreement though, the so-called Agenda 21, but it did not manage 
to fulfil all of its requirements (Kern et al. 2003, p. 10). However, some environmental pol-
icies were put into practice. The act on supplying electricity from renewables (StrEG), espe-
cially for wind energy, was an important instrument for promoting climate change during 
the 1990s in Germany (Bechberger and Reiche 2004, p. 27). Then there was the low-carbon 
policy which the main German industrial associations arrange voluntarily with the federal 
government in exchange for the ecotax, which was established four years later when Chan-
cellor Schröder took office (Weidner 2008, p. 7). One reason for these political activities 
was surely the fact that the public rejected a slower pace of implementing climate change 
politics; the climate change issue was by then securely established in the public discourse 
(Weidner 2008, p. 24 f). The public even accused the government of a lack of climate-related 
activity and believed that this lack of activity was (partly) responsible for extreme weather 
as well as floods (Tilly 2007, p. 361). 
This reception of the climate change discourse was only possible in Germany because cli-
mate sceptics – except in 1995 occasionally, but unsuccessfully – could not get a word in 
edgeways (Tilly 2007, p. 362). At the end of this decade, in 1997, the Kyoto Protocol with 
compulsory reductions in greenhouse gas emissions for industrial countries was finalised, 
strongly supported by Angela Merkel who was Secretary of State for the Environment at that 
time (Weidner 2008, p. 7). One year later, the new government SPD and Bündnis 90/Die 
Grünen (1998 to 2005) gave climate protection as well as energy politics top priority 
(Weidner 2008, p. 8). In the next four years, this government implemented a number of 
political projects relating to energy resources. The two most important were the Renewable 
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Energy Source Act [Erneuerbare-Energien-Gesetz, EEG] (Kern et al. 2003, pp. 12 f.). Ecol-
ogy, eco-sensitive behaviour and thinking became mainstream (Brand 1993, p. 20). 
In 2000, “…the Renewable Energy Sources Act (Erneuerbare-Energien-Gesetz, 
EEG)…continuing the approach of its predecessor, the StrEG of 1991, in an extended and 
in many respects improved manner” (Bechberger and Reiche 2004, p. 30). In 2005, the 
Kyoto Protocol came into force. Weidner (2008, p. 4) and Bardt (2005, p. 260) are sure: 
without the huge commitment of Germany over numerous years, this would not have hap-
pened. Even under the new CDU/CSU and SPD government, which was elected in 2005, the 
climate and energy politics went ahead and sources of renewable energy as well as energy 
conservation activities were expanded (Weidner 2008, p. 10). 
During the years which are important for this research – 2007 to 2011 – a clear statement 
about climate change politics was made in 2009. The new CDU/CSU and FDP government 
emphasised in its coalition agreement that they wished to support a low-carbon economy 
and stated that the affiliated technologies, which could be exported, represented an oppor-
tunity for the German economy and an opportunity to reduce global greenhouse gas emis-
sions (Neuhoff 2010, p. 134). This is why the new government established high-tech entre-
preneur funds (Neuhoff 2010, p. 134). As a pioneer in environmental protection, the coalition 
agreement, moreover, assumed that Germany could advance growth in decarbonisation 
within the European Union and throughout the world (Neuhoff 2010, p. 136). With this 
agenda, the new government extended the work of the former government, which had con-
sisted of the CDU/CSU and SPD (Koalitionsvertrag 2005). 
In 2009, the global financial crisis influenced the activities of climate change politics. Cli-
mate change became less important in the political debate – despite alarming news from 
climate scientists (Kuckartz 2011, pp. 130 f.). The financial crises also had a major influence 
on the United Nations Climate Change Conference in Copenhagen. The expectations were 
high, but these were not fulfilled. “Weltrettung vertagt! [Salvation of the world adjourned!]” 
was one headline of Die Zeit (2009) after the conference, even though the article said that 
the two-degree-target was still on the international agenda as well as the fact that the people’s 
behaviour had changed, companies had realised that green engineering is competitive and 
that more and more cities had joined forces to tackle climate change. 
The general German mindset in relation to climate change at the beginning of the research 
period is described by Tilly (2007). He says that to take part in an environmental regime, 
such as the Kyoto Protocol, all states involved have to agree that climate change is anthro-
pogenic, that there is a connection between greenhouse gas emissions and climate change, 
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that a reduction of greenhouse gas emissions will have an impact on the further development 
of climate change and that climate change has negative consequences for the environment 
(p. 357). 
Looking at literature that analyses climate change as a concept, in Germany, Tilly (2007) 
argued, climate change was differently constructed during the years. According to him, until 
1986 there was scepticism and resistance, from 1986 to 1992 there was catastrophising, and 
from 1992 to 1997 climate change was seen as a general political problem (Tilly 2007, p. 
360). For Tilly (2007), the second period in particular – with the widespread interpretation 
of climate change as a catastrophe – was essential for the further perception of climate 
change: first, because this effect was only found in Germany and, second, because the term 
“climate catastrophe” created a dynamic which put pressure on politicians (p. 360). Besides, 
Tilly (2007) shows that the Climate Enquete Commission had the explicit task to create con-
sensus about climate change across all political parties and definitely institutionalised cli-
mate change as an issue of concern throughout society (p. 361). After this period, the dis-
course of “climate catastrophe” was well established in Germany and doubts about climate 
change and its consequences could no longer influence the public (Tilly 2007, p. 362). For 
Tilly (2007), the question is, however, why this discourse was so widespread in Germany 
and he stated that perhaps it was not so much that the Climate Enquete Commission estab-
lished the consensus, but rather that the Climate Enquete Commission utilised an existing 
consensus in German society to achieve success (p. 365). 
Weidner (2008) extended Tilly’s (2007) notion of “climate catastrophe” when exploring the 
overall concepts of German climate politics and stated that there are two dominant concepts 
which influence all climate change actors, the general public as well as the scientific dis-
course: the concept of “ecological modernisation” and the concept of “sustainable develop-
ment” (p. 11). Weidner (2008) claims that these concepts are not in competition but are 
complementary or even congruent concepts (p. 11). According to Weidner (2008), “ecolog-
ical modernisation” refers to a political system or nation state that endorses environmentally 
compatible/friendly production as well as a consumer structure (p. 11). This concept should 
ensure long-term and stable welfare gains in capitalist structures (Weidner 2008, p. 11). The 
concept of “sustainable development” is more global and more long-term as well as broader 
in scope, because it refers to global welfare development which will remain important in the 
remote future; in this concept, ecological aspects are not necessarily prioritised in relation to 
social and economic aspects (Weidner 2008, p. 12). 
After the period which this research covers, the new CDU/CSU and SPD government took 
office in 2013. In the “Aktionsprogramm Klimaschutz 2020 [Action programme climate 
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protection 2020]” of the Bundesministerium für Umwelt, Naturschutz, Bau und 
Reaktorsicherheit, the new government adopted the goal of the former government to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions by 2020 – a 40 per cent reduction in comparison to 1990 was the 
target (2014, p. 7). This is why activities for industry, agriculture, transport, waste disposal 
as well as in construction and real estate management were planned. The goal of these ac-
tivities was to reduce 62 to 78 million tonnes of greenhouse gases by 2020 (BMUB 2014, p. 
26). In addition, renewable energy was identified as the main energy source in the future: by 
2025, 40 to 45 per cent of the energy in Germany should be produced by renewable energy 
sources and, by 2035, between 55 and 60 per cent (BMUB 2014, p. 67). 
Summarising German climate change politics, Bechberger and Reiche (2004) say that “from 
an international point of view, Germany can be seen as one of the pioneering countries in 
the development and application of RES [Renewable Energy Sources]” (p. 26). Weidner 
(2008) refers to an expected 20 years of positive path dependency by the German govern-
ment, regardless of the dominant parties and despite socio-ecological changes (pp. 10 f.). 
Thus, for him “German climate change policy is one of the most ambitious and effective 
climate protection endeavors worldwide” (Weidner 2008, p. xii). 
Like Germany, Australia has a long history of climate change discussion. However, the de-
velopment of the Australian green movement was not as clear-cut as the German one (see, 
for example, Hamilton 2001 and Taylor 2014). 
Its climate change politics started when Robert Hawke was Labor Prime Minister of Aus-
tralia from the early 1980s to the early 1990s, and Australia “…proved willing to adopt, in 
principle at least, ambitious targets for reducing emissions” (Hamilton 2001, p. 32). So, 
Hawke initiated numerous programmes which mainly focused on Australia’s energy system 
(Hamilton 2001, p. 32). “In October 1990 Australia formally adopted the Toronto targets… 
of stabilising greenhouse gas emission at 1988 levels by 2000 and reducing them by 20 per 
cent from that level by 2005” (Taylor 2014, p. 31). 
Hawke also made sure that the media supported his programmes: “…Human responsibility 
for the enhanced ‘greenhouse effect’ was given in every press article reviews as well as in 
government documents” (Taylor 2014, p. 2) and environmental matters, in general, as well 
as climate change in particular were treated as ‘mainstream’ and of concern to all citizens 
(Taylor 2014, p. 62). In addition, scientists were the leaders of this movement which was 
characterised “...by their effective interaction with media and policymakers as well as the 
3 Theory: The Extended Sphere Model of Bräuer and Wolling (2014) 67 
organisation of conferences and major public events” (Taylor 2014, p. 29). “Equally remark-
able is the fact that the science information about causes, effects and risks has remained 
consistent over nearly three decades” (Taylor 2014, p. 2). 
In March 1996, the Howard government took office and, for the national debate about cli-
mate change and the leading role of Australia in the global climate change discussion, this 
was a major setback (see, for example, Crowley 2007, Taylor 2014 and Hamilton 2001). 
Crowley (2007) explains that Australia’s position on climate change changes “…from aspir-
ing global leader in the 1980s… to a globally isolated laggard a decade later…” (p. 130). 
Taylor (2014) says that “where once there had been a clear narrative about risk…, Australi-
ans were now told not to worry…” (p. xiii). And Hamilton (2001) is sure that “the fact that 
the Howard Government appointed as the Minister for Resources and Energy a man who 
rejected greenhouse science, defended the interests of the coal industry at every oppor-
tunity…” (p. 74). For more than a decade, the issue climate change was, thus, treated as a 
burden. 
The change came with the election campaign, in 2006/2007 – the campaign which is exam-
ined in this research: Climate change was brought back onto the agenda. Labor candidate 
Kevin Rudd “…did a fine job of scaring voters with dire predictions on the extent of human-
induced climate change and the potential damage to Australia” (Suter 2010, p. 268). This 
election campaign was “… referred to as the world’s ‘first climate change election’” 
(McDonald 2012, p. 578). And, after Rudd won the election, “the first action of the new 
Rudd Labor Government was to ratify the Kyoto Protocol – the first time that the first act of 
an Australian Government was to ratify a treaty” (Suter 2010, p. 268). In addition, Rudd was 
“…among the most active heads of state at the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (UNFCCC) Conference of the Parties in Copenhagen in 2009, at which 
Australia had one of the largest delegations” (McDonald 2012, p. 579). 
Rudd “…was willing to create an innovative way of combating climate change” (Suter 2010, 
p. 269). He did, however, disappoint his voters: he only managed to introduce “…relatively 
mainstream political responses, such as a cap-and-trade emissions trading scheme, [which] 
encountered serious – and ultimately effective – political opposition“ (McDonald 2012, 
p. 589). He called climate change the 'greatest moral challenge' – and then failed to push it 
through; in effect he just walked away from the issue (Suter 2010, p. 310). 
Only about three years later, in June 2010, Kevin Rudd was replaced by Julia Gillard, pre-
viously the Deputy Prime Minister, in a rapid ‘coup’; Rudd went to the backbenches 
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(McDougall 2014, p. 290). As a consequence, the controversies within the Labor party es-
calated so much that they became more interesting for the media than the party’s main topic 
“climate change” (McDougall 2014, p. 290). The new Prime Minister, nevertheless, intro-
duced a carbon tax in response to the issue of global warming; however, she was portrayed 
as lacking charisma and did not do well in communicating her message (McDougall 2014, 
p. 290). So, the dynamics in terms of climate change in Australia seemed to disappear as fast 
as they came. 
The Australian mindset about climate change during the time of this research was described 
by Williams and Booth (2013) as not being a pressing political issue in Australian admin-
istration during the eleven years of conservative government following Prime Minister John 
Howard’s election in 1996, but it became an issue again when federal politics shifted back 
towards the left and the Australian Labor Party, led by Kevin Rudd, took office in late 2007 
(p. 22). However, Rudd’s efforts to act on climate change became increasingly contentious 
or simply unpopular (Williams and Booth 2013, p. 23). Williams and Booth (2013) state that 
Kevin Rudd put climate change in a global, universal and threatening context during his 
election campaign “...but saw the world in overly simplistic terms as divided between two 
camps” (p. 24). He, thus, created the dichotomy of climate sceptics or climate deniers versus 
climate change action (Williams and Booth 2013, p. 24). So, in effect, Rudd trivialised the 
climate change discussion in a political context. And, even though some bills were passed 
to promote energy efficiency and investment in renewable, there has been resistance in Aus-
tralia to unilateral acceptance of the need to tackle climate change-related issues (Williams 
and Booth 2013, p. 23). 
The time after the research period is of interest because, in 2013, Rudd was again the can-
didate for the Labor Party; however, this results in an electoral disaster (McDougall 2014, 
p. 291). After four years of intra-party chaos, on 7 September 2013, the Labor government 
was defeated (McDougall 2014, p. 289). With Tony Abbot, Prime Minister from 2013 to 
2015, a new era began for climate change in Australia. One of his first political statements 
about climate science was that anthropogenic climate change was “crap” (Readfearn 2014). 
And in his political autobiography Battlelines, he set out his position in more detail: 
“It sounds like common sense to minimise human impact on the environment and to 
reduce the human contribution to increased atmospheric-gas concentrations. It 
doesn’t make much sense, though, to impose certain and substantial costs on the econ-
omy now in order to avoid unknown and perhaps even benign changes in the future” 
(Readfearn 2014). 
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McDonald (2012) says about the Australian behaviour in terms of climate change, that “of 
all states in global politics, there are few that could lay claim to being as inconsistent on 
global climate change as Australia” (p. 579). 
Summarising these findings about the political influence on the German and Australian cli-
mate change discussion, it is clear that politics, in general, is able to make – or not make – 
climate change a national issue and, consequently, has the power to support or disregard the 
climate change discussion. Looking at the literature examined that was related to the German 
and Australian climate change discussion, the power of politics in terms of climate change 
seems to be greater in Australia. The opinion of the Australian Prime Minister and his/her 
party essentially dominates the debate about climate change (see, for example, Hamilton 
2001, Crowley 2007, Taylor 2014). Because climate change was its central issue, it can be 
assumed that the climate change discussion during the 2007 Australian election was evident 
in the two Australian newspapers which were analysed in this research. 
German political parties, in contrast, do not question the existence of climate change; it 
seems that it is no longer possible. The German public has accepted climate change as a fact 
(see, for example, Weidner 2008, Umweltbewusstsein in Deutschland 2014). So, it is diffi-
cult for a German political party not to mention this issue as if it wants to be successful in 
an election campaign. Therefore, it is assumed, that during the German election campaign, 
there was no big difference before and after the election in media coverage of climate change. 
Table 4 compares the political influence on the climate change discussion in Germany and 
Australia. 
 
Table 4: Sphere of structural conditions: political influence on the German and 
Australian climate change discussion 
Century Germany  Australia 
1970s The German government establishes aware-
ness of climate change  
no climate change discussion 
1980s The Green party was founded; Chancellor 
Helmut Kohl declared climate question to 
be the most important environmental issue 
of all time, Climate Enquete Commission 
was founded 
Prime Minister Robert Hawke established am-
bitious targets for reducing emissions, focus-
ing on the domestic energy system 
1990s Agenda 21 was established; the Kyoto Pro-
tocol was finalised 
Australia adopted the Toronto targets of a 20 
per cent reduction in greenhouse gas emis-
sions; in 1996 John Howard became Prime 
Minister and the leading role of Australia in 
the climate change discussion disappeared 
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Century Germany  Australia 
2000s  the Renewable Energy Sources Act and the 
Kyoto Protocol came into force; the German 
government supports a low-carbon econ-
omy and affiliated technologies; 
climate change was described as a catastro-
phe; the term “climate catastrophe” cre-
ated a dynamic which put pressure on poli-
tics; 
climate change was established as a con-
cept of “ecological modernisation” and 
“sustainable development”;  
ambitious action in terms of climate change  
2006/2007 Labor candidate Kevin Rudd 
brought climate change back onto the politi-
cal agenda; 
climate change was put in a global, universal 
and threatening context, using the catch-
phrase ‘greatest moral challenge’;  
the Kyoto Protocol was ratified, and Australia 
became active in the UNFCCC;  
Rudd’s efforts to act on climate change, how-
ever, became increasingly contentious and 
unpopular; he trivialised the discussion  
2010s “Aktionsprogramm Klimaschutz 2020 [Ac-
tion programme climate protection 2020]” 
was established  
Prime Minister Julia Gillard was not accepted 
with her programme to initiate a carbon tax; 
2013, Tony Abbot as Prime Minister says an-
thropogenic climate change is “crap”;  
resistance in Australia to any unilateral ac-
ceptance of the need to tackle the issue of cli-
mate change 
 
3.2.2. The public’s attitude to climate change 
As politics is an influencer in terms of climate change and – especially in Australia – is able 
to make, or not make, climate change a national issue, this short chapter provides an 
overview of public opinion on climate change in both countries and, thus, explores the social 
consensus about climate change. 
The German public’s attitude to climate change is represented in the Eurobarometer Survey 
2014 – a special edition which focused on climate change. It was carried out by 
TNS Opinion & Social network and took place in the 28 Member States of the European 
Union from 23 November to 2 December 2013 (Eurobarometer 2014, p. 3). Some 27,919 
respondents from different social and demographic backgrounds were interviewed face-to-
face at home in their mother tongue language (Eurobarometer 2014, p. 3). The following 
paragraphs show the German results, based on roughly 1,600 interviews (Eurobarometer 
2014, p. TS 2). 
As many as 70 per cent of the German participants stated that climate change is one of the 
most serious problems the world is facing (Eurobarometer 2014, p. 14), rating it 7.6 (ranking: 
1 = “not at all a serious problem” to 10 = “an extremely serious problem”) (Eurobarometer 
2014, p. 23). Answering the question “In your opinion, who within the EU is responsible for 
tackling climate change?”, most of the German respondents said “business and industry” 
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(52 per cent), 45 per cent say “national government”, 41 per cent say “the European Union” 
and 31 per cent of the German respondents were most likely to mention that they have “per-
sonal responsibility” for tackling climate change (Eurobarometer 2014, p. 28). 
A surprising 65 per cent even said that they have personally taken any action to combat 
climate change over the past six months (Eurobarometer 2014, p. 32). Of these, 79 per cent 
added that they “try to reduce waste and regularly separate it for recycling”, 68 per cent said 
they “try to cut down their consumption of disposal items whenever possible” and 44 per 
cent said they “buy locally produced and seasonal food whenever possible” as well as “when 
buying a new household appliance, they chose it mainly because it was more energy efficient 
than other models” (Eurobarometer 2014, p. 40). 
In response to “the view that combating climate change can boost the EU economy and jobs 
(saying that they either totally or tend to agree)”, 27 per cent of the German respondents 
“totally agree” and 51 per cent “tend to agree” (Eurobarometer 2014, p. 46). This result 
shows that the German respondents also sees climate change as an opportunity for the econ-
omy. 
Moreover, the latest survey “Umweltbewusstsein in Deutschland [Environmental awareness 
in Germany]” (2014) carried out by the Umweltbundesamt, from 8 July to 6 August 2014, 
asked 2,117 people who were interviewed online (2014, p. 14) and an additional 2,000 peo-
ple who were interviewed personally from July 10 to 31 and August 2 to 31, 2014 (2014, 
p. 15). 
Around 19 per cent of Germans say – when asked an open question – that environmental 
protection is one of the key issues in the country. As a result of this response, environmental 
protection is fifth in the ranking of the most important issues of the country. “Social security” 
(37 per cent) and “financial/economic policy” (29 per cent), “pension policy” (24 per cent) 
and “security and peace” (20 per cent) were felt to be more important by the interviewees 
(Umweltbewusstsein in Deutschland 2014, p. 19). In the same context, it is noticeable that 
76 per cent of the interviewees stated that environmental protection is much more important 
than economic growth (Umweltbewusstsein in Deutschland 2014, p. 23). 
Looking at environmental quality, 86 per cent of the Germans who took part in the survey 
said that in their own village/town/city the quality is high, 73 per cent said this for Germany 
in general but only 7 per cent for the whole world (Umweltbewusstsein in Deutschland 2014, 
pp. 39 ff.). Another central question was whether the population feels that environmental 
issues represent a burden: 59 per cent of the interviewees say that they “feel an average/nor-
mal burden”, 31 per cent “rather less burdened”, and 10 per cent “clearly less burdened”. 
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Only 3 per cent feel “rather burdened” or “clearly burdened” (Umweltbewusstsein in 
Deutschland 2014, p. 38). In addition, 44 per cent of the interviewees were "very convinced" 
that Germany can tackle the issues which arise from climate change. 4 per cent even say that 
they are “thoroughly convinced” (2014, p. 44). 86 per cent also say that they have to be 
active and to change their lifestyle to protect the environment (Umweltbewusstsein in 
Deutschland 2014, p. 33), and 64 per cent say that a “Bruttosozialglück [Cross-national for-
tune indicator]” should be established, because it is an attractive way to combine environ-
mental issues and economic development (Umweltbewusstsein in Deutschland 2014, p. 34). 
So far, this survey shows that most of the interviewees are satisfied with the way they live 
and they do not feel affected by environmental issues – now or in future (Umweltbewusstsein 
in Deutschland 2014, p. 45). This assumption is further supported by the fact that they only 
pay more for environmentally friendly and sustainable products when it pays off (Umwelt-
bewusstsein in Deutschland 2014, p. 73), for example, “always” for household appliances 
(46 per cent), lamps (48 per cent) and televisions or computer (36 per cent) (Umweltbewusst-
sein in Deutschland 2014, p. 53). Looking at the results which relate to involvement in en-
vironmental issues, this impression is strengthened. 
The survey shows that environmental protection is a social norm – not just an alternative 
movement – in Germany. Nevertheless, mainly volunteers work on this issue: only 8 per 
cent of the interviewees stated that they are already voluntarily involved in environmental 
activities (Umweltbewusstsein in Deutschland 2014, p. 63). In addition, 14 per cent of the 
interviewees said that temperature increases "strongly influence" their health. 39 per cent 
say they are influenced "less", while 13 per cent said "not at all" (Umweltbewusstsein in 
Deutschland 2014, p. 45). 
The first impression of the issue culture in Germany is strengthened when you realise that 
91 per cent of the interviewees said that it is important for them to live in such a way that 
one is in peace with the environment and oneself (Umweltbewusstsein in Deutschland 2014, 
p. 22). 74 per cent are concerned about how much their children/grandchildren will be af-
fected by climate change (Umweltbewusstsein in Deutschland 2014, p. 23). Moreover, 
64 per cent say that less consumption would protect the environment (Umweltbewusstsein 
in Deutschland 2014, p. 22). 
Osberghaus et al. (2013) surveyed 6,404 private households with the support of market re-
search institution Forsa between 4 October and 4 November 2012. Most of the households 
were in North Rhine-Westphalia (22.5 per cent), Bavaria (15.3 per cent), Baden-Wuerttem-
berg (12. 1 per cent) and Lower Saxony (9.8 per cent). The participants answered an online 
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questionnaire, and households without internet access could take part via a special tool de-
vised by Forsa which could be connected with the television (Osberghaus et al. 2013, p. 3). 
As many as 81.1 per cent of all participating households believe in general that climate 
change is already taking place (Osberghaus et al. 2013, p. 13), 70.8 per cent said that it is 
taking place in Germany (Osberghaus et al. 2013, p. 14), 11.9 per cent said that “It is not 
currently taking place in general, but will happen” (Osberghaus et al. (2013, p. 13), and 22.7 
per cent made this statement for Germany (Osberghaus et al. 2013, pp. 14 f.). 
In those households in which inhabitants believe that climate change is happening or will 
happen, 43.8 per cent thought that it is anthropogenic, 3.7 per cent said it has natural causes 
and 52.3 per cent said that both factors are responsible for climate change (Osberghaus et al. 
2013, p. 16). As many as 84.6 per cent of all participants answered that the global tempera-
ture will increase until 2100 (Osberghaus et al. 2013, p. 17). Values for the expected changes 
in temperature ranged from -40 °C to +50 °C and the median value was +3.5 °C (Osberghaus 
et al. 2013, p. 18). In addition, 91.0 per cent of the participating households expected that 
heavy rainfall will increase due to climate change, 90.1 per cent expected an increase in 
storms, 88.1 per cent more floods, 78.7 per cent extreme heat and 59.1 per cent said that 
more avalanches and landslides could be expected (Osberghaus et al. 2013, p. 22). Moreover, 
6.1 per cent of those interviewed were sure that their personal lifestyle will change due to 
climate change in the next decade (Osberghaus et al. 2013, p. 22). 
An important aspect of the survey by Osberghaus et al. (2013) is that those people who 
believe in the negative consequences of climate change were “extremely sure” about it 
(40 per cent) (p. 28). Altogether, the participating households felt “very well” or “rather 
well” informed about the reasons (58.9 per cent) and consequences (50.0 per cent) of climate 
change (Osberghaus et al. 2013, p. 30). 
However, when they asked the participants for their subjective opinion about statements on 
climate change, its reasons and consequences, Osberghaus et al. (2013) identified a high 
uncertainty due to a huge number of “I do not know” answers (pp. 32 f.). These results fur-
ther support the finding that awareness of climate change is deeply established in the German 
mindset, because everybody knows about climate change and feels informed. It, however, 
also shows that this knowledge is only perceived; it is not necessarily well founded. 
The Australian public’s attitude to climate change is represented in “Climate of the Nation” 
(2010), a survey by the Climate Institute of Australia. This survey was carried out during 
one week in March, April, and June 2010 and each week 1,000 Australians took part in it 
(Climate Institute of Australia 2010, p. 32). 
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In Australia, the issue of climate change is ranked as seventh in terms of importance: “cli-
mate change appears as a mid-ranking issue below the health system, economy, the cost of 
housing, jobs and the education system” (Climate Institute of Australia 2010, p. 8). So, only 
8 per cent of the Australians say that climate change is “the most important topic”, while 
7 per cent say “it is an important topic” for the nation (Climate Institute of Australia 2010, 
p. 8). 
Nevertheless, 68 per cent of Australians are concerned about climate change in general (Cli-
mate Institute of Australia 2010, p. 9). Reasons given for concern about climate change were: 
“water shortages for the cities” (64 per cent), “more droughts affecting farmers” (62 per 
cent), a “more polluted planet” (61 per cent), a “more polluted Australia” (59 per cent), “de-
struction of the Great Barrier Reef” and “animals and plants becoming extinct” (58 per cent 
each) as well as “extreme weather/bushfires” (56 per cent) (Climate Institute of Australia 
2010, p. 9). 
The information the interviewees saw was felt to be confusing: “Some…believed there was 
a lack of balanced, unbiased information available and they do not know which sources of 
information to trust” (Climate Institute of Australia 2010, p. 10). This confusing information 
had an impact: 23 per cent of the interviewees said that climate change is due to natural 
causes, while 77 per cent believed that climate change is anthropogenic (Climate Institute of 
Australia 2010, pp. 10-11). There were, however, differences in opinions about when climate 
change will take place: “Around two thirds of the people (65 per cent)…believe that climate 
change is happening now, 17 per cent believe it will happen in the future, while 18 per cent 
don’t think it will happen at all” (Climate Institute of Australia 2010, p. 11). 
As in the German Eurobarometer Survey (2014), 33 per cent of the participating Australians 
replied “no” when asked whether they would pay more for electricity (Climate Institute of 
Australia 2010, p. 20), even though 86 per cent of the respondents would “moving to clean 
energy sources like solar, wind and geothermal” (Climate Institute of Australia 2010, p. 21). 
This statement might be a sign of the fact that in Australia as well people believe climate 
change should be tackled, but only when the measures taken do not influence their current 
lifestyle. 
In the survey by the Climate Institute of Australia (2010), a major finding is that the inter-
viewees are very aware of the impact of climate change in their country; however, they leave 
responsibility for tackling it to the politicians: 85 per cent of the Australian interviewees said 
that they would “…support a major political party that has a detailed plan to change Australia 
to using cleaner sources and energy” (p. 22). 74 per cent would support an emissions trading 
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scheme (p. 23). 73 per cent of the “…people want Australia, as a nation, to lead in reducing 
pollution and changing to cleaner, smarter energy”, and 20 per cent even wanted Australia 
to become the world leader in tackling climate change ( p. 24). 
Of interest, too, are the findings that 36 per cent were not concerned about water shortage in 
the cities, 38 per cent did not believe that more droughts will affect the Australian farmers, 
and 44 per cent did not entirely link extreme weather and bushfires to climate change (Cli-
mate Institute of Australia 2010, p. 9). 
Jackman (2009) carried out an research on how political attitudes shape public opinion on 
climate change in Australia and the US (p. 1). In Australia, the survey was conducted by 
Q&A Market Research, Brisbane, using random-digit dialling to sample households in 
which the youngest resident at home (aged 18 or older) was asked to participate in the survey 
(Jackman 2009, p. 2). The sample size was 800. The data were weighted so as to be repre-
sentative of the Australian population by age, gender and state (Jackman 2009, p. 2). Because 
31 per cent of the Australian population voted for the Liberal party, many of them are critical 
of climate change, and 39 per cent of the Australian population voted for the Labor Party, 
with many voters who view climate change as an important issue, Jackman mainly compared 
these two groups of voters in comparison to all respondents (Jackman 2009, pp. 2 ff.). 
The results of the questions about climate change policy showed that 83 per cent of the 
respondents agree that “the world’s climate is getting warmer”; 90 per cent of Labor voters 
and 76 per cent of Liberal voters (Jackman 2009, p. 2). And 67 per cent of all respondents 
said that the world is getting warmer because of human activity; 78 per cent of Labor voters 
and 48 per cent of Liberal voters (Jackman 2009, p. 2). The statement “Australia should take 
steps to reduce its production of greenhouse gases, even if it means fewer jobs and a reduc-
tion in living standards for Australians” was agreed to by 59 per cent of all respondents; 
70 per cent of the Labor voters agreed and 44 per cent Liberal voters (Jackman 2009, p. 3). 
Due to the upcoming Copenhagen Climate Conference in 2009, Jackman (2009) also asked 
respondents if “Australia should delay any steps towards reducing greenhouse gas emissions 
until it is clear what countries like the United States and China will do on this issue” (p. 3). 
As many as 46 per cent of respondents agreed with this statement; 40 per cent of Labor 
voters and 64 per cent of Liberal voters (Jackman 2009, p. 3). Jackman (2009) summarised 
these results saying that his study representing the Australian public shows that “…Labor 
has a compelling political incentive to keep the climate change issue salient” (p. 4) and that 
“supporters of conservative parties are more sceptical about climate change and less sup-
portive of government action than the population-at-large” (Jackman 2009, p. 5). 
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Summarising the results of the literature in this chapter about climate change and the public 
sphere, “climate change” as an issue is not seen by the German nation as most important 
when people are asked openly what they feel is the most important topic. Nevertheless, cli-
mate change awareness is high when people are asked explicit questions. The German public 
mostly believe that climate change is taking place and that the reason for climate change is 
a mixture of anthropogenic activities as well as natural causes. 
Those responsible for tackling climate change are felt to be business and industries and the 
national government. In addition, most Germans say they are actively involved in climate 
change protection. Answers about activities are, however, not convincing: these include, for 
example, waste recycling. 
Many are concerned about their children and grandchildren and how they could be affected 
by climate change. The assumption is that there will be an average increase in temperature 
of 3.5 degrees, heavy rainfall and more storms and floods. This shows that the consequences 
of climate change are seen in a negative light. Positive aspects such as an increase in job 
opportunities are not ranked high. 
Two findings from the surveys of the German public’s viewpoint on climate change are 
surprising: first, it is very noticeable that self-reporting about climate change knowledge 
differs from the actual state of knowledge about climate change. Second, it is remarkable 
that especially those people who believe in the negative consequences of climate change are 
“extremely sure” about it (40 per cent). This is remarkable as the opposite phenomenon was 
found among the Australian public. 
As in Germany, the importance of climate change is mid-ranked in Australia. Australians 
also agree that climate change has already started, that they are already being affected by 
climate change and that it is caused by humans. An increase in temperature of about 3.8 de-
grees is expected by 2100. In this context, it is important that a distinction is made between 
climate and weather. Consequently, extreme weather is not necessarily seen as evidence of 
climate change. 
Nevertheless, in the context of climate change, Australians are concerned about water short-
age, drought effecting farmers, animals and plants becoming extinct, extreme weather and 
bushfires. As in Germany, Australians say that they are actively combating climate change, 
although this also mostly involves recycling. 
Wehrspaun and Eick (2002) explain this phenomenon by arguing that consumption patterns 
and ecology are not compatible in Western societies such as Germany and Australia 
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(Wehrspaun and Eick 2002, p. 1). The authors talk about a "Marginalitätsparadox" [paradox 
of marginality] (Wehrspaun and Eick 2002, p. 5), which for the authors means that the re-
quired ecological behaviour does not correspond with the Western lifestyle and that people 
often feel they are in a hopeless situation in terms of climate change (Wehrspaun and Eick 
2002, p. 5). This is why they demand that communication about climate change should con-
sider the need for economical, ecological and social fairness and should not only refer to 
marginal ecological benefits (Wehrspaun and Eick 2002, p. 5). 
Those who are responsible for tackling climate change are the politicians in Australia, and 
these act differently: Labor is pro and the Liberal party is against climate change mitigation. 
Maybe this political conflict is responsible for the fact that fewer than 50 per cent of Aus-
tralians believe that a global emission reduction scheme is not possible. But also, in relation 
to their own country, Australians criticise the fact that climate change policy has not been 
sustainably developed. Table 5 provides an overview of the results of this short chapter. 
 
Table 5: Public sphere: the public’s attitude to climate change 
Aspect of the public’s attitude 
to change coverage 
Germany Australia 
Identify climate change as an im-
portant topic/are concerned 
about climate change 
Very high 
(81 %) 
High  
(68 %) 
Feel a personal responsibility for 
tackling climate change 
Moderate  
(31 %) 
No information available 
Say others are responsible (in-
dustry/politics) 
High 
(business and industry/national 
government) 
High 
(politicians are responsible) 
Think that combating climate 
change can boost the economy 
and jobs 
Moderate Low 
Feel affected by environmental 
issues 
Low 
(14 % feel “strongly influenced”) 
High 
(about 85 %, dependent on the 
topic) 
Pay more for environmentally 
friendly and sustainable pro-
ducts 
Moderate Moderate 
Feel responsible for future gen-
erations 
High No information available 
Are aware of the consequences 
of climate change 
High High 
Feel well informed about the 
causes of climate change 
Moderate Moderate 
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An examination of the public’s attitude to climate change is not part of this research. Nev-
ertheless, the results described in this chapter allow one to draw conclusions about the rep-
resentation of climate change in the two countries. On the one hand, responsibility for miti-
gating climate change was assigned to politicians in both countries. Thus, the public in the 
two countries agree on this issue, which is an aspect that might be reflected in climate change 
coverage in the two countries. On the other hand, Germans and Australians have a different 
viewpoint on the extent to which they feel affected by environmental issues: the German 
public argues that there is relatively little impact, whereas the inhabitants of Australia say 
that the impact is high. These two opinions might also be discernible when investigating the 
framing of climate change. 
3.2.3. The impact of lobbying on climate change coverage in Germany and Australia 
To find studies about lobbyism in Germany and Australia is difficult. This should, however, 
not be a surprise. Lobby groups are very secretive about the way they exert influence as well 
as about the sources of their funding and, consequently, they are only rarely examined in 
scientific research. 
Because the literature does not clearly explain how the work of these lobby groups/think 
tanks influences climate change coverage, the following paragraphs try to elaborate on this. 
Generally, both industry lobbies, the ‘grey’ NGOs which are well-organised and financially 
strong, and the lobby of environmental organisations, the ‘green’ NGOs, which are often 
smaller, individual groups with moderate levels of funding, are active in the political arena 
(see, for example, Walk 2011, Kozák 2010, Enders 2001). Whereas industrial lobbies mainly 
focus on alliances of convenience with political decision makers (Kozák 2010, p. 93), envi-
ronmental organisations often create pressure via public opinion, using activities, such as 
protests during a climate change conference, or the publication of shocking photographs 
showing the consequences of climate change on the internet (Kozák 2010, p. 72). Thus, grey 
NGOs mainly convey their interests via the political system, while green NGOs – perhaps 
due to their more limited funding – create events that can be reported in the media. So, the 
instruments used by the two lobby groups are different and the one that can influence the 
political arena might be more powerful. 
Walk (2011) explains that NGOs, in general, are well prepared to influence politicians: they 
have established working groups and networks to represent their interests, they plan their 
statements designed to influence government meetings very early and they know exactly 
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about the timetable of the government. Some members of NGOs even become part of gov-
ernment delegations (Walk 2011, p. 11).  
Equipped with this knowledge, NGOs, for example, during climate conferences, are able to 
promote their agenda directly in the responsible committees having access to the bargaining 
room, a right to speak briefly, and are able to participate in so-called dialogue meetings with 
governments. Although they cannot be sure that their agenda will be acted on, they are di-
rectly heard and are clearly able to influence the discussions about an issue (Walk 2011, 
p. 11).  
In the following section some literature on German and Australian lobby groups and policy 
making is referred to in order to provide an overview of the issue of lobbyism and the influ-
ence that lobby groups have on media reporting. 
For Germany, there is a text by Bülow (2010), eco-political spokesman and correspondent 
of the fraction of the SPD parliamentary party in the German federal parliament [Deutscher 
Bundestag] on the topic Carbon, Capture and Storage (CCS) (p. 5). He talks about lobbyism 
in the context of the legislative procedure relating to CCS and says that there are two groups 
of lobbyists: private interest groups, such as trade associations and companies, which aim to 
maximise their profit – Bülow (2010) calls them “Profitlobbyisten [profit lobbyists]” (p. 4) 
– and public interest groups which feel responsible for the environment, consumer protec-
tion, children and pensioners (Bülow 2010, p. 4). Bülow (2010) makes clear that profit lob-
byism is very powerful and has a lot of influence on German politics (p. 4). Alongside the 
gun, health and automotive lobbies, the energy lobby is strongly represented in Berlin (Bü-
low 2010, p. 12). In addition, these profit lobbyists are able to talk directly with the delegates 
whereas public interest groups only have the chance to talk about their issues in public (Bü-
low 2010, p. 11) – two aspects which are also mentioned by Walk (2011). Altogether, there 
are about 5,000 lobbyists in Berlin, so every delegate is surrounded by eight lobbyists, and 
two-thirds of these are profit lobbyists (Bülow 2010, pp. 18 f.). 
Referring to his task to implement a law supporting CCS technology (a technology that is 
designed to prevent carbon emissions reaching the atmosphere), Bülow (2010) explains that 
the money necessary for such projects was provided by companies as well as the government 
(p. 5). In addition, the energy lobby tried to speed up the implementation of the law by pro-
ducing its own law which was designed to reduce costs for their members and include a 
minimum of restrictions, whereas public interest groups were mainly concerned by the tech-
nology itself and whether it could damage or help the climate (Bülow 2010, p. 11). Finally, 
it was not the energy lobby but the Bauernverband [famers’association] which had the power 
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to refuse the law, because the pipelines required for CCS could damage their land; the law 
was never discussed in parliament (Bülow 2010, p. 15). 
Even so, Bülow (2010) as a member of a project for implementing the law for CCS technol-
ogy was personally affected and without doubt, therefore, biased, his report shows that the 
influence of economic interest groups in the German federal parliament is considerable and, 
thus, indirectly also influences media reporting. 
An analysis by the Corporate Europe Observatory (CEO) (2010) examined the major Euro-
pean contributors to climate change denial in the years 2005 and 2006 (p. 9). At the begin-
ning of its research, CEO (2010) made it clear that “in the EU there is no obligation for think 
tanks to disclose their funding” (p. 2), which explains why it is difficult to find research on 
this issue. CEO (2010) examined eight European think tanks which produce and/or promote 
a wide range of material focused on denying climate change, including the Institute of Eco-
nomic Affairs (IEA), International Policy Network (IPN) and Global Warming Policy Foun-
dation (GWPF) based in the UK, CFACT Europe in Germany, the Spanish Instituto Juan de 
Mariana, the Danish group CEPOS, the French Institut Économique Molinari and the Aus-
trian Hayek Institute. Then there are the EU’s eight largest emitters, which are ArcelorMittal, 
BASF, Bayer, BP, E.ON, GDF Suez, Lafarge and Solvay, as well as the three oil companies 
Repsol, Shell and Total (p. 2). All think tanks refused to reveal the sources of their funding 
(CEO 2010, p. 2). 
Concentrating on the German think tank CFACT Europe, which is a branch of the US Com-
mittee for a Constructive Tomorrow, CEO (2010) says that it produces some of the most 
radical denialist material and is one of the main organisers of the International Conference 
on Energy and Climate, a European gathering of deniers (p. 5). The conference took place 
during the Cancún climate talks, inviting prominent climate change deniers, such as Fred 
Singer and Christopher Monckton as well as Dieter Ameling, former president of the Ger-
man Steel Federation (CEO 2010, p. 5). 
Based on the responses from the EU’s largest emitters and oil companies, oil giant BP admits 
to financially supporting the UK IEA (CEO 2010, p. 2), saying that “BP, along with 
many…governments, is keen to see a market-based solution…” (CEO 2010, p. 3). CEO 
(2010) identified the three most transparent corporations as the French cement company 
Lafarge, the energy firm E.ON and the German chemical company BASF, which affirmed 
that they do not contribute to any of the eight think tanks (CEO 2010, p. 8). The question 
here is whether this is true. 
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CEO (2010) could not clarify whether European corporations contribute to climate deniers 
in Europe, but its analysis shows that several of them support at least mainstream think tanks 
and that most of them do not offer financial transparency. So, the level of unreported finan-
cial support of climate denying think tanks might be higher. 
In Australia, it is also difficult to find research on lobbyism; however, for a different reason: 
Griffiths et al. (2007) explain that the Government of Australia has some strategies in terms 
of climate change, but these rely on “…voluntarism by industry and corporations and it does 
not require mandatory targets for energy efficiency or emissions reduction” (p. 424). As an 
example of such a voluntary programme, Griffith et al. (2007) name the Greenhouse Chal-
lenge (1995 to 2005) and its new programme the Greenhouse Challenge Plus (2005 to pre-
sent) which were both intended to encourage businesses to commit themselves to reducing 
the impacts of greenhouse gas emissions and climate change (p. 421). Griffith et al. (2007) 
state that these voluntary commitments have become means of enhancing corporate reputa-
tions and are supported by businesses, in particular the coal lobby, as a means of avoiding 
any regulatory initiatives, which could increase their costs (p. 421).  
In addition, the authors refer to the Australian Business Roundtable on Climate Change. The 
Business Roundtable is comprised of BP Australia, AIG, Origin Energy, Swiss Re, Visy 
Industries and Westpac Bank as well as, indirectly, the CSIRO and Allen Consulting Group 
(Griffith et al. 2007, p. 425). This group of companies have released a Report to Government 
in which it is argued that delaying action to ensure a transition to a low-carbon economy will 
increase costs to business and the economy (Griffith et al. 2007, p. 421). Griffith et al. (2007) 
state that “…in line with a market- based institutional governance systems, we saw the emer-
gence of a group of proactive companies arguing that there is an economic case for industrial 
adjustment to address climate change issues” (p. 421). The Australian Business Roundtable 
on Climate Change, in addition, criticises the Australian Government for its current approach 
in that emission targets “…are voluntary and piecemeal, with little consistency between ju-
risdictions” and calls for the Australian Government to intervene and, thus, provide certainty 
for business and community investment (Griffith et al. 2007, p. 421). The Australian Gov-
ernment, however, still argues that the impact of climate change can be reduced through 
initiatives more suited to Australia’s economic and geographical position (Griffith et al. 
2007, p. 422). 
Lobbyism also plays a role in the electricity industry, the single largest producer of green-
house gases in Australia, which needs, according to Griffith et al. (2007), a nationally uni-
form regulation to enhance emissions reduction and provide certainty to the industry and 
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consumers (p. 422). However, most Australian states have established their own carbon trad-
ing system, which offers a range of alternatives for the electricity industry if they wish to act 
in their own interests (Griffith et al. 2007, p. 423). Griffith et al. (2007) claim: “…Climate 
change can be addressed through a range of voluntary measures undertaken by corporations 
and individuals while the Commonwealth supports research into carbon capturing technolo-
gies” (p. 422). Consequently, for Griffith et al. (2007), climate change policy in Australia is 
viewed by powerful corporations as a matter for the Australian Government to decide, on 
the one hand. These corporations delegate responsibility to the State. The Australian Gov-
ernment, on the other hand, offers options for climate change actions to corporations, but 
there is no pressure behind these activities. So, it stands to reason that the Australian Gov-
ernment either does not want to jeopardise the economic development of the country, which 
is mainly dependent on the energy economy (see, for example, Hamilton 2001 and Taylor 
2014), or does not want to antagonise the powerful energy corporations. 
For Griffith et al. (2007), all the examples they presented show that neither corporations nor 
the State is identified as the responsible institution for transforming industry systems in re-
sponse to climate change issues in Australia (p. 422). Finally, the authors explain that the 
current decision of the Australian Government to implement a cap-and-trade carbon trading 
scheme after 2011, has now become a battleground for lobby groups and major carbon emit-
ters (Griffith et al. 2007, p. 424). This supports the assumption that the Government does not 
want to lead in terms of climate change issues. 
Mitchell (2012), who was many years a state political editor with the Sun-Herald, examines 
lobbyism in Australia, in general, and confirms the remarks made by Griffith et al. (2007). 
He says that Prime Minister Kevin Rudd’s announcement of a super profit resource tax re-
sulted in “…the most ferocious lobbying campaign ever seen in Australia” (Mitchell 2012). 
Global corporations Tio Tinto, BHP Billiton and Xstrata formed a multi-million-dollar fund 
to stop the tax becoming a law by feeding the media with anti-tax ‘horror’ stories (Mitchell 
2012). 
“The lobbying machine provided a steady stream of ‘talking heads’ to the commercial 
television networks… vilifying the government’s tax plan as un-Australian and anti-
Australian. The no-tax campaigners include the Business Council of Australia, the 
Minerals Council of Australia, the federal Opposition and Rupert Murdoch’s News 
Limited newspapers” (Mitchell 2012). 
It took the mining companies AUD 27 million and only fifty-three days from the announce-
ment of the government’s mining tax proposal to the replacement of Prime Minister Kevin 
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Rudd with Julia Gillard, without any new election, no vote in parliament and no public de-
bate (Mitchell 2012). In February 2010, only seven months after Julia Gillard took office, 
BHP Billiton, which admitted spending AUD 4.2 million, the biggest amount used to torpedo 
the mining tax proposal, declared a record six-month profit of AUD 10.2 billion in a profit 
jump of 71.2 per cent for the second half of 2010 (Mitchell 2012).  
Mitchel (2012), in addition, provides insights into the role of journalists, explaining that in 
New South Wales lobbyists outnumber the Parliamentary Press Gallery by at least two or 
three to one. These lobbyists have lists of all metropolitan journalists including their rating 
in terms of influence, approachability, susceptibility and potential usefulness (Mitchell 
2012). An assumption about the Australian climate change news coverage might, therefore, 
be that it includes more public relations material written by political and industry leaders as 
well as interest groups, using the media as a tool to spread their opinion about an issue. 
Mitchell (2012) admits that the briefings supplied by Australian lobbyists are “…meticu-
lously researched and the information is footnoted and sourced”, because lobbyists are often 
former journalists who know that information will not be taken seriously if it does not in-
clude high-quality material.  
Mitchell (2012) finishes his remarks about his experiences with lobbyism by saying that, 
although the Federal and State Parliaments in Australia have taken steps to regulate lobbyism 
with the establishment of a registration system and a set of lobbying protocols, the influence 
on legislators and the media continues to grow. 
In summary it can be said that, both, German and Australian’ politicians are influenced by 
lobby groups. The literature shows that, in both countries, the lobby/interest groups are 
mainly from the energy/fossil fuel industry. In Germany, these lobby/interest groups are se-
cretive about the amount of money they invest in lobbyism. In Australia, the lobby/interest 
groups have different influence in each national state, which results in different climate 
change policies. In both countries, the influence of lobby/interest groups on climate change 
politics is not clearly identifiable. Nevertheless, the literature about lobbyism in Germany 
and Australia shows the power of lobby groups in the two countries as well as their ambitious 
action against economic changes related to climate change. 
This short chapter about lobbyism shows that the influence of lobby groups could be identi-
fied as critical for mitigating climate change or even as climate-sceptic. Therefore, it is of 
interest to identify climate-change-sceptical coverage. Knowing that the so-called “bal-
anced” news reporting is a common journalistic practice in Australia (see Chapter 3.1), the 
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assumption is that the more lobbyists have a say, the more climate-change-sceptical views 
appear in climate change coverage. 
It can also be assumed that lobbyism influences the politics around climate change. How-
ever, the discussion of lobbyism in this chapter is just exploratory, not in-depth. 
The main aspects about the impact of lobby groups on climate change politics can be found 
in Table 6. 
 
Table 6: Societal sphere: the impact of lobbies on climate change politics in Germany 
and Australia 
Aspect of lobbyism Germany Australia 
Lobbyism is part of the govern-
ment system 
High High 
Economic interest groups in the 
national government influence 
climate change discussions 
High High  
(vary from State to State) 
Financial transparency in terms 
of climate change lobbyism 
Low  
(some sources of funding are re-
vealed) 
Moderate  
(through round tables, compa-
nies admit their lobbying activi-
ties) 
Journalists are used for – and 
profit from – lobbyism 
No information available High 
 
3.2.4. Energy supply, natural resources and the climate of Germany and Australia 
Further external aspects, that have to be known for this work, are the conditions of energy 
supply, natural resources and the climate in the two countries. Analysing these conditions 
provides an overview of the role of fossil fuels as well as nuclear energy, two important 
issues for the climate change discussions. It might, moreover, show what is perceived as 
normal and abnormal climate. 
Comparing the energy supply of Germany and Australia (see Figure 4), AGEB (2016) for 
Germany and AER (editions 2007-2012) for Australia provide the following information: It 
is clear that the diversification of energy sources is much more diverse in Germany than in 
Australia. The amount of nuclear energy was reduced sharply in 2011, the year after the 
nuclear catastrophe in Fukushima, whereas the amount of renewable energy increased in the 
same year and the year after. Nevertheless, fossil fuels (brown coal, black coal and natural 
gas) are still the main energy sources for Germany. 
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Figure 4: Comparison of energy supply in Germany and Australia by source for the years 
2007 to 2012 
Sources: AGEB – AG Energiebilanzen e. V., Stromerzeugung nach Energieträgern 1990-2015, and AER 2007-
2012, Registered generation capacity, by fuel source, State of the energy market 2007-2012 
24,2
19,0
23,6
17,0
24,5
15,0
23,0
15,5
24,5
16,0
25,5
15,0
22,2
47,0
19,4
49,0
18,1
43,0
18,5
42,0
18,3
41,0
18,5
42,0
12,2 14,0 13,9 15,0 13,6
20,0
14,1
20,5 14 21,0 12,1 21,0
1,6 0 1,5 0,0 1,7 1,5 1,4 1,5
1,2
1,5
1,2
1,5
13,8 19,0 14,5 18,0 15,9 20,0 16,6
20,0
20,2
20,0
22,8
20,0
4,1 1,0 3,9 1,0 3,6
0,5
4,2
0,5
4,2
0,5
4,1
0,5
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
Ger
2007
Aus
2007
Ger
2008
Aus
2008
Ger
2009
Aus
2009
Ger
2010
Aus
2010
Ger
2011
Aus
2011
Ger
2012
Aus
2012
El
ec
tr
ic
ity
 g
en
er
at
io
n 
in
 p
er
 c
en
t
Year
brown coal nuclear energy
black coal natural gas
liquid fuels renewable energies (wind, water, solar)
others
86 3 Theory: The Extended Sphere Model of Bräuer and Wolling (2014) 
It is conspicuous that nuclear energy is not part of the Australian energy mix. The country 
relies on black and brown coal. The amount of renewable energy is more or less stable, while 
the use of natural gas declined during the research period. 
Looking at natural resources with a focus on resources for energy generation (Figure 5), 
volumes of brown coal as well as nuclear and renewable energy are sufficient in Germany, 
while energy production based on black coal, natural gas, and especially liquid fuels are 
mainly dependent on imports (BGR’s Energiestudie 2013). In this context, BGR (2013) pro-
vides information about the proportional distribution of the energy mix, with liquid fuels 
having a 33 per cent share of Germany’s energy mix, natural gas a 21 per cent share, brown 
coal and black coal each having a 12 per cent share, while energy from renewables had a 12 
per cent share and nuclear power a 8 per cent share (p. 15). 
 
Figure 5: German resources for energy generation 
Source: BGR – Bundesanstalt für Geowissenschaften und Rohstoffe, Energiestudie 2013, p. 15 
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In 2012, primary energy consumption – i. e. energy that has not been subjected to any con-
version or transformation process, including oil, coal, natural gas, water and nuclear energy 
as well as renewable energy – in kilograms of oil equivalent per capita (one oil equivalent is 
41.868 mega joule) was 3.88 per head in Germany (The World Bank 2018). 
Australia’s energy generation is substantially based on coal which is produced domestically: 
the country earns AUD 38 billion from the export of 392 megatons of coal and is the second 
largest coal exporter after Indonesia (Energy in Australia 2013, p. 67). Based on the study 
Energy in Australia (2013), natural gas is mainly renewable and bioenergy is only produced 
for own use. The volume of renewable and bioenergy produced is, however, very small. 
Liquified petroleum gas and refined products are imported for energy generation (see Figure 
6) (Energy in Australia 2013, p. 4). The energy mix consists of black and brown coal (35 per 
cent), oil (36 per cent), natural gas (25 per cent) and renewables (4 per cent) (Energy in 
Australia 2013, p. 4). 
 
Figure 6: Australian resources used for energy generation in 2012 
Source: Energy in Australia 2013, pp. 21 f. 
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In 2012, the primary energy consumption – i. e. energy that has not been subjected to any 
conversion or transformation process, including oil, coal, natural gas, water and nuclear en-
ergy as well as renewable energy – in kilograms of oil equivalent per capita (one oil equiv-
alent is 41.868 mega joule) was 5.58 per head, in Australia (The World Bank 2018).  
Reviewing the climate in both countries, the situation in Germany was more or less stable 
for a long time, with reliable climate and weather conditions; extreme weather, such as heavy 
rainfall, was not part of German everyday life (Germanwatch 2007, p. 4). The situation, 
however, has since changed. The Deutsche Wetterdienst (DWD) has predicted that Germany 
is likely to experience the following changes relating to climate until 2050: in the summer-
time, temperatures will increase by about 1.5 °C to 2.5 °C in comparison to 1990 and during 
winter time, temperatures will be between 1.5 °C and 3 °C hotter; there will be less rainfall 
(about 40 per cent) in summer whereas in winter the rainfall will increase by about 30 per 
cent (DWD 2016). Over the last 100 years, temperatures increased by 0.8 to 1.0 degree Cel-
sius, rainfall increased in winter and, there was simultaneously, less snow (Germanwatch 
2007, p. 4). Extreme climate events, such as heat waves, heavy rainfall, and squalls, have 
increased over the last 20 years (Germanwatch 2007, p. 4). 
The prediction is that increases in temperature as well as the changes in rainfall will be re-
flected in the environment and the daily routine of Germany’s population (Germanwatch 
2007, p. 8). Because nature will react with longer vegetation periods and changes in biolog-
ical diversity, human beings need to expect extended allergy cycles as well as heat waves, 
which can cause large numbers of deaths (Germanwatch 2007, p. 8). Increases in tempera-
ture and heavy rainfall, in addition, will confront the German population with serious effects 
on the ecosystem as well as socio-economic processes due to sea-level rise, extreme weather 
glacier meltdown and floods (Germanwatch 2007, p. 8). 
Australia's climate is dominated by dry, sinking air from the subtropical high-pressure belt, 
which moves north and south with the seasons and makes the rainfall pattern over Australia 
strongly seasonal (Australian Bureau of Meteorology 2014). Australia’s climate has warmed 
by 0.9 °C since 1910, and the frequency of extreme weather has changed, with more extreme 
heat, fewer cool periods and reduced rainfall, especially in the southwest, where there is 
reduced winter rainfall (Australian Bureau of Meteorology and CSIRO 2014, p. 3). Extreme 
heat has increased, resulting in an extended fire season (Australian Bureau of Meteorology 
and CSIRO 2014, p. 3). Low rainfall combined with very high evaporation (particularly in 
inland Australia) leads to low surface water flows and seasonal river systems (Australian 
Bureau of Meteorology 2014). 
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Australian temperatures are projected to continue to rise: by 2070, compared to 1980 to 1999, 
warming is projected to be 1.0 to 2.5 °C for low greenhouse gas emissions and 2.2 to 5.0 °C 
for high emissions (Australian Bureau of Meteorology and CSIRO 2014, p. 15). The Aus-
tralian population will, thus, need to contend with a growing number of extreme fire-weather 
days in Southern and Eastern Australia on average, an increased proportion of intense cy-
clones and sea-level rise around the Australian coastline; higher mean sea levels will increase 
the frequency of extreme sea-level events (Australian Bureau of Meteorology and CSIRO 
2014, p. 15). 
Summarising this section about energy supply, natural resources used for energy genera-
tion, and climate, Germany uses less fossil fuels than Australia, due to a wider range of 
energy sources. Nuclear power is part of Germany’s energy mix, whereas Australia does not 
use nuclear power at all. Germany produces energy domestically from brown coal, nuclear 
and renewable energies. In Australia, renewable and bioenergy is exclusively produced 
within the country alongside natural gas. However, this production is at a very low level. 
Australia’s energy comes mainly from coal. The coal industry plays a major role in Aus-
tralia’s economy. Australia is a leading exporter of coal. This is why the switch from coal to 
renewable energy for energy production is a massive challenge. 
The climate in Germany will include hotter summers and winters, less rainfall in summer, 
and more rainfall in winter by 2050. The consequences of climate change are expected to be 
longer vegetation periods, changes to biological diversity, seal-level rise, extreme weather, 
glacier meltdown and floods. In addition, humans need to expect extended allergy cycles 
and more frequent heat waves, which can cause large numbers of deaths. The climate in 
Australia has warmed, resulting in extreme heat, fewer cool periods, reduced rainfall and 
extreme fire-weather conditions. Moreover, Australia already has low surface water flows 
and seasonal river systems. In future, Australia will face a growing number of extreme fire-
weather days and intense cyclones as well as extreme sea-level events (see Table 7). 
For the climate change coverage which is surveyed in this research, these results lead to the 
expectation that, on the one hand, Australian newspapers will have a larger number of reports 
about the effects of climate change, because the lifestyle of the people is already being af-
fected by these effects, and it may include more calls for action in terms of climate change. 
German climate change coverage, on the other hand, is likely to become more diverse, re-
ferring to the problems of climate change, the causes as well as the effects of climate change, 
responsibilities and calls for action in terms of climate change. 
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Table 7: Sphere of structural conditions: energy supply, resources, and climate in 
Germany and Australia 
Aspect of energy supply, re-
sources and climate 
Germany Australia 
Energy supply mainly based on 
coal and oil/liquid fuels 
Moderate  
(57 % of the  
energy mix) 
High 
(71 % of the  
energy mix) 
The coal industry is a major eco-
nomic force 
Moderate High 
Use of nuclear power Moderate  
(8 % of  
the energy mix) 
None 
Increase in renewable energy 
within 5 years 
High (plus 65 %) Extremely low (plus 5 %) 
Production of renewable energy Moderate 
(22.8 % of electricity is generated 
from renewables) 
Moderate 
(20 % of electricity is generated 
from renewables) 
Consequences of climate change 
(for example, hotter summers 
and winters, less rainfall in sum-
mer, extreme heat, extreme fire-
weather conditions, low surface 
water flows) 
Low 
(expectations of scientists for 
2050 are introduced) 
Extremely high 
(climate change has already hap-
pened; current changes are ex-
perienced by the public) 
Scientific awareness of further 
consequences of climate change 
Extremely high 
(expected: longer vegetation pe-
riods, changes to biological di-
versity, sea-level rise, extreme 
weather, glacier meltdown and 
floods, extended allergy cycles 
and frequent heat waves which 
can cause large numbers of 
deaths) 
Extremely high 
(expected: a growing number of 
extreme fire-weather days, in-
creased frequency of intense cy-
clones and extreme sea-level 
events) 
 
3.3. Journalistic influences from inside the media company 
Researchers have identified that there are forces from inside the media company which in-
fluence the representation of issues in newspapers (see, for example, Cox 2006, Boykoff and 
Boykoff 2004). Aspect which are imposed from the media owner are the usage or non-usage 
of certain news values within in newsroom (see, for example, Robie 2008, Caple and Bed-
narek 2013, Masterton 1998), there is the pressure from inside the media company about 
how an issue in a newspaper is represented (see, for example Cox 2006, Boykoff and Boy-
koff 2004) and there are the non-democratic or hierarchical newsroom processes (see, for 
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example, Donk et al. 2012, Josephi 2011). From discussions of these issues it is clear that 
coverage is not always objective but can be influenced by a number of interests. 
One major powerful interest is the management of a media company. It can regulate the way 
in which the news is represented and disseminated. The management of a newspaper, for 
example, could reduce the amount of space which is available for a news story (Cox 2006, 
p. 164) and “…increases pressure on journalists to dramatise issues to ensure that a story 
gets out” (Cox 2006, p. 164). The reason for this is that news is now a source of profit. 
Boykoff and Boykoff (2004) provide an overview of the various influences, writing that: 
"…the content of news is affected by three normative orders…: political norms (the 
idea that the proper role of the mass media is to provide the citizenry with political 
information that will lead to enhanced accountability on the part of elected officials), 
economic norms (the constraints on journalists working within a capitalist society in 
which reporting must be both efficient and profitable), and journalistic norms (objec-
tivity, fairness, accuracy, balance)" (p. 126). 
The organisational influence of media companies in Germany and Australia (besides UK, 
Finland, Latvia, the Netherlands, Austria, Portugal, Sweden and Switzerland) was evaluated 
in The Media for Democracy Monitor by Donk et al. (2012). Donk et al. (2012) start from 
the premise of current media system science, which claims that the media reflects the system 
of political power and control (p. 501). So, Donk et al.’s (2012) research refers to political 
thought about the substance of democracy [Demokratiegehalt] in established democracies – 
the Demokratiebarometer [the democracy barometer] – which also includes an index about 
the quality of media systems in terms of performance and the provision of information 
(p. 502). 
For their research, Donk et al. (2012) investigated a model which includes the three main 
functions of journalists in a democracy: 1. freedom, i. e. the guarantee that there is a free 
flow of information; 2. equality, i. e. an open forum for interests as well as opinion; and 
3. control, i. e. the control of social power (p. 505). Every of these functions were associated 
with some indicators which, on the one hand, refer to the media structure and, on the other, 
refer to the performance of the media company; for example the indicator “freedom” has 
“numerous news sources” as a structural aspect and “rules for democracy within a news-
room” as a performance aspect (Donk et al. 2012, pp. 505 f.). 
The findings of Donk et al. (2012) are based on a secondary analysis of the indicators cited, 
with data from 2008, as well as on interviews with leading journalists in the most important 
news media – including newspapers, public radio, public television, private television and 
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news websites – for each country, and were completed in 2010 (p. 506). The most important 
research question raised by Donk et al. (2012) for this chapter of the research is the question: 
how democratic is the organisation of news production in leading media? (p. 507). 
The findings of Donk et al. (2012) show that the media companies’ influence in Germany is 
a special case, because institutional forms of debate – for example, editorial meetings, which 
take place regularly – are part of the newsroom culture, a culture which is based on the 
freedom of the press and guarantee everyone an equal voice in a discussion (p. 509). How-
ever, this is not the case when selecting leading positions; these are selected in hierarchical 
structures (Donk et al. 2012, p. 509). In an earlier article about his findings in the context of 
The Media for Democracy Monitor, Marcinkowski and Donk (2009) wrote that “…manage-
ment usually appoints editors-in-chief and, in most of the cases, journalists are not involved 
in the process” (p. 208). As one of two exceptions, Marcinkowski and Donk (2009) name 
Süddeutsche Zeitung, which has established a board of leading editors that could impede the 
owners’ choice with a quorum of two-thirds (p. 208). Another noticeable consequence of the 
power structure in a newsroom is that the choice of interview partners is decided by the 
editor-in-chief or the heads of departments (Marcinkowski and Donk 2009, p. 209). Regard-
ing monopolisation, Marcinkowski and Donk (2009) state clearly that, especially in the re-
gional newspaper market, there is a tendency towards newspaper conglomerates in Germany 
(p. 209). 
For Donk et al. (2012) there is room for improvement when it comes to democratic-deliber-
ative processes in the newsroom (p. 510): even though journalists only feel committed to 
work investigatively in a few newsrooms, it is part of the editorial outlines (p. 514). In addi-
tion, Donk et al. (2012) remark that in Germany there are influential journalistic unions as 
well as a strong education in media ethics; however, the issue of violation of media ethics is 
not debated openly (p. 513). 
In Australia, journalists do not formally have a voice regarding the choice of leading staff 
(Donk et al. 2012, p. 509). In addition, although there are no written regulations on how 
decisions about news are to be made, the newspaper staff decides together about news se-
lection (Donk et al. 2012, p. 509). 
Josephi (2011), who used the results of The Media for Democracy Monitor for her Australian 
Journalism Monographs, affirmed Donk et al.’s (2012) finding, writing that consultation, 
participation and plurality of views are part of Australia’s newsroom culture (p. 19). How-
ever, as in Germany, the editor is the boss and, thus, also in Australian newsrooms the struc-
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ture is hierarchical (Josephi 2011, p. 19). Josephi (2011) even stated that the degree of inde-
pendence of an Australian newsroom from its owner or the management is a difficult subject, 
due to hand-on media owners (p. 20). 
It is, therefore, no surprise that Donk et al. (2012) explain that there is a high concentration 
in media ownership in Australia with a lot of influence across all genres and a great deal of 
power in terms of spin (p. 511). Besides, Josephi (2011) brings a surprising aspect into the 
discussion, saying that every state or territory nominates its top stories; however, the decision 
about which one is published is made by media outlets with national news values in mind 
(p. 20). The consequence of this decision is that regional news tends to take a backseat. In 
terms of climate change coverage, these newsrooms tend to ignore regional climate change 
issues, giving national issues more priority – based on the interests and criteria for newswor-
thiness in the respective newsroom. 
In Australia, ethical standards are part of journalistic education (Donk et al. 2012, p. 513). 
“However, internally the media in Australia show few democratic traits due to the influence 
of media owners” (Josephi 2011, p. 21). 
Summarising these outcomes about influences from inside the media company (see Table 8), 
the assumption that German journalism is based on strong ethical rules and regulations is 
confirmed. Discussions between journalists in the newsrooms are institutionalised, regulated 
by the freedom of the press and by hierarchical structures. In Australia, there are no regula-
tions about how journalists should cooperate and there is a participatory newsroom culture. 
Nevertheless, in Australian hierarchical structures also play a major role when filling a lead-
ing position and deciding about newsworthiness. 
Another difference between Germany and Australia is that a few media owners build huge 
conglomerates across all media genres in Australia, whereas there are more media owners 
in Germany. 
For the coverage which is studied in this research, these facts may well result in a broader 
variety of opinions, perspectives, and aspects about climate change in German newspapers 
than in the climate change coverage of the Australian newspapers. 
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Table 8: Institutional sphere: comparison of German and Australian newsrooms in terms 
of internal factors of influence 
Aspects of internal influence Germany Australia 
Debate, consultation, participa-
tion and plurality are part of the 
newsroom culture  
Yes Yes 
People in leading positions are 
selected in hierarchical struc-
tures 
Yes Yes 
The choice of interview partners 
lies with the editor-in-chief or 
the head of departments  
Yes No information available 
Newsroom processes are demo-
cratic 
Yes No, because of strong influence 
of media owners 
Media ethics issues Yes, but not debated openly No information available 
 
3.4. The journalistic profession in Germany and Australia 
Although journalists have a major stake in news coverage, being the authors of all articles 
published in a newspaper, there are only a few studies about journalistic work from a jour-
nalistic point of view. This, however, is an important perspective for this research, because 
it helps to explain which influencing factors a journalist has to deal with while doing his/her 
job. 
At the beginning of every journalistic career, there is training during which journalists learn 
their trade. Harnischmacher (2010), Hirst (2010), Schäfer (2012), the United Nations Envi-
ronment Programme, Wuppertal Institute Collaborating Centre on Sustainable Consumption 
and Production & Grimme Academy (2011), Cox (2002) and Dernbach (2012) discuss the 
education of journalists and their route into the newsroom. During their education, the earli-
est influencers of journalism are also identified from the authors. 
In addition, there are aspects which are intrinsically motivated, such as the ideological iden-
tity of journalists and, thus, how they see their work in society. A comparison of several 
countries in terms of journalistic ideological identity was made by Hanitzsch et al. (2011) as 
well as Hanusch (2008), who was responsible for the Australian part of Hanitzsch et al.’s 
(2011) survey. The comparative aspect in Hanitzsch et al.’s (2011) survey is of special in-
terest for this research, because it is currently the only study that includes the journalists’ 
viewpoint on their work as well as a comparison between countries. Moreover, Weischen-
berg et al. (2006), Hanusch (2008), Lünenborg and Berghofer (2010) and Rodrigues (2008) 
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studied the self-concept of journalists in the two countries as well as how they are able to 
put it into practice. These two aspects – the ideological identity as well as the self-concept 
of journalists – show how much the opinion of a journalist plays a role in the two countries 
examined in this research. 
The individual perspective of journalists in Germany and Australia as well as aspects which 
influence this perspective are the main issues in this chapter: In Chapter 3.4.1, this research 
reviews journalists’ attitudes to work. How do they define their institutional role and what 
is their epistemology and ideological identity? Chapter 3.4.2 – about the socialisation of 
journalists – discusses how journalists are educated. Chapter 3.4.3 identifies their profes-
sional self-concept, so what tasks do they have (from their own perspective). Chapter 3.4.4 
shows the news values which are mainly relevant in Germany and Australia in general as 
well as in relation to environmental/scientific coverage of which climate change is one part. 
3.4.1. German and Australian journalists and their attitude to work 
With their “World Journalism Project”, Hanitzsch et al. (2011) compare the institutional 
role, epistemology, and the ideological identity of journalists in Germany and Australia dur-
ing the period in which this research took place. 
Hanitzsch et al. (2011) carried out a comparative survey of 1,800 journalists in 18 countries 
(p. 273). Concentrating on Germany and Australia, he asked 100 journalists working in 20 
news organisations in each country, including daily newspapers, general-interest weeklies 
(magazines/newspapers), one news agency as well as television and radio stations 
(pp. 277 f.). Online newsrooms were not part of the sample (Hanitzsch et al. 2011, p. 276). 
However, Hanitzsch et al. (2011) selected five journalists each with some editorial respon-
sibility in the 20 newsrooms, while the other 95 journalists were selected randomly (p. 276). 
The methodology used for Germany and Australia, the two countries which are of interest 
for this research, were telephone interviews about their institutional roles, their epistemolo-
gies and ethical views (Hanitzsch et al. 2011, p. 276). 
The authors started with a literature review of the three aspects (institutional roles of jour-
nalism in society, journalist’s epistemologies and ethical ideologies) (Hanitzsch et al. 2011, 
pp. 275 f.). Hanitzsch et al. (2011) first identified three dimensions of journalistic institu-
tional roles: 1. Intervention, illustrating two types of journalists who are either involved, 
socially committed, assertive and motivated, or uninvolved, dedicated to objectivity, neu-
trality, fairness and impartiality, 2. Power distance referring to either a journalism that is a 
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“fourth estate”, which challenges those in power, or opportunistic journalists, who see them-
selves as partners of the ruling elites, 3. Market orientation referring to the target audience 
in their role as a citizens/consumers, which is represented by journalistic cultures that either 
give priority to public interests or emphasise political information to create an informed cit-
izenry (p. 275). 
Second, epistemological underpinnings are discussed in terms of objectivity: 1. objectivism, 
i. e. journalists either believe that there is an objective truth, which can be reported, or all 
representations are inevitably selective and require interpretation, and 2. empiricism includ-
ing a journalistic culture which either emphasises observation, measurement, evidence and 
experience, or accentuates reason, ideas, values, opinion, and analysis (Hanitzsch et al. 2011, 
p. 276). 
Third, for the ideological identity, Hanitzsch et al. (2011) use the two dimensions of ethical 
ideologies which the psychologist Forsyth published in 1980. These are: 1. relativism which 
refers to journalists who have either the opinion that ethical decisions are dependent on the 
context or that journalists should rely on moral absolutes regardless of the context, and 
2. Idealism which refers to journalists who are either highly idealistic and means-oriented or 
less idealistic and goal-oriented (p. 276). 
A master questionnaire, based on the findings in the literature review and developed collab-
oratively to guarantee intercultural validity, was first developed in English and then trans-
lated into the relevant languages, using simple wording to reduce potential translation prob-
lems (Hanitzsch et al. 2011, p. 278). 
The first list of 12 items, which was designed to measure the institutional roles of journalists, 
includes five possible responses: “extremely important”, “very important”, “somewhat im-
portant”, “little important”, and “not important at all”, the second list of 14 items designed 
to identify journalists’ epistemological beliefs and ethical ideologies includes the options 
“strongly agree”, “somewhat agree”, “neither agree nor disagree”, “somewhat disagree” and 
“strongly disagree” (Hanitzsch et al. 2011, p. 279). 
First, the findings of Hanitzsch et al. (2011) in terms of the institutional role show that, in 
Germany, there is “a fairly strong emphasis on the motivational potentials of journalism…” 
(p. 281) which includes values, such as “…non-involvement, detachment, monitoring the 
government, as well as providing political and interesting information to motivate the peo-
ple…” focusing on political information (pp. 281 f.). Australian journalists have the same 
institutional role, but they focus on what they think is “interesting information” (Hanitzsch 
et al. 2011, p. 282). So, political issues are of great significance in Germany whereas, in 
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Australia, newsworthiness is not connected with politics. This is why it is of considerable 
interest to compare the news values of Germany and Australia, an aspect which is discussed 
in Chapter 3.4.4. 
Hanitzsch et al.’s (2011) findings about the second aspect, journalism epistemology, show 
that the most important issue for German journalists is to publish only material which is 
verified (p. 283). For Australian journalists it is most favourable to provide analysis of events 
and issues (Hanitzsch et al. 2011, p. 283). 
Regarding ethical ideologies, the authors found that German journalists do not accept per-
sonal influence, such as own interpretations of events and issues, whereas Australian jour-
nalists agree to an “…interpretative but factual mode of reporting” (Hanitzsch et al. 2011, 
p. 284). Moreover, questionable methods of reporting are not an option for German journal-
ists, as Germany is part of the “absolutist” paradigm which states that journalists “…usually 
follow universal rules of ethical professional conduct…” (Hanitzsch et al. 2011, p. 286). 
These results are interesting, but older studies claim the opposite (see, for example, Dons-
bach 1982, Köcher 1985, Kepplinger 1979). However, Weischenberg et al. (2006) also stated 
in his research on journalism in Germany, which is further discussed in Chapter 3.4.3, that 
the majority of German journalists are much more reluctant to engage in unethical practices 
than they were 12 years ago (p. 257). The unauthorised use of government documents is 
acceptable for some German journalists (25 per cent), while other practices are used vanish-
ingly low (masquerading as an employer: 11 per cent, adopting a different opinion to get 
information: 11 per cent, pretending to be a different person: 8 per cent, paying money for 
information: 6 per cent, using hidden microphones/cameras: 5 per cent) (Weischenberg et 
al. 2006, p. 257). Admittedly, these results do not completely exclude unethical behaviour 
as Hanitzsch et al. (2011) does, but it shows that there might be a change of thinking in 
journalism in Germany. 
Unlike in Germany, Australian journalists are more open to unethical behaviour. There jour-
nalists say that it “depends on the situation” (Hanitzsch et al. 2011, pp. 285 f.). 
Hanusch (2008), who was responsible for the Australian research on 100 journalists in the 
mainstream media as part of the global journalism research project carried out by Hanitzsch 
et al. (2011), published his findings in another journal with more detailed results about the 
Australian journalism culture. The basis for his survey was the aforementioned methodology 
and framework developed by Hanitzsch et al. (2011, p. 5).  
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Concentrating on the epistemology, Hanusch (2008) says that Australian journalists claimed 
that “…their beliefs and convictions did not influence their reporting” (p. 7). Regarding eth-
ical ideologies “…two-thirds believe there are ethical principles which should always be 
followed” (Hanusch 2008, p. 7). Both aspects are examined together by Hanusch (2008) with 
the following results: 81 per cent of the participating journalists “agreed” or “strongly 
agreed” that “I make claims only if they are substantiated by hard evidence and reliable 
sources.”, 78 per cent stated that “I provide analysis of events and issues in my work.”, 69 
per cent stated that “I remain strictly impartial in my work.”, 70 per cent said that “There are 
ethical principles which are so important that they should be followed by all journalists, 
regardless of what situation and context.”, and 69 per cent stated that “I do not allow my 
own beliefs and convictions to influence my reporting” (Hanusch 2008, pp. 9 f.). These re-
sults somewhat soften the assumption of more sensational coverage in Australian journalism 
because of terms such as “hard evidence”, “reliable sources” and “strictly impartial”. Nev-
ertheless, that Australian journalists “provide analysis” means that they interpret the findings 
represented in their coverage. Hanusch (2008), however, comments that journalism in Aus-
tralia follows “…the traditional values of the media as the fourth estate…” (p. 8) and its 
journalists are “…passive, adversarial and objective reporters…” (p. 8). 
Comparing the results for Germany and Australia in relation to the work attitude of jour-
nalists (see Table 9), there are some major differences in how journalists define their work. 
In Germany, journalists seem to refer to strong ethical rules and regulations, which do not 
accept opinions in the form of interpretation and analysis of the represented facts. In Aus-
tralia, a personal view on a topic seems to be acceptable as long as supporting facts are given. 
These characteristics in terms of Australian journalists’ work attitude is to see as critical as 
also sceptical voices – i. e. journalists with a climate-change-sceptical attitude – might have 
a say and might spread this opinion via their medium. Facts to support climate-change-scep-
tical media messages could easily be found as there exists also scientific work about the non-
existence of climate change. 
Moreover, the fact that German journalists concentrate on “political information” whereas 
Australian journalists look for “interesting information” gives rise to the assumption that 
there may be more articles with a focus on political actors in German newspapers than in 
Australian ones.  
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Table 9: Subject sphere: comparison of German and Australian journalism work 
attitudes 
Aspect of journalism work atti-
tude 
Germany Australia 
Material must be verified High Extremely high 
Special focus High 
(political information) 
High 
(interesting information) 
Provides analysis of events and 
issues 
Low High  
Personal opinion/interpretation Low High 
Ethical principles should be fol-
lowed by all journalists 
High High 
Values of the media represent 
the “fourth estate” 
No information available High 
 
3.4.2. German and Australian journalists and their socialisation 
Which are the qualities of a good journalist? This question is of major interest when com-
paring news coverage in two countries, because the socialisation of journalists can be very 
different in each country and, thus, can influence the representation of an issue such as cli-
mate change. 
The socialisation of journalists starts during their education. In Germany and Australia, jour-
nalism education faces similar challenges. Harnischmacher (2010), who reviews and vali-
dates the German system of journalism education, explains that it can be summarised as 
“Studium plus X [studying plus x]” (p. 357). Even though the education of journalists played 
a major role in the university reformation in the 1970s and Germany took a leading role in 
including science in journalism education, the practical part of journalism involved training 
in the media companies (Harnischmacher 2010, p. 358). For Harnischmacher (2010), the 
central issue is that media science and journalism practice during a study is not accepted by 
the media sector as a proper education and is not even preferred over other studies (p. 361). 
For him, it is of great importance that journalism studies increase their relevance in the media 
sector (Harnischmacher 2010, p. 364). 
Exactly the same issue is referred to by Hirst (2010), who discusses recent scholarly debates 
about what is accepted as a good journalism education in Australia (p. 83). He says that he 
as a journalism educator hoped that the media industry would accept his graduates as pro-
fessionally competent (Hirst 2010, p. 84). He further explains that there is a battle of jour-
nalism education versus “…the conservative industry view that theory is out of place in 
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journalism training” (Hirst 2010, pp. 87 f.). Hirst (2010) demands that journalism educators 
place emphasis on learning and reflexive praxis, so that future journalists are able to analyse 
their socio-political environment (p. 93). 
The fact that a journalist is only seen as a ‘proper’ journalist when learning journalism skills 
in a newsroom gives the media companies a lot of power. They not only decide who gets the 
chance to be a journalist due to choosing trainees themselves. The journalist also has the 
impression that the traineeship is of higher value than what he/she has learned during jour-
nalism studies. So, the journalism freshman is familiarised with the philosophy of a media 
company and is influenced by its owners. This is why this research also examines the organ-
isational system of the media companies in a later chapter. To answer the question about the 
qualities of a good journalist, the answer revealed by this discussion is: having experience 
of professional practice. 
Having experience of professional practice is, however, a special challenge in some areas of 
reporting, such as in environmental journalism. Environmental journalism, or even climate 
change journalism, is not a subject a journalist could learn at university or any journalism 
school (see, for example, Schäfer 2012, United Nations Environment Programme, Wupper-
tal Institute Collaborating Centre on Sustainable Consumption and Production & Grimme 
Academy 2011, Cox 2006, Dernbach 2012). Thus, it is also difficult for researchers to re-
search on climate change journalism because it does not exist as a structured educational 
training. Schäfer (2012) discusses environmental journalism in Europe. He explains that 
every council meeting of the European Union reveals 27 versions of the same environmental 
topic (Schäfer 2012, p. 67). He further states that, therefore, the training for European jour-
nalists needs to include the environmental issues of the European Union (Schäfer 2012, p. 
72). In 2011, the United Nations Environment Programme and the Wuppertal Institute Col-
laborating Centre on Sustainable Consumption and Production together with the Grimme 
Academy (2011) developed a guideline for a journalism course to teach future journalists 
how to handle sustainability, which is defined as considering environmental aspects as much 
in one’s own everyday life as social and economic aspects (p. 16). In this context, Cox (2006) 
stated that “…few reporters have training in science and knowledge of complex environ-
mental problems… [and] few news organisations have the financial means to hire such tal-
ent” (p. 174). He also claimed that, due to the fact that “the real environment is altogether 
too big, too complex, and too fleeting for direct acquaintance…, journalists have sought 
ways to simplify, frame, or make ‘maps of the world’ to communicate their stories” (Cox 
2006, p. 177). Dernbach (2012) explains that environmental journalism has never become a 
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separate department, but it is represented in the media in five different concepts: as ecolog-
ical-oriented economic journalism, anti-economy-oriented sustainability journalism, as 
scandal journalism (focusing on negative events including the risk of Armageddon), as sci-
entific journalism, and as energy, climate and waste journalism (pp. 14 f.). 
These results show that qualities of a good journalist are similar in Germany and Australia. 
In both countries, a good journalist is made by training on the job; the industry assesses 
journalism education as merely “nice to have”. Environmental journalism is not a subject at 
university or journalism school. It is an issue which underlies the personal interest of a jour-
nalist, and his/her personal interest will affect his/her knowledge about it (see Table 10).  
The fact that the socialisation of journalists is very similar in Germany and Australia leads 
to the assumption that the socialisation of journalists is not a factor of influence for the cli-
mate change coverage studied in this research, but it could explain differences in the style of 
reporting. 
 
Table 10: Subject sphere: German and Australian journalists and their socialisation 
Aspects of journalists and their 
socialisation 
Germany Australia 
Acceptance of journalism studies  Low Low 
Acceptance of training on the job High High 
Existence of environmental jour-
nalism as a part of education 
Low Low  
 
3.4.3. German and Australian journalists and their self-concept 
Examining journalists’ socialisation in both countries, another central issue is their self-con-
cept as a journalist. Do they see themselves as advocates for a certain public sphere, as a 
supervisory authority or as a critic? 
Weischenberg et al. (2006) asked 1,536 German journalists working in all kinds of media 
from 1 February to 25 April 2005 via telephone interviews on their self-concept (p. 349). 
The authors defined 15 statements which need to be ranked by the participating journalists 
in terms of their role and the relevance of action (Weischenberg et al. 2006, p. 355). Rele-
vance of action stands for the connection between the self-concept of a journalist and the 
possibility to put it into practice (Weischenberg et al. 2006, p. 355). The results of Weisch-
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enberg et al. (2006) – representing only the two options of highest agreement: “I agree en-
tirely” and “I agree mainly” – show four central issues of self-concept and relevance of ac-
tion (p. 356). 
Looking at the top-5 answers, most of the participating journalists described their self-con-
cept in terms of “informing the public neutrally and precisely” (88.6 per cent), followed by 
“explaining and conveying complex issues” (79.4 per cent) , “informing the audience as soon 
as possible” (74.1 per cent), “representing reality as it is” (73.8 per cent) and “concentrating 
on news which is of relevance for most of the audience” (60.2 per cent) (Weischenberg et 
al. 2006, p. 356). 
Analysing these five topics regarding their possibility to put these self-concepts into action, 
the ranking changes: “inform the audience as soon as possible” (79.1 per cent) is ranked first, 
followed by “inform the public neutrally and precisely” (76.4 per cent), “explain and convey 
complex issues” (75.1 per cent) “concentrate on news which are of relevance for most of the 
audience” (74.4 per cent) and “represent reality as it is” (67.2 per cent) (Weischenberg et al. 
2006, p. 356). 
Weischenberg et al. (2006), therefore, conclude that the self-concept of journalists in Ger-
many is being an informer for their audience, and the results of the relevance of action anal-
ysis shows that the participating journalists can also put this claim into action (p. 355). Only 
the aspect “representing reality as it is” appears to not be very practical: only two-thirds of 
the participating journalists stated that it is easy to put this principle into action, whereas all 
other aspects were agreed to by 75 per cent (Weischenberg et al. 2006, p. 356). 
Looking at the answers with the least approval in terms of the self-concept of journalists, 
“influencing and putting specific topics on the political agenda” (13.8 per cent) is named 
least frequently, followed by “presenting specific viewpoints to the audience” (19.4 per cent) 
(Weischenberg et al. 2006, p. 356). However, only 39.4 per cent are able to put the self-
concept relating to “influencing and putting specific topics on the political agenda” into ac-
tion (Weischenberg et al. 2006, p. 356). These results might mean that journalists are asked, 
for example by the owners of the medium they work for, to put influential material into their 
coverage. As many as 66.8 per cent were able to put their self-concept in terms of “presenting 
the audience with specific viewpoints” into action (Weischenberg et al. 2006, p. 356). 
Reviewing the statements made by Weischenberg et al. (2006), Lünenborg and Berghofer 
(2010) analysed the self-concept of political journalists with the support of online analyses 
in November/December 2009 using the databases “Zimpel” and “MEDIAtlas” to identify 
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the sample of journalists (pp. 5 f.). A total of 916 journalists answered the questions (Lünen-
borg and Berhofer 2010, p. 7). The results produced by Lünenborg and Berghofer (2010) 
support Weischenberg et al.’s (2006) findings about the journalistic role of informing and 
mediating: 95.5 per cent of the participating journalists argue that they “explain and convey 
complex issues” and 82.7 per cent say “inform the public neutrally and precisely” (p. 38). 
Lünenborg and Berghofer (2010) identified this result as a change in comparison to previous 
studies, which ranked these two aspects the other way around (p. 37). Moreover, 79.3 per 
cent stated that they “represent reality as it is” and 62.2 per cent wanted to “inform the audi-
ence as soon as possible” (Lünenborg and Berghofer 2010, p. 38). 
The two aspects that met with least approval – “influencing and putting one’s own topics on 
the political agenda” and “presenting one’s own viewpoints to the audience” – reveal a 
higher percentage among political journalists than among journalists in all fields: 24.6 per 
cent said that “influencing and putting one’s own topics on the political agenda” and 32.5 per 
cent stated that “presenting one’s own viewpoints to the audience” is part of their self-con-
cept (Lünenborg and Berghofer 2010, p. 39). 
These results correspond with those of Weischenberg et al. (2006). But the ranking of the 
top answers is different. For Lünenborg and Berghofer (2010) political journalists see them-
selves much more as explainers and mediators, i. e. in a more audience-centric role; the 
demands of the audience are considered by political journalists (p. 37). In addition, the re-
search shows that part of the self-concept of political journalists is to “offer criticism regard-
ing abuses” (74.4 per cent) (Lünenborg and Berghofer 2010, p. 39). Especially in the context 
of this research, it is highly relevant that Lünenborg and Berghofer (2010) discovered that 
48.2 per cent of political journalists stated that they are mainly concerned with environmen-
tal politics (p. 36); and climate change is one aspect of environmental politics. So, in relation 
to interpreting the results of this research, the research by Lünenborg and Berghofer (2010) 
shows that climate change, one the one hand, might be explained and criticised by political 
journalist and can, thus, include the journalists’ opinions. On the other hand, climate change 
could be discussed in a political context. 
To find research on the self-concept of journalists from an Australian perspective is difficult. 
Hanusch (2008) explains that the last survey on this issue, which was carried out by Hen-
ningham, was in 1998, 16 years before the survey he carried out himself (p. 8). 
Hanusch (2008) also deals with the self-concept of Australian journalists. As explained in 
the previous chapter, the basis for his survey was the aforementioned framework developed 
by Hanitzsch et al. (2011), which includes three constituents of journalism culture which are 
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the functions of journalism in society (institutional roles), the notions of reality and what 
constitutes evidence (epistemologies) and how journalists deal with ethical problems (ethical 
ideologies) which, in addition, are further divided into seven principle dimensions (p. 5). 
Hanusch (2008) provides deeper insight into the results of the Australian survey. 
The central finding about the institutional roles are that journalists “…merely report events 
rather than get involved in them” (Hanusch 2008, p. 6). Their role is to be a detached ob-
server and that they do not set the political agenda or are advocates for social change (Han-
usch 2008, p. 6). “To provide citizens with the information they need to make political de-
cisions” is ranked as “extremely important” or “very important” by 79.0 per cent of the 
participating journalists, “to act as watchdog of the government” is stated by 76.0 per cent, 
“to be an absolutely detached observer” by 71.4 per cent, “to act as watchdog of business 
elites” by 67.0 per cent, and “to provide the audience with the information that is most in-
teresting” by 61.6 per cent of the Australian journalists (Hanusch 2008, p. 6). The latter 
aspect shows – as does the study by Lünenborg and Berghofer (2010) – that the demands of 
the audience are also of importance for Australian journalists. Hanusch (2008) approves this 
aspect when saying that Australian journalists favoured a citizen-oriented approach and even 
increasingly see readers as consumers of their coverage (p. 6). This is why Australian cov-
erage might be somewhat more audience-centric than German coverage, which could also 
be due to the fact that Australia has an increasingly tabloid newspaper market (see, for ex-
ample, Papandrea 2013). 
Another important finding is the role of watchdogs, either monitoring the government or 
business elites (see Hanusch 2008, p. 6). Neither aspect is part of the results in the German 
surveys. Although Lünenborg and Berghofer (2010) talk about “offer criticism regarding 
abuses” (p. 39), the Australian term of a “watchdog” is much stronger and seems to be a 
much more investigative approach to journalism, with a focus of the political and economic 
elites in the country. This approach might result in more news coverage with own opinion, 
due to a greater aspiration to fulfil the role of a watchdog. 
Besides Hanusch’s (2008) survey, there was also research by Rodrigues (2008), who ana-
lysed the self-concept of journalists in the Australian state of Victoria. This research took 
place between July 2007 and February 2008 and adopted a two-step approach, combining 
quantitative and qualitative methods (Rodrigues 2008, p. 114). A total of 600 survey ques-
tionnaires were sent to journalists in metropolitan, suburban and regional print, radio and 
television newsrooms in Victoria, of which 83 were returned (Rodrigues 2008, p. 114). In 
addition, 12 in-depth interviews were conducted to supplement the information gathered 
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through the surveys (Rodrigues 2008, p. 114). The focus of the project was journalists’ views 
about a broad range of issues, including journalism ethics (Rodrigues 2008, p. 116). 
The results produced by Rodrigues (2008) are comparable to those found by Hanusch 
(2008): Almost all respondents state that it is “extremely important” for the media to “inves-
tigate claims and statements” (88 per cent), to “provide analysis of complex problems” 
(77 per cent), and to “get information to the public quickly” (75 per cent) (Rodrigues 2008, 
p. 118). Ranked fourth and in the mid-range of “extremely important” are to “provide anal-
ysis of international developments” (63 per cent) (Rodrigues 2008, p. 118), an answer which 
supports the audience-centric approach of Australian media which Hanusch (2008) also 
identified. However, the fifth answer was to “motivate ordinary people to get involved in 
public discussion of important issues” (52 per cent) (Rodrigues 2008, p. 118). This is an 
intervention of the media and might draw the attention of the public to, for example, a low-
value issue just in order mobilise them in a certain direction. 
Rodrigues (2008) also asked the participating journalists about the circumstances in which 
illegal practices are accepted (p. 117). Looking at the five most important answers, 63 per 
cent of the sample of journalists says that “using confidential business/government docu-
ments without authorisation” is “justified on occasion” when it relates to an important story 
(Rodrigues 2008, p. 117). 49 per cent say the same about “badgering unwilling infor-
mation/sources to get the story”, 46 per cent refer to “making use of personal documents 
without permission” and “using re-creations or dramatisations of news by actors” and 41 per 
cent feel the same about “using hidden camera or microphones” (p. 117). So, illegal practices 
are occasionally used in Australia and do not seem to be unethical or labelled as “bad jour-
nalism”. These practices are either good or bad for the public discourse. A good aspect of 
the acceptance of illegal practices is that that the public gets access to secret information, in 
terms of climate change, for example, to the agenda of the fossil fuel lobby. A bad aspect is 
that the substance of the coverage could be principally questioned. So, knowledge about 
journalists engaging in illegal practices might irritate the public. 
To answer the question about the self-concept of journalists, the answer after this part of the 
chapter is: as an informer and criticiser for Germany and being a watchdog and analyst for 
Australia (see Table 11).  
These results of the journalist’s self-concept leads to a new question for this work, that is to 
say: how could this self-concept be identified in climate change coverage? Therefore, two 
types of articles are differentiated, the informing and the commenting articles.  
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Informing articles are factual articles. They include facts and data, cite people as well as 
scientific results, drafts of legislation and opinion polls. An example for an informing article 
from the German media is “Die entscheidenden zwei Grad” from Süddeutsche Zeitung. It 
says in terms of climate change: “Effektiver Klimaschutz, betonte Johann Wackerbauer vom 
Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, verursachen Kosten von einem Prozent des Bruttoinlands-
produkts. Die Kosten, die ein Klimawandel verursacht, liegen bei fünf, manche schätzen 
sogar 20 Prozent [Effective climate protection, emphasized Johann Wackerbauer from the 
Institute for Economic Research, costs one percent of gross domestic product. The costs 
caused by climate change are five percent, some even estimate 20 percent]” (Süddeutsche 
Zeitung, 30.11.2009). This example cites a scientist and mentions data.  
The Sydney Morning Herald publishes “Getting it right on climate change” and writes: “As 
expected, [the climate change conference in] Bali has become a lightning rod for a range of 
differing perspectives, from those who accept the scientific consensus on the dangers of cli-
mate change and want urgent action to those who question the science and prefer vague 
interaction. European nations and some developing countries have been pressing for devel-
oped countries to agree to a 25 to 40 per cent cut in carbon emissions by 2020. The United 
States, Japan and Canada oppose such efforts” (Sydney Morning Herald, 13.12.2007). This 
article gives information about the discussion and, thus, about the different perspectives 
worldwide on climate change during the Bali conference. 
Commenting articles are opinion articles that use narratives. So, feature stories which reveal 
the life of a particular person belong to this category. Also, public relations material, such as 
interviews, speeches or articles in which the authors are political leaders or experts express-
ing their own personal opinion are examples of commenting articles. These articles are often 
written in the first person, using “I” or “we”.  
An example for a commenting article in Germany is from Norbert Röttgen, Bundesumwelt-
minister at the time of publishing. He writes in Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung: “In Kopen-
hagen geht es ums Ganze: Schaffen wir den Durchbruch für den internationalen Klimaschutz 
– oder behalten die Kassandras recht und der Klimaschutz wird auf die lange Bank gescho-
ben?“ [Copenhagen is all about the whole picture: will we achieve a breakthrough for inter-
national climate protection - or will the Cassandra's be right and climate protection be post-
poned?] (Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 2.12.2009). So, this article is written by a person 
with own polical interests and he writes in first person using „we“.  
For Australia, The Age writes about “Renaissance in the Valley”: “It’s early Monday morn-
ing and clouds of steam rising from the huge stacks over Loy Yang power station hang in 
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the spring sunshine. The scene below is not so peaceful. Earlier, environmental protesters 
have broken in an chained themselves to conveyer belts delivering coal to the plant. Remov-
ing them under the eye of cameras is slow work. The protesters’ supporters wear orange T-
shirts with the slogan ‘I’m taking real action for climate change’ emblazoned across the 
front” (The Age, 23.09.2007). This articles tells a story, using narratives to create a picture 
in the readers’ mind. 
So, this work also looks at this reflection of the self-concept, coding all articles in terms of 
being informing or commenting. 
Moreover, the findings of this chapter – that Germany’s journalists are informer and criti-
ciser and being a watchdog and analyst is important for Australian journalists – results in the 
expectation that journalists in Germany would produce mainly informing coverage, whereas 
Australian journalists would write in a commenting style. 
 
Table 11:  Professional sphere: comparison of the self-concept of German and Australian 
journalists 
Aspects of the self-concept of 
journalists 
Germany  Australia 
Provide citizens with information  neutrally and precisely to make political decisions 
Take an audience-centric ap-
proach 
consider the demands of the au-
dience and present their own 
viewpoints 
provide the audience with the in-
formation that is most interest-
ing for them 
Influence/guide readers with 
their coverage 
least approval in terms of the 
self-concept 
important aspect of journalism 
Use illegal practices, such as 
dramatisation, hidden cam-
eras/microphones etc. 
no information available occasionally used 
The task of the journalist informer and criticiser watchdog and analyst 
 
3.4.4. German and Australian journalists and news values 
News values are an important journalistic tool, helping journalists to identify what is im-
portant and what is not newsworthy. To identify the most important news values of our time, 
in Germany, Ruhrmann and Göbbel (2007) ask in an online survey 43 journalists of all kind 
of media (3 chief editors, 7 managing editors, 4 news managers, 18 managing editors, 1 ed-
itor on duty and 9 editors without leadership role) about current news values, the changes in 
news values, the control authority of news values, and the most relevant news topics (p. 39). 
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To identify these two aspects, Ruhrmann and Göbbel (2007) offered all participants a list of 
21 scientifically identified news values including their definitions; each criterion could be 
ranked from 1 (not important) to 5 (very important) (p. 40). To identify the most relevant 
news topics, the participants in the study are, moreover, asked an open question: to name the 
topics which they feel are of most importance in their newsroom (Ruhrmann and Göbbel 
2007, p. 45). 
So, Ruhrmann and Göbbel (2007) identified 1. the purview, which means the total number 
of people who are directly affected by an event, with an average of 4.3; 2. German partici-
pation, which includes either coverage with German participation or without German partic-
ipation, with an average of 4.0; 3. negative consequences/damage/failure, which concen-
trates on the negative aspects of an issue, with an average of 3.8; 4. surprise, which is an 
event that confounds all expectations, with an average of 3.8; 5. conflict/differences of opin-
ion, which stands for the representation of verbal or written controversies, with an average 
of 3.7, and 6. positive consequences/benefits/success, which includes positive events that are 
explicitly named, with an average of 3.7 (p. 41). Further news values are prominence (3.3), 
proximity to Germany (3.3), personalisation (3.3), establishment of issues (3.3), visualisa-
tion (3.2), status of the scene of the event (3.1), status of the country where event takes place 
(3.1), violence/aggression (3.1), and demonstration (3.1) (Ruhrmann and Göbbel 2007, 
p. 41). The existence of pictures and, thus, a picture as a ‘lead’ for news (3.0), the political 
proximity to Germany (3.0), the visual demonstration of emotions (2.9) the economic prox-
imity to Germany (2.8), the influence of an institution or a person (2.7), the cultural proxim-
ity to Germany (2.6), and sexual/erotic aspects (1.5), which was of less importance for the 
participants in the survey (Ruhrmann and Göbbel 2007, pp. 41 f.). Göbbel’s und Ruhrmann’s 
(2007) analysis, consequently, confirms the classic news values of purview, conflict/differ-
ences of opinion and damage vs. benefits (p. 42). 
Referring to changes in news values, the criteria “existence of pictures”, “visualisation”, 
“visual demonstration of emotions”, “purview”, “prominence”, “personalisation” and “Ger-
man participation” are seen as of greater importance (Ruhrmann and Göbbel 2007, p. 43). 
Badenschier and Wormer (2012) investigate news values in the context of science journalism 
of which climate science is a part. They therefore use a quantitative as well as a qualitative 
method: a content analysis and guided interviews analysing the German nationwide quality 
daily newspapers Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Süddeutsche Zeitung and Die Welt (Ba-
denschier and Wormer 2012, p. 74). For the guided one-hour interviews, Badenschier and 
Wormer (2012) include the editor responsible for the science sections in each of the selected 
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newspapers (p. 74). The content analysis of the selected newspapers is completed in a ran-
domly selected week in the first half of 2009; each article is scanned completely “…because 
a former study clearly indicated that a remarkable amount of science coverage can be found 
outside the science section”, using the “50+ percent scientific content” rule (Badenschier 
and Wormer 2012, p. 74). Finally, Badenschier and Wormer (2012) classify 192 articles as 
science journalism coverage (Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung: 31, Süddeutsche Zeitung: 59, 
Die Welt: 82) (pp. 74 f.). 
Badenschier and Wormer (2012) started their research by creating a draft catalogue of news 
factors for science coverage, using the ideas about news factoring in science coverage pub-
lished by Ruhrmann (1990/1997) (Badenschier and Wormer 2012, p. 70). The existing news 
factors were extended for science coverage, for example, “proximity” became “scientific 
proximity” (Badenschier and Wormer 2012, p. 71). Badenschier and Wormer (2012) identi-
fied 29 news values, resulting in a draft catalogue of factors (pp. 72 f.). 
After the interviews and the content analysis, Badenschier and Wormer (2012) reduced the 
number of news values relevant to scientific communication to 14: “Astonishment”, “Polit-
ical relevance”, “Composition”, “Range (number of affected people)”, “Controversy”, “Ref-
erence to elite persons”, “Economic relevance”, “Relevance to recipients/society”, “Graph-
ical material”, “Scientific relevance”, “Intention”, “Actuality (Trigger)”, “Personalisation”, 
and “Unexpectedness”, all of which should “…help science journalists to pick the ‘right’ 
story…” (p. 79). The authors summarised their findings, writing that classical news values 
are relevant in science journalism and that the perspective of the general audience is of in-
creasing importance for the selection (Badenschier and Wormer 2012, p. 80), a result that is 
discussed in the chapter about the self-concept of journalists. 
Finding studies about news values in Australian media is difficult. The keywords “news 
values” and “Australia” in the period between 2007 and 2011, when this research took place, 
just lead to news values in the context of special issues, such as the representation of obesity, 
suicide or of Sudanese migrants in the media. News values in the context of content analysis 
are not available. It seems that news values are just a niche issue for researchers in Australia. 
Does this mean that, in Australia, news values are not developed? Or are they based on fixed 
journalistic rules that journalists learn during their education and do not question or extend? 
Robie (2008) is the only researcher who analysed the literature about news values generally 
and examined their historical development, not explicitly for Australia, but for various re-
gions in the Pacific. In his four-world model, Australia is part of the first world, together 
with New Zealand, Canada, European nations, and the US (Robie 2008, p. 105). Robie 
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(2008) defined the following news values for the first world: 1. timeliness: news is now; 
2. proximity: news is near; 3. personality: news is prominent or includes interesting people 
including politicians, royalty, sports heroes and heroines, hip hop artists and movie stars; 
4. unusual, odd events: news is quirky, weird, bizarre oddities outside the norm; 5. human 
interest; 6. conflict; and 7. disaster (p. 17). And “‘objectivity’ is espoused as a dominant 
ideal for First World media…” (Robie 2008, p. 15). 
The study which is cited in all current research on Australian news values (see, for example, 
Robie 2008, Caple and Bednarek 2013) was done by Masterton (1998). So, unfortunately, 
there seem to be no other specific research on this issue in an Australian context. 
Masterton (1998) asked why some information is more newsworthy than other information 
(p. 86). So, he sent more than 2,500 copies of a questionnaire in English, French, Spanish 
and Russian to decision-making journalists working at newspaper agencies and in broadcast 
newsrooms in 151 countries around the world as well as to journalism schools, both aca-
demic and based on training on the job (Masterton 1998, p. 89). He received replies to 11 per 
cent of all questionnaires sent and these came from 69 countries (Masterton 1998, p. 90). All 
respondents coded a list of 14 defined news values with “agree” (scored 2 points), “agree in 
part” (scored 1 point), “disagree in part” (scored minus 1 point), and “disagree” (scored mi-
nus 2 points) (Masterton 1998, p. 91). Dividing the total points scored by each news value 
by the number of respondents resulted in the “level of acceptance” (Masterton 1998, p. 91). 
Masterton (1998) states that the most important news values identified in his research are: 
“consequence” (importance/impact), with a level of acceptance of 1.75, “proximity” (near-
ness), with a level of acceptance of 1.42, “conflict” (disagreement), with a level of ac-
ceptance of 1.42, “human interest” (stories about people), with a level of acceptance of 1.41, 
“novelty/unusualness” (bizarre/the rare), with a level of acceptance of 1.34, and “promi-
nence” (about prominent people), with a level of acceptance of 1.26 (p. 91). 
Comparing Masterton’s (1998) results with the list made by Robie (2008) reveals no major 
differences, even though Mastertons’s (1998) study is an international one. “Personality” 
(Robie 2008) corresponds with “Prominence” (Masterton 1998), “proximity”, “unusual”, 
“human interest” and “conflict” are identified by Masterton (1998) and Robie (2008) as well. 
“Disaster” (Robie 2008) could be associated with “conflict” (Masterton 1998). Only “time-
liness”(Robie 2008) is not equivalent to Masterton’s (1998) “consequence”, which means 
that the news values differ only slightly. So, there seems to be a general set of news values 
which are used throughout the world and to which Australia corresponds. 
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Due to the differences in news values research, it is very difficult to assess this aspect of 
journalists’ socialisation. A noteworthy aspect of German news values is that also positive 
events are considered to be newsworthy, an aspect which is not mentioned in Australia. The 
Australian news values “timeliness” and “human interest” does not appear in the list of Ger-
manys’ 21 scientifically identified news values (Ruhrmann and Göbbel (2007)). The latter 
aspect is a sign that Australians are interested in people stories or as Masterton (1998) put it: 
“…people want to know about other people, even if they are not important people” (p. 97). 
Instead, Germany refers to “the purview”, which includes not only one, but a number of 
people affected by an event. This could suggest a preference for representing positive or 
negative events, not just the consequences for a single person. All other aspects are compa-
rable: “German participation” with the Australian news values “proximity”, the German 
“surprise” is similar to the Australian “unusual odd events” and the German “negative con-
sequences/damage/failure” with the Australian news values of conflict” and “disaster”. 
A summary of all news values can be found in Table 12. 
 
Table 12: Professional sphere: comparison of German and Australian news values 
Aspects of news values Germany Australia 
Purview, participation/relevance, 
(economic, political, scientific) 
proximity, range 
Yes Yes 
Negative consequences, damage, 
failure, disaster 
Yes Yes 
Surprise, unusual, odd events, 
unexpectedness, astonishment 
Yes Yes 
Conflict, differences Yes Yes 
Positive consequences, benefits, 
success 
Yes No 
Timeliness, actuality Yes Yes 
Personality No Yes 
Human interest No Yes 
Composition Yes No 
Reference to elite nations Yes No 
 
Summarising Chapter 3.4, it appears that journalists in Germany and Australia have similar 
preconditions. They need to prove themselves in the newsroom after their study or train-
eeship until they are accepted as a “good” journalist. Especially when they want to specialise 
in a field, such as climate change, they have to learn by doing and broaden their horizons in 
this field of interest on their own. 
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Differences in journalist’s socialisation can be found in the definition of their role: German 
journalists want to be informers and criticisers, whereas Australian journalists tend to be 
analysers and watchdogs. For the climate change coverage in German newspapers, on the 
one hand, this could mean that journalists are more neutral than those writing for Australian 
newspapers. On the other hand, Australian newspapers help their audiences to understand 
complex issues, while German journalists see their main role as to inform. These findings 
correspond with the findings about the self-concept of a journalist – informer and criticiser 
versus watchdog and analyst. It could be measured in the examination of the climate change 
coverage in this research as an appearance of two types of writing styles: German journalists 
inform readers about facts and criticising misuse of polls, scientific results or drafts of drafts 
of legislation. Australian journalists comment on climate change coverage using statements 
made by the political and economic elite in the country as a basis for critical analysis and 
introduce their own experiences to make issues related to climate change more accessible to 
their readers. 
3.5. Climate change coverage: the newspapers investigated 
This chapter provides a closer look at the organisational structure and the political back-
ground of the four newspapers which are the basis for this research. 
A discussion about the chosen newspapers is necessary because the different owners, the 
political orientation of a newspaper and circulation are factors of influence, which could also 
be represented in the news coverage of climate change. So, the newspapers are part of the 
“institutional sphere”. 
The newspapers used for the research were chosen based on two requirements. The first is 
that they have the highest circulation in each country. This is an important aspect, as they 
influence public opinion on a broad scale. Because this research was intended to identify 
how different quality newspapers represent climate change, the second requirement is that 
all basic newspapers should have high journalistic standards. This is why tabloid newspapers 
are not considered. 
Based on these requirements, the following newspapers are the basis for this research: For 
Germany, the report of the Bundesverband Deutscher Zeitungsverleger e. V. [Federal Asso-
ciation of Newspaper Publishers] says that the newspapers with the biggest circulation are 
Sueddeutsche Zeitung (428,266 copies) and Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (363,620 cop-
ies) (2010). For Australia, The Sydney Morning Herald (207,013 copies) and The Age 
(197,500 copies) are examined (Audit Bureau of Circulations 2010). 
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In the following the four newspapers are introduced in terms of the ownership of the news-
papers and their political orientation based on the literature. From the literature review of the 
four newspapers, it is noticeable that from 2007 to 2011, German as well as Australian re-
searchers seemed not to have been interested in studying the general political direction of 
newspapers. This is why the literature review about the four newspapers is very general. 
3.5.1. Süddeutsche Zeitung 
Süddeutsche Verlag, the publisher of Süddeutsche Zeitung, is owned by a family of publis-
hers from Munich as well as Südwestdeutsche Medien-Holding (Süddeutsche Verlag 2011). 
As stated in their mission statement, Süddeutsche Verlag (2011) considers itself to be inde-
pendent of political parties and ideologies and has the central claim to provide information 
as well as freedom of opinion and a liberal and tolerant attitude. Süddeutsche Zeitung has a 
column called “Wissen” in which climate change is represented alongside topics such as 
archaeology, psychology and astronautics; regular climate change specials are not part of 
the media plan (Süddeutsche Verlag 2011). 
Eilders (2002), who analysed the political positions of five German quality newspapers from 
1994 to 1998 including Süddeutsche Zeitung as well as Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (the 
latter is discussed in the next section), provided the basis for the following examinations of 
these newspapers (p. 34). This is why her findings are presented first. 
Focusing on editorials, which “…indicate the editorial stance of a media outlet” (p. 33), 
Eilders (2002) codes the whole article using 45 defined issue categories with five conflict 
dimensions, including “economic wealth and distribution”, “institutional and individual au-
tonomy”, “cultural identity”, “societal integration”, and “external security” (pp. 34 f.). A 
total of 8,717 editorials were read and 15,890 issues of the five newspapers were reviewed 
(Eilders 2002, p. 35). 
Concentrating on Süddeutsche Zeitung, Eilders (2002) identified the newspaper as taking a 
centre-left position in relation to political issues (p. 41). Accordingly, most issue dimensions 
are evaluated as left by Süddeutsche Zeitung, especially “control of new technology versus 
acceptance of risk”, “participation versus representation”, and “cultural identity versus inte-
gration” (Eilders 2002, p. 43). Nevertheless, in conflict situations, in particular those which 
refer to tax and economy issues, the coverage is rather conservative (Eilders 2002, p. 43). 
Lüter (2004) used Eilders’ (2002) data to examine editorial positions in the comments of 
German quality newspapers. He wrote that Süddeutsche Zeitung has a left-liberal orientation 
(Lüter 2004, p. 181) with a highly diagnostic approach to issues but does not put criticism 
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and explanations at the centre of its coverage (p. 185). The newspaper mainly supports the 
German Green Party (Lüter 2004, p. 180), which is an important information for this re-
search. So, Süddeutsche Zeitung might be expected to be strongly pro-mitigating climate 
change. Lüter (2004), moreover, analysed the “positioning” of all newspapers in terms of 
directive editorial comment. However, the “positioning” of Süddeutsche Zeitung was, at 64.7 
per cent, the lowest on this dimension of all the newspapers studied (Lüter 2004, p. 188). 
Thus, the “positioning” of Süddeutsche Zeitung is below average (Lüter 2004, p. 188). This 
“positioning” and the highly diagnostic approach to issues confirms the description of the 
socialisation of German journalists who see themselves as informers and criticisers (see 
Chapter 3.4.3). 
3.5.2. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 
The shareholders and editors of Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung are the FAZIT-Stiftung and 
the four publishers of Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung are Berthold Kohler (for politics), 
Jürgen Kaube (for the arts section), Holger Steltzner (for economic issues) and Werner 
D‘Inka (for the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Rhein-Main region) (FAZ 2015). The 
founders of Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, mainly Erich Welter, decided that the editorial 
and entrepreneurial independence of the newspaper could best be guaranteed with the sup-
port of a non-profit institution as a majority shareholder (FAZ 2015). 
Eilders’ (2002) analysis of editorials in Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung identified this news-
paper as taking a rather conservative position in relation to political issues (p. 41). This can 
also be seen when she reviewed the issue dimensions: Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung only 
assesses “supranationalism versus sovereignty”, “cooperation versus conflict” and “central-
ism versus autonomy” as left (p. 43). Comparing all five newspapers she analysed, Eilders 
(2002) stated that: “…liberal and conservative papers displayed surprisingly corresponding 
positions on some issues while they strongly disagree on others” (p. 48). 
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung and Süddeutsche Zeitung mostly disagree on the issue di-
mensions „cosmopolitanism versus ethnocentrism“ and „cultural identity versus integration“ 
(Eilders 2002, p. 42) which both discuss relationships with foreign countries and culturally 
different groups (Eilders 2002, p. 54). Neither issue dimension is of interest for a discussion 
about climate change. This is why this difference will not result in different climate change 
coverage. “Cooperation versus conflict” and “supranationalism versus sovereignty” are the 
two issue dimensions that both newspapers mostly agree about (Eilders 2002, p. 42). The 
first dimension is about the East-West or North-West conflicts, the second discusses the 
activities of important organisations, such as the UN, NATO and the EU (Eilders 2002, 
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p. 56). This latter issue dimension could be of importance for the results of this research, 
because all institutions have a stake in the climate change discussion. Due to a very small 
difference of 0.03 (1.00 means absolutely left, 3.00 means absolutely right) between the two 
newspapers, there might be no difference in coverage. However, Eilders (2002) also exam-
ines the mean position for some policies (p. 44). This is why the environmental and energy 
policies, representing an ecological position, are compared with labour and employment as 
well as economic policies, representing the economic position. Frankfurter Allgemeine 
Zeitung clearly takes a right position (environmental policy: 2.29, energy policy: 2.58, labour 
and employment policy: 2.62, and economic policy also 2.62) (Eilders 2002, p. 44). 
Süddeutsche Zeitung positions itself more to the left in terms of its ecological position (en-
vironmental policy: 1.49, energy policy: 1.58), but only slightly in terms of its economic 
position (labour and employment policy: 2.11 and economic policy 2.21) (Eilders 2002, 
p. 44). This further supports the assumption that Süddeutsche Zeitung takes a stronger ap-
proach to encouraging climate change mitigation, and this is even stronger than that of 
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung. 
Lüter (2004) wrote that Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung takes a highly diagnostic approach 
to issues, whereas Süddeutsche Zeitung does not put criticism and explanations at the centre 
of its coverage (p. 185). Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung mainly supports the CDU Party and 
has a very negative view of the PDS party (Lüter 2004, p. 180). 
3.5.3. The Age 
The Age, based in Melbourne, is 100 per cent owned by Fairfax Media Limited and 60 per 
cent of the Australians consume Fairfax Media Limited content. The total masthead reader-
ship per month of The Age is 3.4 million (Fairfax Media Limited 2014). 
In his analysis of the Australian media system Rahkonen (2007) explains that The Age is a 
traditional quality paper with an audience at the highest socio-economic level including ed-
ucated people and decision makers (p. 28). In addition, he speaks about the pursuit of quality 
by The Age, which is represented by its broad and liberal way of reporting and the fact that 
it employed three investigative journalists (Rahkonen 2007, p. 29). 
3.5.4. The Sydney Morning Herald 
The Sydney Morning Herald is also 100 per cent owned by Fairfax Media Limited and has 
5.4 million total masthead readership per month. Thus, The Sydney Morning Herald has the 
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largest total masthead readership in Australia across print, web, mobile and tablet (Fairfax 
Media Limited 2014). 
Rahkonen (2007) also describes The Sydney Morning Herald in his analysis of the Australian 
media system. He says that The Sydney Morning Herald – like The Age – reports liberally 
(Rahkonen 2007, p. 33) and also dedicates a strong socio-economic position to its audience 
(Rahkonen 2007, p. 29). 
Johnston and Graham (2012) made a content analysis of the front section of the two broad-
sheets The Australian and The Sydney Morning Herald in April and May 2007 and 2009 and 
identified an increasingly narrative writing style (p. 521). This result, consequently, proves 
the assumption made in Chapters 3.4.3 and 3.4.4 that Australia’s journalists (mainly) use a 
commenting writing style. 
The authors coded a sample of 2,435 stories in 2007 and 2,565 stories in 2009 (Johnston and 
Graham 2012, p. 522) and conducted three semi-structured interviews with leading newspa-
per editors and journalists by phone which took about 45 minutes each (Johnston and Gra-
ham 2012, p. 523). The results for The Sydney Morning Herald show an increase in com-
ment/column articles (2007: 1.5 per cent; 2009: 3.2 per cent) (Johnston and Graham 2012, 
p. 523). Narrative style decreased during the same period by about 10 per cent (2007: 
22.2 per cent; 2009: 13.4 per cent) (Johnston and Graham 2012, p. 523). 
Although, with The Age and The Sydney Morning Herald, Fairfax Media Limited is the 
owner of two quality newspapers with the highest circulation in Australia and are, therefore, 
quite powerful, this media group is apparently only of little interest to researchers. Further 
literature about this media group’s newspapers is, therefore, not available. 
In contrast, there are a number of articles about Rupert Murdochs News Ltd. (see, for exam-
ple, Thussu 2007, McKnight 2010). A reason for this fact might be that Rupert Murdoch as 
a person is of interest because he not only controls his global media empire, but also has a 
huge reputation within the broader media and communication sphere, for example, in politics 
(Arsenault and Castells 2008, p. 503). And he is self-promoting, appearing “…on the cover 
of almost every major western publication” (Arsenault and Castells 2008, p. 503). Therefore, 
the research on The Age and The Sydney Morning Herald is finished with these two short 
sections. 
Looking at the findings about the German and Australian newspapers covered by this re-
search, the results are not comparable. Due to the fact that Fairfax Media Limited, the media 
company behind The Age and The Sydney Morning Herald, was practically not examined by 
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researchers during the research period, there is no applicable information available. The 
available information about Süddeutsche Zeitung and Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung is also 
not very detailed (see Table 13). 
 
Table 13: Societal sphere: comparison of the newspapers in terms of climate change 
coverage  
Germany Australia 
Süddeutsche Zeitung Frankfurter Allgemeine 
Zeitung 
The Age The Sydney Morning 
Herald 
Centre-left/liberal 
(Eilders 2002, Lüter 
2004) 
Conservative 
(Eilders 2002) 
Broad and liberal 
(Rahkonen 2007) 
Liberal 
(Rahkonen 2007) 
Highly diagnostic ap-
proach to issues to is-
sues 
(Lüter 2004) 
Highly diagnostic ap-
proach to issues 
(Lüter 2004) 
Investigative  
journalists 
(Rahkonen 2007) 
No information availa-
ble 
Not putting criticism 
and explanations at the 
centre of its coverage  
(Lüter 2004) 
Not putting criticism 
and explanations at the 
centre of its coverage 
(Lüter 2004) 
No information availa-
ble 
No information availa-
ble 
Pro German Green 
Party/contra CSU  
(Lüter 2004) 
Pro CDU Party/contra 
PDS party 
(Lüter 2004)  
No information availa-
ble 
No information availa-
ble 
Only little directive 
comment. 
(“positioning”) 
(Lüter 2004) 
Only little directive 
comment. 
(“positioning”) 
(Lüter 2004) 
No information availa-
ble 
No information availa-
ble 
No information availa-
ble 
No information availa-
ble 
Audience at the highest 
socio-economic level 
(Rahkonen 2007) 
Audience at the highest 
socio-economic level 
(Rahkonen 2007) 
 
3.6. Summary of theoretical findings 
Existing studies on climate change coverage in Germany and Australia have recognisable 
deficits: 1. Large-scale studies cannot go into detail, 2. statements about extreme weather 
always refer to the amount, not the quality of the coverage, and 3. the examination of climate 
change coverage mainly refers to the analysis of coverage in the context of climate confer-
ences, and not in the context of events representing social and economical consequences 
(environmental disaster) or political and medial consequences (election campaign). This re-
search aims on closing these gaps. 
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In doing so, this research will, first, look at the political influence on German and Australian 
climate change coverage (see, for example, Bechberger and Reiche 2004, Tilly 2007, 
Weidner 2008, Neuhoff 2010, Schäfer et al. 2012, Maurer 2011, Manne 2011, Bacon 2013). 
The literature shows that the influence of politics seems to be greater in Australia. The opin-
ion of the current Australian Prime Minister and his/her party essentially dominates their 
involvement in climate change. This is why the assumption is that the climate change cov-
erage during the 2007 Australian election was more diverse in the two Australian newspa-
pers. German political parties, by contrast, do not have the chance to choose whether they 
would like to include climate change in their election programme. They have to, because 
climate change is securely established in the public discourse. 
Second, this research considers the influence of lobby groups on German and Australian 
climate change coverage (see, for example, Walk 2011, Bülow 2010, CEO 2010,Griffiths et 
al. 2007, Mitchell 2012). The literature shows that, in both countries, these lobby/interest 
groups mainly come from the energy/fossil fuel industry. The assumption is, therefore, that 
a critical tone in terms of climate change appears in the news coverage of climate change or 
even a climate-change-sceptical viewpoint as well as that climate-change-sceptical institu-
tions have a say, because this could be caused by lobby groups. 
Thirdly, the analysis of the literature about energy supply, natural resources for energy gen-
eration, and climate has shown that Germany is less dependent from fossil fuels than Aus-
tralia due to a broader diversification of energy sources and that climate change already in-
fluences the lifestyle of Australia’s inhabitants whereas the German public is not as affected 
(see, for example, AGEB 2016, AER 2007-2013, BGR 2013, Energy in Australia 2013, Ger-
manwatch 2007, Australian Bureau of Meterology and CSIRO 2014). This leads to the ex-
pectation that the two examined Australian newspapers would have a higher number of re-
ports about the effects of climate change and it is likely to include more calls for action in 
terms of climate change. On the other hand, German climate change coverage could be more 
diverse. 
Fourthly, the influence from inside the media company was discussed in this chapter (see, 
for example, Cox 2006, Donk et al. 2012, Josephi 2011). A central finding of this examina-
tion is that Australian journalists seem to have more freedom when writing their coverage. 
However, the power of media outlets and the influence of media owners put this advantage 
into perspective. For the coverage which is studied in this research, these facts could result 
in a broader variety of opinions, perspectives, and aspects related to climate change in Ger-
man newspapers, whereas the climate change coverage in the Australian newspapers is sim-
ilar within each medium. 
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Fifthly, the attitude of journalists to their work is different in the two countries: German 
journalists tend to concentrate on “political information” whereas Australian journalists look 
for “interesting information” (see, for example, Hanitzsch et al. 2011, Hanusch 2008). Be-
cause climate change is a political topic, this result gives rise to the question whether climate 
change is rather represented in a political context in German newspapers. 
Sixthly, the literature about the qualities of a good journalist, i. e. their socialisation, shows 
similar preferences (see, for example, Harnischmacher 2010, Hirst 2010). This is why the 
assumption is that the socialisation of journalists is not a factor which can explain differences 
in climate change coverage. 
Seventhly, the self-concept as a journalist is described as “informer and criticiser” for Ger-
many and “being a watchdog and analyst” for Australia (see, for example, Weischenberg et 
al. 2006, Lünenborg and Berghofer 2010, Hanusch 2008, Hanitzsch et al. 2011, Rodrigues 
2008). These results about the self-concept of a journalist could be measurable in the exam-
ination of the climate change coverage in terms of two types of writing styles: German jour-
nalists inform the public about facts and criticise abuses using polls, scientific results or 
drafts of legislation. Australian journalists comment in their climate change coverage on 
statements by the political and economic elite of the country as a basis for a critical analysis 
and introduce their own experiences to make climate change accessible to their readers. 
Eighthly, the findings about news values are not sufficiently informative (see, for example, 
Ruhrmann and Göbbel 2007, Badenschier and Wormer 2012, Robie 2008, Masterton 1998). 
The news values in the two countries seem to be quite similar. 
Ninthly, the newspapers which are examined in this research are discussed (see, for exam-
ple, Süddeutsche Verlag 2011, Eilders 2002, Lüter 2004, FAZ 2015, Rahkonnen 2007, John-
ston and Graham 2012); however, the literature about these newspapers is too different to 
provide comparable results. 
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4. Conclusions from theory 
The findings of research on framing climate change as well as of the literature based on 
Bräuer and Wolling’s “Extended Sphere Model” (2014) introduces a number of aspects rel-
evant to the representation of climate change in newspapers and about the profession of 
journalists as authors of climate change coverage. For the development of hypotheses and 
sub research questions, these aspects are set in the context of the two main events included 
in this research – the two elections in Germany and Australia as well as the environmental 
disasters in the two countries. The central goal is to identify frames and frame sub-dimen-
sions of climate change found in the literature, deduced from theory (see Chapters 2 and 3) 
and inductively added while testing the code book.  
The theoretical findings from Chapters 2 and 3 show that, basically, both countries identify 
climate change as a problem and call for action, even though without demanding concrete 
activities. Besides this consensus, there are, however, a number of differences between Ger-
man and Australian climate change media coverage. 
In this research, these differences in coverage are examined in the context of an election and 
an environmental disaster. In the following, the theoretical findings from Chapters 2 and 3 
are, therefore, associated with these events. As a result, hypotheses as well as sub research 
questions are defined, comparing the two countries, the two events and the time before and 
after the event itself. 
4.1. Comparisons between the countries 
The theoretical findings related to German and Australian climate change coverage, which 
are of importance for the comparison between the two countries, focus especially on the 
following three topics: climate change politics, lobby groups and journalistic norms. 
That politics has a major influence on the representation of climate change in German as 
well as Australian media is a central finding of the theoretical discussion. The Chancellor 
and the Prime Minister, respectively introduced the topic in both countries in the 
1970s/1980s and made it a political issue, however, with different effects as the literature 
analysed (see Chapter 3) shows. In Australia, the climate change discussion and the respon-
sibility for climate change are strongly connected with the opinion of the Prime Minister and 
his/her party. They influence the intensity of media appearance by supporting the issue of 
climate change, or by not doing so (see, for example, Hamilton 2001, Crowley 2007, Taylor 
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2014). Thus, they also influence the extent of public discourse about climate change. In Ger-
many, by contrast, the literature review shows that climate change is now firmly established 
in the political as well as in the public discourse; it is part of German society’s value system 
(Weidner 2008, p. 24 f). Weidner (2008) refers to 20 years of positive path dependency by 
the German government, regardless of the dominant parties (pp. 10 f.) and says that the 
country’s climate change policy is one of the most effective worldwide (Weidner 2008, p. 
xii). 
These different conditions are also reflected in election programmes of the two countries. In 
Germany, climate change is part of every party programme. In Australia, climate change 
became, for the first time after nearly two decades, an issue in the 2007 election, using the 
slogan “the greatest moral challenge of our time” (Suter 2010, p. 310). This clear statement 
about the importance of tackling climate change leads to the assumption that the climate 
change coverage during the election campaign in Australia not only defines, but also ex-
plains the issue, using frame sub-dimensions of causes and effects, and refers to action de-
signed to mitigate climate change, which can be identified by the frame sub-dimensions of 
the frame element “treatment recommendation”. Due to the fact that climate change is not a 
new topic in elections in Germany, the political parties only have to say that climate change 
is part of their programme. German media coverage of climate change, therefore, tends to 
be rather generic, including just a problem definition without going too much into detail.  
Hypothesis 1: Australia’s climate change coverage is dominated by frames of causes and 
effects as well as of action. Germany’s climate change coverage is unspecific and restricted 
to defining the problem. 
These findings resulting in hypothesis 1 also give a hint to one of the dominant authors of 
climate change coverage in the two countries: the findings show that Australia’s politicians 
have stronger influence whereas Germany’s politicians have less influence on media atten-
tion to climate change.  
Hypothesis 2: Politicians in Australia have a greater stake in the representation of the na-
tional climate change discussion than those in Germany. They are more often mentioned in 
the country’s newspapers than German politicians in German newspapers. 
Examination of the influence of lobby groups on German and Australian climate change 
coverage illustrates the fact that lobbyists from various industries and organisations are part 
of the political arena. Via politicians, the lobby group’s input also finds its way into the 
media. Due to the fact that the literature about lobby groups is insufficient, a hypothesis 
about lobbyism is not considered. However, the findings about lobbyism must be connected 
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with another outcome of the literature review, i. e. the fact that there is a difference in terms 
of the way journalists deal with sources. The Australian climate change coverage is affected 
by balance-as-bias news reporting; Australia’s journalists aim to give different viewpoints 
on a topic equal coverage (see Bacon 2013). This journalistic norm creates a lot of scope for 
lobbying – an issue which is also reflected by the public that “…believed there was a lack 
of balanced, unbiased information available…” (Climate Institute of Australia 2010, p. 10). 
As a consequence, there are more critical voices and climate-change-sceptical viewpoints in 
Australian newspapers: McGaurr et al. (2013) state that the “uncertainty” frame is predom-
inant (89 per cent), signifying that Australia’s news media make an effort to achieve bal-
anced reporting, but without considering dominant scientific opinions (p. 27). 
In Germany, this phenomenon of giving critics and sceptics a say only rarely exists, because 
the literature shows that there is a consensus that climate change is man-made: Arlt and 
Wolling (2012) say that the “uncertainty discourse” is rarely mentioned (p. 291). 
Hypothesis 3: In Australia, the representation of climate-change-sceptic viewpoints is a nor-
mal aspect of climate change coverage. German newspapers rarely give space to such scep-
tical voices. 
The literature about journalists does not identify major differences. German and Australian 
journalists face the same advantages and disadvantages when starting their working career 
and editors in both nations claim that you learn to be a journalist by training on the job (see, 
for example, Harnischmacher 2010, Hirst 2010). This latter finding, however, shows that the 
influence of media outlets and media owners on the representation of climate change could 
be considerable. They, for example, decide about the usage or non-usage of certain  news 
values within a newsroom (see, for example, Robie 2008, Caple and Bednarek 2013, Mas-
terton 1998) and they influence the representation of issues in newspapers (see, for example 
Cox 2006, Boykoff and Boykoff 2004). From discussions of these issues it is clear that cov-
erage is not always objective but can be influenced by a number of interests. 
This seems to be especially the case in Australia as the literature about the influence on 
journalists from inside the media company shows. Donk et al. (2012) explain that there is a 
high concentration in media ownership in Australia with a lot of influence across all genres 
and a great deal of power in terms of spin (p. 511). And Josephi (2011) talks about “…few 
democratic traits due to the influence of media owners” (Josephi 2011, p. 21). 
Another difference between Germany and Australia is that the media owners build huge 
conglomerates across all media genres in Australia – basically there are two huge conglom-
erates, that is to say Fairfax Limited and News Corp (see, for example, Lidberg 2018) – 
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whereas there are more media groups in Germany. This might be expected to lead to a 
broader variety of opinions in German climate change coverage. 
Hypothesis 4a: German newspapers represent a wide variety of perspectives on climate 
change. The diversity of frame sub-dimensions is high. In Australia, the variety of perspec-
tives on climate change is low. 
Hypothesis 4b: The variety of actors in German newspapers is higher than the variety of 
actors in Australian newspapers.  
The literature shows that the self-understanding as a journalist is represented as an “informer 
and criticiser” in Germany and “being a watchdog and analyst” in Australia (see, for exam-
ple, Weischenberg et al. 2006, Lünenborg and Berghofer 2010, Hanusch 2008, Hanitzsch et 
al. 2011, Rodrigues 2008). These results might be related to two types of writing styles: 
German journalists, on the one hand, might primarily critically inform the public about facts, 
using polls, scientific results or drafts of legislation. On the other hand, Australian journalists 
comment on climate change using statements by the political and economic elite and their 
own experiences to make climate change accessible to their readers. 
Hypothesis 5: German journalists use an informing writing style for climate change cover-
age, while Australian journalists use a commenting one. 
The literature about the public’s attitude to climate change shows that Germany as well as 
Australia “say others are responsible” and name “politicians” as accountable for the issue. 
The German public refers to the national government, and expects national politicians to act 
against climate change (Eurobarometer 2014, p. 28). Also the Australian public refers to 
national politicians; the Climate Institute of Australia (2010) found out: 85 per cent of the 
Australians said that they would support a major political party that has a detailed plan to 
tackle climate change in the country (p. 22). 
Hypothesis 6: German as well as Australian climate change coverage demands that national 
politicians tackle climate change.  
A question which arises from this hypothesis, but refers to the comparison between the two 
events, makes the following assumption: an environmental disaster makes national action 
necessary. So, domestic politicians must take action. In contrast, in an election campaign, 
politicians might demand international action. 
Sub research question 1: Does the response to an environmental disaster emphasise national 
activities, whereas the discourse in an election emphasises international activities? 
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The literature also reveals a strong difference in how the public in the two countries experi-
ence the impact of climate change on their everyday life: the German public “feel affected 
by the consequences of climate change – now or in future – to a limited extent (Umwelt-
bewusstsein in Deutschland 2014, p. 45), whereas the Australian public feel “strongly af-
fected” Climate Institute of Australia (2010, p. 22ff). 
Hypothesis 7: German climate change coverage contains few frame sub-dimensions of the 
effects of climate change. In Australia, the media widely represents the effects of climate 
change. 
Another question which refers to the comparison of the two events is based on the assump-
tion that an environmental disaster leads to discussions about the effects of climate change. 
Sub research question 2: Does “causal interpretation (the effects of climate change)”appear 
more often during the environmental disaster than during the election? 
Because sub research questions 1 and 2 compare the two events, these sub research questions 
are answered in Chapter 6.2.2, in which the comparison between the two events is made. 
4.2. Comparisons between the two events 
The comparison between the two events refers to the findings about energy supply, natural 
resources for energy generation, and climate as well as the political aspects. 
The literature about energy supply, natural resources for energy generation, and climate 
shows that 1. Extreme weather has already impacted the lifestyle of Australia’s inhabitants 
– hurricanes, heatwaves, floods and drought already exist; in Germany, the impact is still not 
that visible (Germanwatch 2007, p. 4, and Australian Bureau of Meteorology and CSIRO 
2014, p. 3), and 2. Germany increasingly uses renewable energy and, in general, has a 
broader diversification of energy sources (AGEB 2016). Australia mainly relies on coal, a 
fact, which has led to a coal industry with massive industrial power and a powerful lobby in 
the national government (AER 2007-2012). 
So, there are two aspects which might influence the perception of climate change in Aus-
tralia: first, Australia’s climate has always included hurricanes, heatwaves, floods and 
drought. Thus, the Australian nation might be more used to environmental disasters, alt-
hough the number of these environmental disasters is increasing. And, second, the coal in-
dustry might have the power to push the connection between environmental disasters and 
climate change into the background, so that it is only rarely represented in media coverage. 
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Good (2008) already identified this phenomenon of “protecting the economy” in her study 
about the framing of climate change in Canadian, American, and international newspapers, 
explaining that topics such as extreme weather, floods, forest fires, and hurricanes/storms 
are ignored to protect the economy (p. 246). 
Hypothesis 8: Whereas the newspaper coverage around the political election comprises re-
quests for action, the media informs the public about the consequences of climate change 
during the time of the environmental disaster. 
From this hypothesis another sub research question arises related to the writing style of cli-
mate change coverage. This sub research question refers to the assumption that an environ-
mental disaster leads to coverage that presents data and facts about the issue, whereas an 
election provides room for commenting pieces. 
Sub research question 3: Is the newspaper coverage of climate change around the political 
election commenting and is it informing during the time of the environmental disaster? 
In the discussion about the differences between the two events, the senders of climate change 
coverage also play an important role – and here especially politicians and journalists. Politi-
cians in Germany as well as in Australia are under pressure: the German public demands 
climate change action (see, for example, Tilly 2007, Eurobarometer 2014, Climate Institute 
of Australia 2010). Politicians, therefore have to provide success messages, showing that 
they do act against climate change. Looking at the journalists, in Germany, they say that 
their role is informing and mediating about news events (see, for example, Lünenborg and 
Berghofer 2010 and Weischenberg et al. 2006). “To provide citizens with the information 
they need to make political decisions” is ranked as “extremely important” or “very im-
portant” by Australian journalists (Hanusch 2008, p. 6). These findings from the state of 
research result in the following assumptions: 1. Politicians increase their public relations 
activities during the election period, and 2. an environmental disaster encourages journalists 
to inform the public broadly about climate change issues. Therefore, the following sub re-
search question about the actors arises. 
Sub research question 4: Are political actors dominant during the time of the political elec-
tion, whereas other actors get more attention during the time of the environmental disaster?  
4.3. Comparisons before/after the event 
The comparison before/after the two events mainly refers to the literature review of political 
and climate aspects, to lobby groups as well as to the theoretical findings about framing. 
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The theoretical findings about the dominance of climate change in the context of the 2007 
election campaign in Australia also relate to the timeframe before and after the election. The 
assumption is that, during the election campaign, the framing of climate change is – as de-
fined in Chapter 4.1 – more focused on causes and effects as well as action to present climate 
change as an important topic which must be tackled. 
Hypothesis 9: Australia’s climate change coverage before the election was strongly domi-
nated by frames of causes and effects as well as of action. After the election, the frames 
became more diverse.  
Whether these changes can be observed also during the German political election remains 
an open question. No hypothesis can be stated based on the existing literature. 
Sub research question 5: Which of the defined frames from hypothesis 9 were dominant be-
fore and after the German political election? 
Awareness that climate change was again part of the election campaign – after nearly two 
decades – might increasingly spur lobby groups into action that want to avert the victory of 
Kevin Rudd’s Labor Party. Alliances between lobbyists and governmental representatives 
created pressure: lobbists have established working groups and networks to represent their 
interests (see, for example, Kozák 2010, Walk 2011). So, one might expect more critical 
voices before the election, whereas afterwards fewer sceptics might have a say because the 
effort of lobby groups to convince voters about the non-existence of climate change might 
decline.   
Hypothesis 10: Critical and sceptical voices accompanied the 2007 election before the Aus-
tralian election day. After the election, the prominence of critical and sceptical voices was 
clearly reduced. 
In relation to the Australian media coverage, McGaurr et al. (2013) stated that the “disas-
ter/implicit risk” frame (96 per cent), which refers to the consequences of climate change – 
most of them life-threatening, such as floods, water and food shortages – is predominant 
(p. 27). This “disaster/implicit risk” frame might be expected to appear increasingly during 
the Queensland flood as evidence of a life-threatening environmental disaster. 
The negative results of climate change also dominate in the German media (Arlt and Wolling 
2012, p. 292). The assumption is that after an environmental disaster, such as the Oder flood-
ing, these negative connotations related to climate change are strengthened. “Causal inter-
pretation (effects of climate change)” with a strong negative connotation might be expected 
to dominate the coverage. 
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Hypothesis 11a: After the Queensland floods, the Australian newspaper coverage of climate 
change concentrated on the frame sub-dimensions “Causal interpretation (effects of climate 
change)” in general.  
Hypothesis 11b After the Oder floods, the German newspaper coverage of climate change 
concentrated especially on negative effects relating to the frame sub-dimensions “Causal 
interpretation (effects of climate change)”. 
Because there were no findings published concerning differences in the framing of climate 
change  between the four newspapers, the following two sub research questions were stated. 
Sub research question 6: Was there a difference in framing of climate change in the four 
newspapers examined? 
Sub research question 7: Which actors were covered in the context of climate change in the 
four newspapers examined? 
 
 128 
5. Methodology 
The quantitative analysis in this study concentrates on two German (Süddeutsche 
Zeitung/Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung) as well as two Australian (The Age/The Sydney 
Morning Herald) national quality newspapers which were studied in terms of their climate 
change coverage. This climate change coverage relates to two events: an election as well as 
an environmental disaster.  
The articles focusing on political change were evaluated six months before/after: 
• 27 September 2009 (Germany): the election victory of the CDU/FDP coalition 
• 3 December 2007 (Australia): the election victory of the Australian Labor Party 
The context of the environmental disaster was examined six months before/after: 
• May 2010 (Germany): the Oder floods 
• December 2010 (Australia): the Queensland floods 
The goal of this thesis was to find out whether these two events resulted in changes in fram-
ing climate change in German and Australian quality newspapers. 
The keywords used to identify the articles for the this work were “Klimawandel”/”climate 
change” and “Erderwärmung”/”global warming”. For the Australian articles the database 
Ebsco Host Megafile Premier was used, while for the German articles the online archives of 
the newspapers Süddeutsche Zeitung and Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung provided the data. 
For the analysis, all journalistic genres were considered, except letters to the editor. As the 
online archives of the newspapers were used, the research only focused on textual aspects, 
not on pictures. The content of the text as a whole was decisive, and not just parts of the 
coverage, such as only the headline. 
A total of 9,850 articles were found in these four time periods, of which 1,012 articles were 
analysed (see Table 14). 
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Table 14: Composition of the articles analysed 
 Number of articles 
found 
Sample in per cent Final number of arti-
cles analysed* 
German election 1,906 Every 10th article 200 
(85 before/115 after) 
Australian election 4,324 Every 10th article 420 
(202 before/218 after) 
German environmental 
disaster  
1.433 Every 10th article 175 
(112 before/63 after) 
Australian environmental 
disaster 
2,187 Every 10th article 217 
(112 before/105 after) 
Total 9,850  1,012 
* The articles sued for the analysis were counted, starting with the first article in every month. 
 From this monthly retrieval of data, variations in the sample emerged. 
The chosen quality newspapers have the highest circulation rate in their countries: 
Süddeutsche Zeitung (428,266 copies) (in the following tables the abbreviation “SZ” is used) 
and Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (363,620 copies) (in the following tables the abbrevia-
tion “FAZ” is used) (Bundesverband Deutscher Zeitungsverleger e. V. 2010), The Sydney 
Morning Herald (207,013 copies) (in the following tables the abbreviation “SMH” is used) 
and The Age (197,500 copies) (Audit Bureau of Circulations 2010). Thus, the assumption 
was that the arguments in the articles in these four quality newspapers – in this case about 
climate change/global warming – would have high acceptance in society and refer to the 
dominant ideologies, hegemonic structures and the popular culture of each country (see, for 
example, Reese 1990, Cottle 2000, Hermes and Dahlgren 2006, as discussed in Chapter 2). 
The representation of environmental issues in the articles, thus, reflects the dominant mes-
sages in terms of environmental issues in each of the two countries. 
5.1. Developing the code book 
The code book consists of two parts, which include first stage and second stage coding (see 
Appendix A). 
The first stage coding was designed to make sure that the newspaper could be identified and 
each article classified. Thus, it included the headline of each coded article, the keyword used, 
the date of publication, as well as the name of the newspaper. Moreover, all articles were 
first examined in terms of their journalistic form of expression. The following two dimen-
sions of journalistic form of expression were defined: commenting and informing. 
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Commenting articles are articles that use narratives. So, feature stories which show the life 
of a certain person as well as public relations material, such as interviews, speeches or arti-
cles in which authors are political leaders or member of the church and, thus, show their 
personal opinion are commenting. In addition, these articles are often written in the first 
person (“I” and “we”). 
Informing articles are factual articles. These include facts and data, cite scientific results, 
drafts of legislation, opinion polls and adopt a neutral news style. 
The second stage coding identified frame sub-dimensions in the four German and Australian 
quality newspaper coverage using Entman’s (1993) frame dimensions “Problem definition”, 
“Causal interpretation”, “Moral evaluation”, and “Treatment recommendation” (p. 52) as a 
basis. Considering the findings of other researchers from the literature review of framing 
(see Chapter 3), it became apparent that the aspect “causal interpretation” had to be divided 
into two parts for more explicit results. So, “causal interpretation” was divided into “causal 
interpretations” (which focus on “causes of climate change”, for example, human activities 
as a cause of climate change), and “causal interpretations” (which refer to “the effects of 
climate change”, for example, changes in biodiversity). Because the literature review has 
also shown that the “moral evaluation” was about responsible behaviour in terms of climate 
change – or could even be assessed as a sub-item of responsibility – this term was changed 
into “responsibility”. The frame sub-dimensions of responsibility refer to the integrity of 
humans, the economy/industry and countries. 
Entman’s (1993) four frame elements thus provide the basic raster for the second stage cod-
ing of German and Australian climate change reporting, but they are augmented by several 
sub-dimensions found in the literature review (see Chapter 3) as well as with the support of 
an inductive analysis while testing the code book. During the test of the code book, some of 
these ex ante defined sub-dimensions were extended. For example, in “Causal interpretation 
(effects of climate change)”, the sub-dimension “Effects on humans: diseases, epidemics, 
death, war etc.” in its first definition did not include “death” and “war”. Moreover, in “Re-
sponsibility” the item “including tax” in the sub-dimension “Financial/economic aspects (in-
cluding tax) should not influence activities against climate change” was added. Moreover, 
additional frame sub-dimensions were found inductively while testing the code book. Look-
ing for example at the frame element “Causal Interpretation (causes of climate change)”, the 
frame sub-dimensions “Destruction of forests”, “Emission of greenhouse gases”, and “Nat-
ural causes” were found in the literature. The frames and frame sub-dimensions “Human 
activities, in general”, “Population increase”, and “Denying that humans are a possible 
cause” were added during the test of the code book. 
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The result of the literature review as well as the findings from inductive analysis while test-
ing the code book are summarised in Table 15 to Table 19 using “problem definition”, 
“causal interpretation – causes of climate change”, “causal interpretation – effects of cli-
mate change”, “responsibility” and “treatment recommendation” as main categories for all 
identified frame sub-dimensions. 
Looking a bit closer at the five frame elements, the concept of “problem definition” identi-
fies how the issues “climate change” and “global warming” are represented in the selected 
print media. This dimension encompasses sub-dimensions which can be used to examine the 
basic views of the coverage in terms of “Klimawandel”/“climate change” and 
“Erderwärmung”/“global warming”. 
“Problem definition” is the frame element which, at least, must appear clearly in each article. 
This means that one of the sub-dimensions of this category must be written down in the same 
or similar words to those in Table 15. Just the appearance of the words “Klimawandel”/”cli-
mate change” or “Erderwärmung”/”global warming” is not a “problem definition”. All arti-
cles in the sample which did not fulfil the requirement that a “problem definition” appears 
were replaced by a new one. Articles which appeared twice in the sample were also replaced. 
This description of the coding process also shows that the coding unit is the article as a 
whole, not just a headline or a paragraph.  
The code units are “0” and “1”. Code “0” is used if the sub-dimension is not mentioned in 
the article, code “1” if the sub-dimension appears in the selected coverage. It is possible to 
code more than one sub-dimension in each article. When code “1” is selected, the key player 
of the sub-dimension – i. e. the actor behind the statement – must also be identified and 
coded “1”. Due to the fact that, in some articles, more than one key player discussed the 
issue “Klimawandel”/”climate change” or “Erderwärmung”/”global warming”, it was also 
possible to code more than one sub-dimension of “problem definition” with “1” in an article. 
The frame sub-dimensions are, however, not connected with a specific actor. The coding 
regulations described in this paragraph also apply to all of the following frame sub-dimen-
sions. 
As already stated: the frame element “causal interpretation” from Entman (1993) is divided 
into two parts. The frame element with the amendment “causes of climate change” concen-
trates on reasons why “Klimawandel”/”climate change” or “Erderwärmung”/”global warm-
ing” is an issue in today’s public discourse and, thus, also in the media coverage (see Table 
16). “Natural causes” is one frame sub-dimension of this frame element. The second aspect 
of “causal interpretation” deals with the “effects of climate change”. It asks the question: 
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What are the consequences of climate change? Based on the foregone collection of sub-
dimensions, four key aspects which are affected by climate change were chosen: nature, 
weather, humans, and the economy (see Table 17). 
Entman’s (1993) frame element “moral evaluation” is renamed “responsibility” because 
most of the literature found about framing connects this frame element to “responsibility” 
(as discussed in Chapter 3). In this frame element, statements about the “responsibility” for 
“Klimawandel”/”climate change” or “Erderwärmung”/”global warming” are included, rang-
ing from “Everybody is responsible” to “Everybody is discharged from responsibility” (see 
Table 18). 
“Treatment recommendation” has two major tasks: First, it demands action. The readers of 
the coverage are asked to be active in the context of “Klimawandel”/”climate change” or 
“Erderwärmung”/”global warming”. Second, it offers excuses for no activity. This could be, 
for example, the fact, that “the economy comes first” or that “there is no problem”. Then, no 
treatment is required (see Table 19). 
In the following, Table 15 to Table 19 summarise all found frame sub-dimensions and gives 
examples. The frame sub-dimensions which were found while testing the code book are 
shaded in white, while those which were found deductively are shaded in grey. 
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Table 15: Frame sub-dimensions: problem definition 
Problem definition 
Sub-dimension Explanation Example(s) 
Climate change 
exists and is a 
problem. 
The sub-dimension Climate change exists 
and is a problem shows that “climate 
change” and “global warming” are issues 
which cause challenges. One could also 
consider establishing, for example, a cli-
mate change commission.  
“Australia’s major cities are lagging be-
hind those in Europe, South Africa and 
the United States in rolling out pro-
grams to tackle climate change, a new 
global report reveals.” (The Age, 
12.06.2012) 
“Insbesondere die Folgen des 
Klimawandels und eingeschleppte 
Arten sind nach IUCN-Angaben nur 
schwer rückgängig zu machen.” (FAZ, 
19.06.2012) 
Climate change is 
a subject of con-
troversial debate. 
The sub-dimension Climate change is a 
subject of controversial debate asks 
whether “climate change” and “global 
warming” really exist. In doing so, it gives 
the climate-change-sceptical position pub-
licity as a different scientific opinion about 
“climate change” and “global warming”. 
“One rank-and-file Liberal member was 
given rousing applause when he said 
global warming was a natural phenom-
enon and the theory that human activ-
ity had caused it was ‘absolute rub-
bish’. …The grassroots debate 
highlights the huge task Mr Turnbull 
faces as he tries to bring his party with 
him on amendments to the Govern-
ment’s carbon pollution reduction 
scheme.” (The Age, 08.11.2009) 
Climate change is 
not fully exam-
ined. 
The sub-dimension Climate change is not 
fully examined states, for example, that 
there is no clear evidence about the exist-
ence and the consequences of climate 
change. 
“The problem with climate change is 
that because it is a concept, a theory, a 
belief, it provides a blank piece of pa-
per upon with every voter can write 
their own political message.” (The Age, 
28.08.2010) 
Climate change 
exists, but is not 
a problem. 
The sub-dimension Climate change exists, 
but is not a problem says that there is, for 
example, an increase in temperature or a 
drought, but it either does not assess 
these natural irregularities as conse-
quences of “climate change” and “global 
warming” or accepted the consequences – 
either negative or positive ones – as not a 
problem/a positive aspect. 
“With the threat of climate change, 
farmers’ ability to grow food in dry 
conditions could become a billion-dol-
lar knowledge export industry, accord-
ing to a leading science writer.” (The 
Age, 06.08.2007) 
Climate change 
does not exist. 
The sub-dimension Climate change does 
not exist identifies the consequences but 
does not connect these consequences 
with “climate change” or “global warm-
ing”. Thus, climate change is not a prob-
lem, and/or its existence is questioned. 
[Cardinal George] Pell, on the other 
hand, clings to the fashionable right-
wing credo that global warming is 
fraud.” (SMH, 19.03.2011)  
 
  
134 5 Methodology 
Table 16: Frame sub-dimensions: causal interpretation (causes of climate change) 
Causal interpretation (causes of climate change) 
Sub-dimension Explanation Example(s) 
Human activities, 
in general 
The sub-dimension Human activi-
ties (in general) shows that “cli-
mate change” and “global warm-
ing” are generally the result of 
human activities – they are anthro-
pogenic. 
“In seinem kürzlich veröffentlichten Buch 
“Waking the Giant – How a Changing Climate 
Triggers Earthquakes, Tsunamis, and Volca-
nos“ beschwört der Professor vom University 
College London ein Szenario herauf, in dem 
der Mensch durch die ungebremste Emission 
von Treibhausgasen schlafende Monster auf-
weckt.” (FR, 04.07.2012) 
“Der Raubbau an den Wäldern geht weiter, 
die Ozeane sind überfischt, die Anzeichen für 
einen vom Menschen verursachten Klima-
wandel verstetigen sich, die Artenvielfalt 
schwindet.” (FAZ, 22.06.2012) 
Population in-
crease 
The sub-dimension Population in-
crease sees world population 
growth and its consequences (i. e. 
the need for more meat) as respon-
sible for “climate change” and 
“global warming”. 
“Its report, “Climate Change and Food Sys-
tems”, estimated food production was re-
sponsible for between 19 and 29 per cent of 
mankind’s total greenhouse emissions, far 
above UN estimates of 14 per cent based on 
a narrower definition of farming… 'The 
world’s agricultural systems face an uphill 
struggle in feeding a projected nine to ten 
billion people by 2050. Climate change intro-
duces a significant hurdle in this struggle,’ it 
said. The world population is now just above 
seven billion.” (The Age, 31.10.2012) 
Denying that hu-
mans are a possi-
ble cause 
The sub-dimension Denying that 
humans are a possible cause ar-
gues that the world is too big. So 
human beings are too small to be 
able to have an impact on “climate 
change” and “global warming”. 
“There may be an argument for Australia to 
price carbon, but it can’t be to arrest global 
warming or slow climate change – we’re 
simply too small an emitter of greenhouse 
gases for moderate cuts to make any meas-
urable difference.” (The Age, 12.04.2011) 
Destruction of 
forests 
The sub-dimension Destruction of 
forests says that “climate change” 
and “global warming” is a result of 
a decreasing area of forests and 
tree population.  
“Die Zeitungen des Landes sind voll mit 
Analysen und Berichten zu Klimawandel, den 
Folgen unkontrollierten Abholzens ganzer 
Wälder und dem prekären Gleichgewicht der 
Ökosysteme.” (FAZ, 19.10.2009)  
Emission of 
greenhouse gases 
The sub-dimension Emission of 
greenhouse gases says that “cli-
mate change” and “global warm-
ing” are results of greenhouse gas 
emissions or an increasing amount 
of car and air traffic. 
“Mark Dreyfus, parliamentary secretary for 
climate change and energy efficiency said, 
commercial buildings accounted for more 
than 10 per cent of national greenhouse gas 
emissions.” (The Age, 23.02.2011) 
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Causal interpretation (causes of climate change) 
Sub-dimension Explanation Example(s) 
Natural reason  The sub-dimension Natural causes 
says that “climate change” and 
“global warming” is a consequence 
of natural cycles, such as solar ac-
tivity or similar. 
 
“But a group of physicists with strong links to 
the Republican White House cherry-picked 
one section of a Hansen graph and used it to 
misleadingly claim in Washington that it 
showed the warming was solely due to the 
sun.” (The Age, 13.11.2009) 
 
Table 17: Frame sub-dimensions: causal interpretation (effects of climate change) 
Causal Interpretation (effects of climate change) 
Sub-dimension Explanation Example(s) 
Effects on nature: 
changes in biodiver-
sity – negative con-
sequences 
The sub-dimension Effects on na-
ture: changes in biodiversity – nega-
tive consequences refers to changes 
in animal and plant species based on 
“climate change” and “global warm-
ing”. The changes are explicitly rated 
as negative.  
“Voters are alarmed about the loss of 
this nation’s living heritage and the im-
pact of burning forests on climate 
change will have to vote Green in 2007.” 
(SMH, 24.07.2012) 
Effects on nature: 
changes in biodiver-
sity – positive conse-
quences 
The sub-dimension Effects on na-
ture: changes in biodiversity – posi-
tive consequences refers to changes 
in animal and plant species based on 
“climate change” and “global warm-
ing”. This change has a positive con-
notation, for example in terms of 
economic growth. 
 
“Der Biologe arbeitet in Bad 
Zwischenahn im “Park der Gärten” und 
kann täglich beobachten, wie die 
Erderwärmung Spuren hinterlässt: 
Kamelien trotzen plötzlich mit 
Leichtigkeit dem Winter, mediterrane 
Kräuter fühlen sich pudelwohl, und der 
Lotus öffnet seine Blüten. Auch die Rho-
dodendren haben ihren Rhythmus 
verändert.” (FAZ, 17.06.2010) 
Effects on nature: 
sea-level rise 
The sub-dimension Effects on na-
ture: sea-level rise includes all causal 
effects of “climate change” and 
“global warming” regarding sea-level 
rise.  
 
“The Intergovernmental Panel on Cli-
mate Change predicts a sea-level rise of 
up to 59 centimetres over the next cen-
tury, a level that would inundate most of 
the Maldives’ inhabited atolls.” (SMH, 
07.01.2012) 
Effects on nature: 
forest fires 
The sub-dimension Effects on na-
ture: forest fires includes all causal 
effects of “climate change” and 
“global warming” regarding forest 
fires. 
“He was asked seven key questions, in-
cluding whether climate change was a 
contributing factor to the extreme fire-
weather conditions on Black Saturday, 
and how often such catastrophic condi-
tions might occur over the next 10-40 
years.” (The Age, 14.08.2010) 
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Causal Interpretation (effects of climate change) 
Sub-dimension Explanation Example(s) 
Effects on nature: 
erosion 
The sub-dimension Effects on na-
ture: erosion includes all causal ef-
fects of “climate change” and “global 
warming” regarding erosion. 
“Now there are warnings that with cli-
mate change triggering higher seas and 
fiercer, more frequent storms, we may 
soon need to buffer Sydney’s beaches 
from erosion by ‘nourishing’ them with 
sand mined from the sea floor.” (SMH, 
08.01.2008) 
Effects on nature: 
results of warming 
(floods, drought, ice 
melt etc.) 
 
The sub-dimension Effects on na-
ture: results of warming includes is-
sues such as floods, drought, ice melt 
etc. as a result of climate change.  
 
“Urban flooding is expected to become a 
bigger problem with climate change, 
with more intense rain events expected 
to occur more frequently, despite expec-
tations of lower annual rainfall totals in 
many parts of Australia.” (The Age, 
15.01.2011) 
Effects on the 
weather: increase in 
temperature 
 
The sub-dimension Effects on the 
weather: increase in temperature is 
the cause of heatwaves.  
 
“Global warming of about 4.5 degrees 
was expected this century if emissions 
continued to rise at current levels, 
though warming could be as low as 3 de-
grees or as high as 7 degrees.” (The Age, 
17.08.2010) 
Effects on the 
weather: more ex-
treme weather 
The sub-dimension Effects on the 
weather: more extreme weather ex-
plains the view that “climate change” 
and “global warming” lead to an in-
crease in extreme weather events.  
“Dr Rajendra Pachauri, the chairman of 
the United Nations’ Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), said a 
new report on extreme weather events 
to be released later this year will support 
previous findings natural disasters are in-
creasing in frequency and intensity 
around the world.” (SMH, 17.05.2011) 
Effects on humans: 
diseases, epidemics, 
death, war etc. 
The sub-dimension Effects on hu-
mans: diseases, epidemics etc. 
states that “climate change” and 
“global warming” could have nega-
tive effects on human health and can 
cause death. 
“Professor McMichael’s paper states 
that the greatest recurring health risk 
over past millennia has been from food 
shortages, mostly caused by drying and 
drought. Warming also leads to an in-
crease in infectious diseases as a result 
of better growth conditions for bacteria 
and the proliferation of mosquitoes.” 
(The Age, 31.01.2012) 
Effects on humans: 
climate change refu-
gees/suffering of the 
poor 
 
The sub-dimension Effects on hu-
mans: climate change refugees/suf-
fering of the poor show that “climate 
change” and “global warming” 
causes people to flee due to drought, 
floods or similar environmental dis-
asters.  
“The President of what could be the first 
country in the world lost to climate 
change has urged Australia to prepare 
for a mass wave of climate refugees 
seeking a new place to live. The Maldiv-
ian President, Mohamed Nasheed, said 
his government was considering Aus-
tralia as a possible new home if the tiny 
archipelago disappears beneath rising 
seas.” (SMH, 07.01.2012) 
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Causal Interpretation (effects of climate change) 
Sub-dimension Explanation Example(s) 
Effects on humans: 
future generations 
will be climate 
change victims 
The sub-dimension Effects on hu-
mans: future generations will be cli-
mate change victims identifies fu-
ture generations as victims of the 
effects of “climate change” and 
“global warming”. 
“‘The time for doubt has passed’, Mr Ban 
told the meeting of 150 nations he had 
convened in New York on Monday, the 
biggest conference on climate change 
yet. ‘What we do about it will define us, 
our era, and ultimately the global legacy, 
we leave for future generations.’” (SMH, 
26.09.2007) 
Effects on humans: 
water/food supply 
The sub-dimension Effects on hu-
mans: water/food supply shows that 
climate change has negative conse-
quences on water as well as food 
supply and, thus, could result in fam-
ine-hit countries. 
“The Cities as Water Supply Catchments 
research programme at Monash Univer-
sity is looking at alternative water sys-
tems to counter pressure such as 
drought, population growth and climate 
change, which are threatening traditional 
water supplies’ ability to meet urban 
needs.” (SMH, 12.10.2010) 
Effects on the econ-
omy: huge effects if 
we do nothing, less 
negative effects if 
we combat climate 
change 
The sub-dimension Effects on the 
economy: huge negative effects if 
we do nothing, less negative effects 
if we combat climate change says 
that the economy has advantages 
from tackling “climate change” as 
well as “global warming”. 
“Zu diesem Schluss kommt auch Claudia 
Kemfert, die für das Deutsche Institut für 
Wirtschaftsforschung DIW eine Abschät-
zung vorgelegt hat: Bis zu 800 Milliarden 
Euro muss Deutschland demnach bis 
2050 für die Folgen eines ungebremsten 
Klimawandels einplanen. Um das Zwei-
Prozent-Ziel einzuhalten, wären nur 500 
Milliarden Euro fällig. Für die Bundesre-
publik fallen die Kosten eher moderat 
aus, weil Mitteleuropa vom Klimawandel 
weitaus weniger betroffen sein wird als 
der Süden des Kontinents und Afrika.” 
(SZ, 17.05.2010 ) 
Effects on the econ-
omy: economic ben-
efits 
The sub-dimension Effects on the 
economy: economic benefits states 
that “climate change” as well as 
“global warming” have economic 
benefits. 
“Gillard, in her Adelaide speech, took on 
the employment fears. She argued that 
failure to act on climate would cost jobs, 
through climate change itself and be-
cause Australia would become less com-
petitive in a lower carbon world. But if we 
acted, jobs would be created in cleaner 
energy, while the nature of other jobs 
would be transformed.” (The Age, 
18.03.2011) 
Effects on the econ-
omy: economic 
problems including 
costs 
The sub-dimension Effects on the 
economy: economic problems in-
cluding costs means that “climate 
change” as well as “global warming” 
causes economic problems and it 
costs money. 
“Nach den Berechnungen der Um-
weltökonomin könnte der Klimawandel in 
den kommenden 50 Jahren durchschnitt-
lich zu gesamtwirtschaftlichen Wachs-
tumseinbußen von 0,5 Prozentpunkten 
pro Jahr führen.” (SZ, 17.05.2010) 
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Table 18: Frame sub-dimensions: responsibility 
Responsibility 
Sub-dimension Explanation Example(s) 
Everybody is re-
sponsible 
The sub-dimension Everybody is re-
sponsible means that all human be-
ings and their activities are responsi-
ble for “climate change” and “global 
warming”. 
“The federal Environment Minister, Mal-
colm Turnbull, goes tow-to-toe in a debate 
on climate change with a 15-year-old. 
Turnbull is part of a discussion panel that 
includes a Baulkham Hills year 9 student, 
Alastair Wadlow, who set up Planet Patrol 
with his sisters Imogen and Freya to en-
courage children to care for the planet.” 
(SMH, 13.12.2010) 
Everybody is dis-
charged from re-
sponsibility  
The sub-dimension Everybody is dis-
charged from responsibility means 
that neither human beings nor their 
activities are responsible for “climate 
change” and “global warming”. 
“The clear impression is that Asian-driven 
coal demand is a more powerful jugger-
naut than climate change. As one English 
delegate put it: ‘The Chinese don’t give a 
stuff about greenhouse emissions, and nor 
do I.’” (The Age, 14.11.2010) 
Humans have 
moral deficits 
The sub-dimension Humans have 
moral deficits says that human beings 
in industrial countries are responsible 
for “climate change” and “global 
warming” whereas developing coun-
tries have to deal with the conse-
quences. 
“A poll by the Lowy Institute has tracked 
the willingness of Australians to pay extra 
for electricity. The number of people who 
refused to pay anything to tackle climate 
change has increased from 21 per cent in 
2008 to 35 per cent in 2010.” (The Age, 
05.09.2010) 
Financial/eco-
nomic aspects (in-
cluding tax) 
should not influ-
ence activities 
against climate 
change 
The sub-dimension Financial/eco-
nomic aspects should not influence 
activities combating climate change 
shows that subsidies in monetary 
form should not play a role in the 
context of “climate change” and 
“global warming”.  
“‘It wasn’t the science, the scientists, or 
the economics that killed action on climate 
change,’ he wrote. ‘What was it? The an-
swer is, the usual suspects: greed and cow-
ardice. If you want to understand opposi-
tion to climate action follow the money.’” 
(The Age, 13.11.2010) 
Developed coun-
tries are responsi-
ble 
The sub-dimension Developed coun-
tries are responsible says that devel-
oped countries are mainly responsi-
ble for the increasing problems of 
“climate change” and “global warm-
ing”. 
“Chinese Finance Minister Jin Renqing said 
his country supported the use of market-
based emissions trading as a method of 
controlling climate change but emphasised 
that China expected developed nations to 
carry the burden. ‘Greenhouse gas is a se-
rious challenge for us, but the source of 
most of the greenhouse gas produced 
came from developed countries,’ he said.” 
(The Age, 04.08.2007) 
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Table 19: Frame sub-dimensions: treatment recommendation 
Treatment Recommendation 
Sub-dimension Explanation Example 
Something must be 
done, in general 
The sub-dimension Something must 
be done, in general does not name 
specific activities, but says that some-
thing must be done in the context 
“climate change” and “global warm-
ing”.  
“Climate change is one of the single big-
gest challenges facing development, and 
we need to assume the moral responsi-
bility to take action on behalf of future 
generations, especially the poorest.” 
(The Age, 19.11.2012) 
General reduction of 
greenhouse gases – 
national focus 
The sub-dimension General reduction 
of greenhouse gases – national focus 
asks human beings in the own coun-
try for action to reduce the amount of 
greenhouse gases in their own coun-
try. 
“As a gas target would be a logical next 
step for the Brumby government – given 
the bold commitments it has already 
made on other fronts to tackle green-
house emissions in its white paper on 
climate change.” (The Age, 04.10.2010) 
General reduction of 
greenhouse gases – 
international focus 
The sub-dimension General reduction 
of greenhouse gases – international 
focus asks human beings throughout 
the world for action to reduce the 
amount of greenhouse gases 
throughout the world. 
“Bis zum Jahr 2050 müssten die 
Indstrieländer ihren Ausstoß an 
Treibhaugasen um 80 bis 90 Prozent 
verringern; nur dann könne ein 
Klimawandel mit dramatischen Folgen 
verhindert werden.” (FAZ, 15.12.2009) 
Demand climate 
change policy – na-
tional focus 
The sub-dimension Demand climate 
change policy – national focus dis-
cusses the invention of special poli-
cies regarding “climate change” and 
“global warming” on a national basis. 
“Promised before the 2006 election, the 
climate change white paper has been 
delayed amid internal confusion while 
the state government waited on the de-
sign of a national carbon trading 
scheme.” (The Age, 16.07.2010) 
Demand climate 
change policy – in-
ternational focus 
The sub-dimension Demand climate 
change policy – international focus 
discusses the invention of special pol-
icies regarding “climate change” and 
“global warming” on an international 
basis. 
“Using a simple analogy, he said that alt-
hough he did not expect his home to 
burn down, he had taken out insurance 
against such a disaster. In the same way, 
Australia and the world need an insur-
ance policy for climate change.” (The 
Age, 20.06.2011) 
Demand more re-
sponsibility by the 
government/politi-
cians 
The sub-dimension Demand more re-
sponsibility by the government/ 
politicians demands action from the 
government as well as from ministers 
and other politicians in terms of cli-
mate change. 
“Speaking in Canberra, the [Climate] in-
stitute’s Erwin Jackson said he hoped a 
hung parliament that gave influence to 
the Greens and the independents could 
ensure more ‘accountability’ in climate 
change policy.” (The Age, 25.08.2010) 
Replacing/displacing 
one energy source 
with another 
The sub-dimension Replacing/dis-
placing one energy source with an-
other discusses for example whether 
the use of fossil fuels for energy con-
sumption could be replaced by the 
use of nuclear power plants for gen-
erating energy. 
“‘The growing realisation that the chal-
lenge of combating global climate 
change will entail significant and sub-
stantive shifts in energy production and 
use in the developed world has stimu-
lated a resurgence of reactor building 
and planning worldwide’, he said.” 
(SMH, 02.02.2008) 
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Treatment Recommendation 
Sub-dimension Explanation Example 
Rewarding climate-
friendly behaviour 
The sub-dimension Rewarding cli-
mate-friendly behaviour says that 
the inhabitants must be recompensed 
for behaving in a climate-friendly 
way. 
 
“Business customers can also take ad-
vantage of the offer [to switch from 
electric to solar hot water or heat 
pumps], which is a combination of certif-
icates, a discount from the manufac-
turer, and funding from an NSW State 
Government climate change fund.” 
(SMH, 31.07.2007) 
Something must be 
done, but this 
should not influence 
economic growth 
The sub-dimension Something must 
be done but this should not influ-
ence economic growth supports all 
activities in the context of “climate 
change” and “global warming” which 
do not influence economic growth.  
“Far from spending the next three years 
chatting about whether to get serious 
about combating climate change, we 
need to debate our unquestioned com-
mitment to unlimited economic 
growth.” (SMH, 14.07.2010) 
Economic aspects 
must be changed be-
cause of climate 
change (including 
greenwashing) 
The sub-dimension Economic aspects 
must be changed because of climate 
change/global warming (including 
greenwashing) says that, for exam-
ple, a new infrastructure is an invest-
ment in tackling “climate 
change”/”global warming”. It also dis-
cusses aspects which show that an in-
stitution or company just wants to 
“green” its image. 
 
“In Deutschland sieht es so aus, als habe 
zumindest Bundesumweltminister Sig-
mar Gabriel erkannt, wie sinnlos und ab-
wegig der ewige Konflikt zwischen Öko-
nomie und Umweltschutz geworden ist. 
Es gilt in der Tat, nun entschiedener die 
Effizienz- und Einsparpotentiale in der 
Energienutzung auszuschöpfen, anders 
haben Sonne, Wind und andere erneuer-
bare Ressourcen so schnell keine 
Chance, mehr als ein Nischendasein zu 
führen. Und es gilt, diesen “Leitmarkt 
Energietechnik” mit aller Kraft sowohl 
für die heimischen Klimaschutzziele als 
auch für den Export zu nutzen.” (SZ, 
28.11.2008) 
Nuclear energy helps 
to reduce emis-
sions/fossil fuel 
quarrying 
The sub-dimension Nuclear energy 
helps to reduce emissions/fossil fuel 
quarrying states that nuclear energy 
is a clean alternative to fossil fuels 
and/or helps to reduce carbon emis-
sions. 
“Nuclear energy produces no carbon di-
oxide emissions when operating.” (SMH, 
27.11.2010) 
Use of renewable 
energy 
The sub-dimension Use of renewable 
energy invites human beings to use 
renewable energy sources, such as 
wind, sun or water. 
 
“Greenpeace, and many other environ-
ment groups, argue that the process 
cannot deliver emissions cuts in time to 
slow down human-created global warm-
ing, and that public investment in the 
experimental technology diverts re-
sources from other ways of reducing 
emissions, such as energy efficiency, so-
lar, wind and wave power.” (SMH, 
06.05.2008)  
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Treatment Recommendation 
Sub-dimension Explanation Example 
Reduction of using 
fossil fuels 
The sub-dimension Reduction of us-
ing fossil fuels wants human beings 
to reduce the consumption of fossil 
fuels. 
“‘Both climate change and peak oil force 
us to think about different kinds of cities 
that are able to cope with less fossil 
fuels,’ he says. ‘We’ve built our civilisa-
tion around the cheapness and easy 
available fossil fuels. That era is ending.” 
(The Age, 19.09.2010) 
Rebuilding the natu-
ral environment 
 
The sub-dimension Rebuilding the 
natural environment explains the im-
portance of a healthy natural envi-
ronment and shows that activities are 
necessary to help nature to recover. 
This sub-dimension is about a funda-
mental change. 
“‘The cheapest and most efficient way of 
slowing down global warming is to pro-
tect and restore the forests, particularly 
the tropical forests,’ the 77-year-old 
said.” (The Age, 10.06.2011) 
Take measures to 
mitigate the effects 
of climate change 
The sub-dimension Take measures to 
mitigate the effects of climate 
change is about establishing a risk 
management in the context of envi-
ronmental disasters. 
 
“Versicherungslösungen wollen Munich 
Re und andere im Rahmen der MCII 
auch für all jene kreieren, die vom 
Klimawandel besonders betroffen sein 
werden: die Entwicklungsländer, die in 
den Dürre- oder Hochwasserzonen 
Afrikas und Asiens liegen.” (SZ, 
27.11.2009) 
Tips for preventing 
the effects of cli-
mate change 
The sub-dimension Tips for prevent-
ing the effects of climate change is 
about practical hints which show the 
reader how he/she could help to 
tackle climate change and global 
warming. 
“However, to achieve the large reduc-
tions in climate change pollution below 
1990 levels being called for by scientists, 
Australia would also need to cut its im-
migration intake and end land clearing, 
the report said.” (SMH, 10.10.2007) 
Increase in 
knowledge about cli-
mate change 
The sub-dimension Increase in 
knowledge about climate 
change/global warming includes arti-
cles which demand climate change 
education or which have educational 
content that increases readers’ 
knowledge about “climate change” 
and “global warming”. 
“Tackling the challenges of climate 
change will require us all to understand 
not just the science of climate change 
but also what options we have to re-
spond to it and mitigate further change. 
…We must be clear about what is hap-
pening now, and that information must 
be available to everyone.” (The Age, 
13.07.2010) 
Scientific develop-
ment 
The sub-dimension Scientific devel-
opment makes “climate change” and 
“global warming” a matter of scien-
tific development. Articles in this sub-
dimension say that scientists are in-
vited to find or work on solutions for 
the consequences/challenges of “cli-
mate change” and “global warming”. 
“The Prime Minister used the occasion 
to announce a new climate change fund 
– to be set up in 2011, to pay for re-
search into clean energy, and also to 
help subsidise the power bills of the less 
well-off.” (SMH, 23.10. 2007) 
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Treatment Recommendation 
Sub-dimension Explanation Example 
Smaller personal car-
bon footprint 
The sub-dimension Smaller personal 
carbon footprint asks human beings 
to reduce their personal expenditure 
of energy. 
“Jeder Deutsche hat im vergangenen 
Jahr zwar noch 7,5 Tonnen 
umweltschädlichen Kohlenstoffdioxids 
(CO2) freigesetzt. Damit leiteten die 
Deutschen jedoch eine Trendwende ein. 
Denn vor zehn Jahren waren es noch 8,0 
Tonnen.” (SZ, 13.12.2010) 
Ask (the media) to 
stop publishing cli-
mate-change-scepti-
cal positions 
 
The sub-dimension Ask (the media) 
to stop publishing climate-change-
sceptical positions argues that the cli-
mate-change-sceptical position, 
which is often picked up and pub-
lished by the media for reasons of 
balance, but is also published as a 
public relations exercise by climate-
change-sceptical scientists or institu-
tions, and should be stopped.  
“The existence of dissenting voices is a 
mark of democracy, but this does not 
mean that balance in reporting scientific 
and policy debates is achieved by giving 
opposing sides equal weight when that 
‘balance’ does not remotely resemble 
the weight of scientific support for hu-
man-caused climate change.” (The Age, 
29.03.2011) 
No treatment re-
quired: the economy 
comes first 
The sub-dimension No treatment re-
quired: the economy comes first 
claims that economic activities are 
more important than any activities 
combating “climate change” and 
“global warming”.  
“Diese Länder [Schwellenländer] wollen 
von ihren Wachstumskonzepten nicht 
abrücken. Internationale 
[Klima]Abmachungen, die sie in ihrer 
Entwicklung beschränken könnten, 
lehnen sie ab.” (FAZ, 22.06.2012) 
No treatment re-
quired: there is no 
problem 
The sub-dimension No treatment re-
quired: there is not a problem ig-
nores all the problems of “climate 
change” and “global warming” and 
does not ask for any activities. 
 
“Fact 1. A mild warming about 0.5 de-
grees Celsius (well within previous natu-
ral temperature variations) occurred be-
tween 1979 and 1998 and has been 
followed by slight global cooling over 
the past 10 years. Ergo, dangerous 
global warming is not occurring.” (The 
Age, 27.06.2011) 
 
 
 
  
inductively 
found while 
testing the 
code book 
deductively 
found from 
the literature 
review 
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5.2. The process of coding 
This research analyses newspaper articles using a deductive-quantitative approach which 
first collects – based on Entman’s (1993) four frame elements – frame sub-dimensions de-
rived from the literature and from testing the code book. After coding the articles on climate 
change in German and Australian quality newspaper using all the frame sub-dimensions, all 
frame sub-dimensions were aggregated using the statistical technique of a cluster analysis 
via SPSS as well as contingency tables and t-tests. 
To identify the different frame sub-dimensions in the second stage coding, the focal words 
“Klimawandel”/”climate change” and “Erderwärmung”/”global warming” were first high-
lighted in the text. Second, the whole phrase in which the focal words appear was analysed 
to identify the frame sub-dimensions. The context of this central phrase was scrutinized to 
check if it  supports the findings (see Figure 7).  
 
Figure 7: Analysis model 
Source: own figure 
To explain the coding process, first, an article from Süddeutsche Zeitung is taken and the 
example in Figure 8 shows that the keyword “climate change [Klimawandel]” is connected 
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with “gives beekeepers a raw deal [spielt den Imkern übel mit]” which represents the frame 
element “Problem definition” and implies that “climate change exists and is a problem”. 
The “loss of one third of the bee colonies [Verlust von einem Drittel der Bienenvölker]” 
refers to the frame element “Causal Interpretation (Effects of Climate Change)” and stands 
for the frame sub-dimension “Effects on Nature: Changes in biodiversity – negative conse-
quences” because it explains the negative consequences of climate change, in this case a 
warm winter for the bees. 
  
Figure 8: Coding example/Süddeutsche Zeitung 
Source: own figure 
An example from Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (see Figure 9) discusses the consequences 
of carbon emissions on climate change. The “problem definition” is “climate change exists 
and is a problem” due to the fact that the keyword “climate change” is connected with the 
statement that “thirty million tonnes (gigatons) of carbon are emitted into the atmosphere 
every year and contribute to climate change [gelangen jährlich fast dreißig Milliarden Ton-
nen (Gigatonnen) des Treibhausgases in die Atmosphäre und tragen so zum Klimawandel 
bei]. The “problem definition” is further supported by the term “climate killer 
[Klimakiller]”. Moreover, the text implies that “human activities [menschliche Aktivitäten]” 
are the cause of these emissions and, thus, of climate change. This represents the sub-dimen-
sion “Human activities, in general” in the frame element “Causal interpretation (causes of 
climate change)”. The statement that “carbon emissions must be reduced drastically [Emis-
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sionen müssen drastisch vermindert werden]” represents the sub-dimension “General reduc-
tion of greenhouse gases – international focus” of the frame element “Treatment recommen-
dation”. 
 
Figure 9: Coding example/Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 
Source: own figure 
The following extract from “The Age” is an example of the minimum requirement regarding 
coding: in this article, only a “problem definition” can be found. By referring to “its associ-
ated consequences” and connecting it to “the issue of our lifetime”, it implies that “climate 
change exists and is a problem” (see Figure 10). 
 
Figure 10: Coding example/The Age 
Source: own figure 
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The last example – from The Sydney Morning Herald (see Figure 11) – states that “the most 
serious aspect of climate change is the equity dimensions of the problem” and, consequently, 
defines the “problem definition” as “climate change exists and is a problem”. In this context, 
it connects climate change with the “increase in concentration of greenhouse gases”. The 
article also clearly identifies the “responsibility” saying that it “lies with the developed coun-
tries”. The second paragraph shown in Figure 10 concerns the economic aspects. It says – 
using the example of India – that its “own path of development” is necessary, looking at 
“reasons of energy security, reduced local pollution and in several respects the creation of 
new employment”. This refers to the “treatment recommendation” that “economic aspects 
must be changed because of climate change”. 
 
Figure 11: Coding example/The Sydney Morning Herald 
Source: own figure 
To test the reliability of the coding process, a second sample was taken from the sample of 
1,012 articles. This sample included five articles from each of the four newspapers and for 
both events, including the search term “Klimawandel/climate change” as well as five articles 
including the search term “Klimaerwärmung/global warming”. So, a sample of 80 articles 
was coded a second time. 
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Altogether 170 frame sub-dimensions were identified, 47 per cent of which refer to the frame 
element “Problem definition” (n = 80), 9 per cent to the frame element “Causal Interpretation 
(causes of climate change)” (n = 15), 21 per cent to “Causal interpretation (effects of climate 
change)” (n = 35), 3 per cent to “Responsibility” (n = 5) and 21 per cent to the frame element 
“Treatment recommendation” (n = 35). 
The frame element “Problem definition”, which, at the very least, must be part of each arti-
cle, achieves a coefficient of 0.98. The frame element “Causal interpretation (causes of cli-
mate change)” gets a coefficient of 0.87. The frame element “Causal interpretation (effects 
of climate change)” has a coefficient of 0.80. And the frame element “Treatment recommen-
dation” achieves a coefficient of 0.74. Only the frame element “Responsibility” has a rather 
poor coefficient of 0.40. However, this frame element was not included in the analysis be-
cause only 19 of 1,012 articles include a responsibility frame sub-dimension. So, the poor 
reliability of the “Responsibility” frame element does not influence the analysis and the re-
sults of this research (see Appendix B). 
The weighted average coefficient was 0.87 (see Appendix C). As a perfect coefficient has a 
value of 1, the weighted average coefficient of all five frame elements suggests good relia-
bility (Raup and Vogelsang 2009, p. xiv). 
The coefficient for the actors was 0.87, the coefficient of the form of expression (comment-
ing/informing) was 0.89 (see Appendix B). 
5.3. Summary: methodology 
The quantitative analysis in this study investigates two German as well as two Australian 
national quality newspapers during the two events of relevance. 
The keywords used to identify the articles for the basic frame analyses were “Klima-
wandel”/”climate change” and “Erderwärmung”/”global warming”. Altogether, 9,850 arti-
cles were found in the German and Australian media that were examined in the defined time 
period, and 1,012 articles – 375 articles from Germany and 637 articles from Australia – 
were analysed. 
The reliability test identified a weighted average coefficient for the framing of of 0.87, for 
the actors of 0.87 and for the form of expression of of 0.89. 
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6. Analysis 
The major task of this analysis was to find significant differences and similarities between 
the climate change coverage in quality newspapers in Germany and Australia in the context 
of an election and an environmental disaster. This is why this chapter tests the hypotheses – 
introduced in Chapter 4 – on the 1,012 articles from Germany and Australia. The hypotheses 
are extended by asking sub research questions which are derived from the theoretical find-
ings (see Chapters 2 and 3). 
As explained in Chapter 5: Study Design, the inquiry started in 07/2007, six months before 
the Australian election, and ended in 06/2011, six months after the Australian environmental 
disaster, the Queensland floods. During this time period, there was a German election, in 
09/2009, and a German environmental disaster, the Oder floods, in 05/2010. 
To get an overview of climate change coverage in the two countries, Table 20 provides an 
overview of all articles on “Klimawandel”/”climate change” and “Klimaerwärmung”/ 
“global warming” which were published in these years of research in the four chosen news-
papers. 
Table 20 shows that, in Germany, climate change coverage has remained at a relatively stable 
low level in comparison with the Australian sample. There were some moderate swings 
during the UN Climate Conferences in Bali, Posen and Cancún and one extreme swing in 
12/2009 during the UN Climate Conference in Copenhagen. The election in 9/2009 had only 
minor impact on the amount of Germany’s climate change coverage. It is also conspicuous 
that, after the Climate Conference in Copenhagen, the amount of climate change coverage 
significantly declined and remained at a lower level than before, with just a moderate upward 
swing during the months in which the climate conferences took place. 
In Australia, the picture is different: the swings there were much more prominent. During 
the six months before the election in 07/2007, the amount of climate change coverage was 
at a high level. Another increase in climate change coverage took place in July 2008 when 
the “Green Paper: Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme”, an initiative of the Australian 
government, was introduced as well as in 12/2009 during the UN Climate Conference in 
Copenhagen. The climate conferences in Posen as well as in Cancún had only a minor in-
fluence on the amount of climate coverage. As in Germany, the amount of climate change 
coverage significantly decreased after the Copenhagen conference and, since then, remained 
at a lower level, too. The environmental disaster in 12/2009 also had no influence on the 
amount of climate change coverage, in Australia. 
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Table 20: Climate Change Coverage in Germany and Australia 
 
Source: own figure 
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To evaluate the findings, Table 20 also includes a “Google Trend Analysis” in the form of 
line graphs. The line graph shows the number of people using the search terms “Klima-
wandel”/”climate change” and “Klimaerwärmung”/”global warming” in the research period. 
The line graphs and the bar graphs, representing the amount of climate change coverage, are 
superimposed on each other to get information about the publics’ searching behaviour re-
garding the two search terms. This chart makes clear that, in both countries, the search be-
haviour of the public mostly coincided with the amount of climate coverage, a fact that shows 
the power of the traditional media. A main finding relates to the graphs around climate con-
ferences: in Germany, public concern was high during the climate conferences, whereas in 
Australia, the public interest was high before each climate conference started. Generally, in 
Australia readers’ awareness seems to be more inconsistent than in Germany. 
As the bar graphs for both countries show, the line graphs’ turning point is also the Copen-
hagen conference: the expectations were high, but they were not fulfilled. “Weltrettung 
vertagt! [Salvation of the world adjourned!]” was one headline of Die Zeit (2009) after the 
conference. After this conference, the interest of the public clearly declined, but remained 
more or less stable at this lower level. The environmental disasters, in addition, do not seem 
to have had any influence on climate change coverage. 
So, despite few differences between the two countries, it is clear that coverage by the quality 
newspapers and the interest of the public in climate change are mostly correlated. 
6.1. Preparing the analysis 
The preparation of this analysis started by examining the frame sub-dimensions, based on 
Entman’s (1993) frame elements. 
The first frame element “Problem definition” – the only dimension which had to be part of 
every climate change article – shows that coverage in Germany and Australia mainly corre-
sponded to the frame sub-dimension “Climate change exists and is a problem”. As many as 
925 articles out of 1,012 (i. e. 91.4 per cent of all articles) made this claim. The frequency 
of correspondence with the remaining frame sub-dimensions of “Problem definition” is 
therefore much smaller. 
This finding related to “Problem definition” is not the only example of a skewed distribution. 
Testing the frequency of all sub-dimensions, the findings show that several  frame sub-di-
mensions, such as “Everybody is responsible” just appears few times (see Table 21 to Table 
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25). Because most frame sub-dimensions, therefore, are not sufficiently present to test the 
hypothesis properly, four steps were necessary to prepare the data for the examination: 
1. frame sub-dimensions are summarised to create new indices whenever necessary 
and meaningful  
2. actors are consolidated into actor groups whenever necessary and meaningful 
3. the way climate change coverage is represented, i. e. whether it is commenting or 
informing, is detected 
4. a two-step cluster analysis is applied to identify frames of climate change. 
First, the frame sub-dimensions are summarised to create new indices. All frame sub-dimen-
sions referring to the frame element “Problem definition” are summarised in one index 
“Problem definition”, which includes three values: “Climate change exists and is a problem” 
as a value which conforms with the scientific consensus gets the data value “1”, “Climate 
change is a subject of controversial debate”, “Climate change is not fully examined” and 
“Climate change exists, but is not a problem” – the three values which are not clear about 
whether climate change is a problem are assigned to the data value “-1” and “Climate change 
does not exist” as the statement most opposite to the scientific consensus gets the data value 
“-2” (see Table 21). 
For all new indices the following applies: if there are articles which include two of the sub-
dimensions which are now consolidated, for example, “Climate change is a subject of con-
troversial debate” as well as “Climate change does not exist” appear in one article, the new 
index is coded with the value “-2”. 
 
Table 21: New indices of the frame element “problem definition” 
Problem definition 
New index Includes the following frame sub-dimen-
sions 
Number of 
cases   
(n =) 
Data value 
“Problem definition” “Climate change exists and is a problem” 925  1 
 “Climate change is a subject of controversial 
debate” 
“Climate change is not fully examined” 
“Climate change exists, but is not a problem” 
 59 
 
 
 12 
 10 
-1 
 
 
-1 
-1 
 “Climate change does not exist” 
No “Problem definition” mentioned 
 11 
  0 
-2 
 0 
The number of problems is higher than 1,012, because 5 articles contain more than one “Problem definition”. 
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The second frame element – “Causal Interpretation (causes of climate change)” – does not 
appear in all of the 1,012 articles. Altogether, it is just represented 109 times. On most of 
these occasions, 49 times, it was stated that “Human activities in general” are the cause of 
climate change. In this frame element, too, frame sub-dimensions are consolidated into new 
indices: one group identifies human beings as causing climate change, that is to say the frame 
sub-dimensions “Human activities in general”, “Population increase”, “Destruction of for-
ests” and “Emissions of greenhouse gases”. The other group denies that humans are a cause 
for climate change. It includes the frame sub-dimensions “Denying that humans are a possi-
ble cause” and “Natural causes”. 
As in “Problem definition”, the frame element “causal interpretation (causes of climate 
change)” is also recoded: Articles with non-human causes – so “Denying that humans are a 
possible cause” and “Natural causes” – are now assigned the data value “-1”. So, the indices 
that are contrary to the scientific consensus again get a negative data value. The articles 
referring to human causes receive the data value “1” (see Table 22). The value “0” appears 
when there is a non-human as well as a human cause in one article. 
 
Table 22: New indices of the frame element “causal interpretation (causes of climate 
change)” 
Causal interpretation (causes of climate change) 
New index Includes the following frame sub-dimen-
sions 
Number of 
cases   
(n =) 
Data value 
“Causes of Climate 
change” 
“Human activities in general” 
“Population increase” 
“Destruction of forests” 
“Emissions of greenhouse gases” 
  49 
    3 
    5 
  31 
 1 
 1 
 1 
 1 
 “Denying that humans are a possible cause”  
“Natural causes” 
No “Causal interpretation (causes of climate 
change)” mentioned 
  14 
    7 
918 
-1 
-1 
 0 
The number of articles is higher than 1,012, because 6 articles contain more than one “Causes of climate 
change”. 
 
The frame element “Causal Interpretation (effects of climate change)” consists of 16 frame 
sub-dimensions referring to effects on nature, for example “Effects on nature: results of 
warming”, effects on weather, for example “Effects on the weather: more extreme weather”, 
effects on humans, for example “Effects on humans: food/water supply”, and effects on the 
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economy, such as “Effects on the economy: economic problems including costs”. Also these 
frame sub-dimensions are consolidated into four new indices which concentrates on the main 
consequences of climate change: 1. “Effects on nature” (174 times), 2. “Effects on the 
weather” (110 times), 3. “Effects on humans” (57 times), and 4. “Effects on the economy” 
(151 times). 
All frame sub-dimensions included get the data value “1”, but “Effects on nature: Changes 
in biodiversity – positive consequences” and “Effects on the economy: economic benefits”. 
They get the data value “-1” (see Table 23) due to emphasising positive aspects of climate 
change. The value “0” appears when there is a positive effect as well as a negative effect of 
climate change in one article. 
 
Table 23: New indices of the frame element “causal interpretation (effects of climate 
change)” 
Causal interpretation (effects of climate change) 
New indices Includes the following frame sub-dimen-
sions 
Number of 
cases  
(n =) 
Data value 
“Effects on nature” “Effects on nature: reduction of resources 
(fossil fuels, tree population etc.)” 
“Effects on nature: Changes in  
biodiversity - negative consequences“ 
“Effects on nature: sea-level rise“ 
“Effects on nature: forest fires“ 
“Effects on nature: erosion“ 
“Effects on nature: results of warming“ 
“Effects on nature: changes in  
biodiversity – positive consequences“ 
No “Effects on nature” mentioned 
    1 
 
  39 
 
  36 
  14 
    2 
  73 
    9 
 
863 
 1 
 
 1 
 
 1 
 1 
 1 
 1 
-1 
 
 0 
“Effects on the 
weather” 
“Effects on the weather: temperature in-
crease“ 
“Effects on the weather: more extreme 
weather“ 
No “Effects on weather” mentioned 
  53 
 
  57 
 
917 
 1 
 
 1 
 
 0 
“Effects on humans” “Effects on humans: epidemics, diseases, 
death etc“ 
“Effects on humans: climate change refu-
gees/suffering of the poor“ 
“Effects on humans: food/water supply“ 
“Effects on humans: future generations are 
climate change victims“ 
No “Effects on humans” mentioned 
  15 
 
  15 
 
  29 
  13 
 
982 
 1 
 
 1 
 
 1 
 1 
 
 0 
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Causal interpretation (effects of climate change) 
New indices Includes the following frame sub-dimen-
sions 
Number of 
cases  
(n =) 
Data value 
“Effects on the econ-
omy” 
“Effects on the economy: huge negative ef-
fects if we do nothing, less negative effects 
if we combat climate change“ 
“Effects on the economy: economic prob-
lems including costs“ 
“Effects on the economy: economic bene-
fits“ 
No “Effects on economy” mentioned 
    4 
 
 
119 
 
  28 
868 
 1 
 
 
 1 
 
-1 
 0 
The number of articles is higher than 1,012, because 19 articles contain more than one “Effects on nature”, 
15 more than one “Effects on weather”, 6 more than one “Effects on humans”, and 7 more than one “Effects 
on economy”. 
 
The frame element “Responsibility” includes the most surprising result: only 1.9 per cent of 
all articles include a responsibility frame element. So, the media in both countries does not 
support the development of a sense of responsibility among their readers. The sub-dimen-
sions “Everybody is responsibly” and “Developed countries are responsible” both appear 
eight times in all articles, i. e. in 0.8 per cent of all articles. All other sub-dimensions occur 
less than eight times. Because of this, only the pro-climate change sub-dimensions – “Eve-
rybody is responsible”, “Humans have moral deficits”, and “Developed countries are respon-
sible” – are consolidated to a new responsibility index. The data value is “1” (see Table 24). 
 
Table 24: New indices of the frame element “responsibility” 
Responsibility 
New index Includes the following frame sub-dimen-
sions 
Number of 
cases  
(n =) 
Data value 
“Responsibility” “Everybody is responsible” 
“Humans have moral deficits” 
“Developed countries are responsible” 
No “Responsibility” mentioned 
    8 
    3 
    8 
988 
1 
1 
1 
0 
The number of articles is lower than 1,012, because 5 articles are not considered in the new index “Respon-
sibility". 
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The frame element “Treatment recommendation” is the most extensive frame element, in-
cluding 22 frame sub-dimensions. The frame sub-dimensions are consolidated into five in-
dices: 1. A general group which consists of the two most conflicting sub-dimensions “Some-
thing must be done, in general” and “No treatment required: there is not a problem”, 2. An 
energy group (including “Smaller personal carbon footprint”, “Reduction in the use of fossil 
fuels”, “Use of renewable energies”, “Nuclear energy helps to reduce emissions/fossil fuel 
quarrying” and “Replacing/displacing one energy source with another”) 3. Treatment rec-
ommendations which refer to national activities (including “Rebuilding a natural environ-
ment”, “General reduction in greenhouse gases – national focus”, “Demand climate change 
policy – national focus”, “Reward climate-friendly behaviour”, “Demand more responsibil-
ity from the government/politicians”, “Something must be done, but this should not influ-
ence economic growth”, “Economic aspects must be changed because of climate change 
(including greenwashing)”, “No treatment required: the economy comes first”) 4. Treatment 
recommendation regarding international activities (including “General reduction of green-
house gases – international focus” and “Demand climate change policy – international fo-
cus”), and 5. Treatment recommendations involving increased information (including “In-
creased knowledge about climate change”, “Scientific development”, “Ask (the media) to 
stop publishing climate-change-sceptical positions”, “Take measures to mitigate the effects 
of climate change”, “Tips for preventing the effects of climate change”). 
“Treatment recommendation” includes three frame sub-dimensions with a negative data 
value: In the “Treatment recommendation: general”-index “No treatment required: there is 
no problem” as most opposed to the scientific consensus gets a data value of “-2”. The index 
“Treatment recommendation: national activities” includes the frame sub-dimension “Some-
thing must be done, but should not influence economic growth”, which gets a data value of 
“-1”, and “No treatment required: the economy comes first”, which – as “No treatment re-
quired: there is no problem”, i. e. says do nothing – also gets the data value “-2”. The value 
“0” appears when there are sub-dimensions of treatment recommendations in one article that 
have a data value of “-2” as well as two times a “1” – so with data values that cancel each 
other. 
The index which appears most often is “Treatment recommendations: national activities” 
(171 times), followed by “Treatment recommendation: increased information” (98 times), 
“Treatment recommendations: international activities” (86 times), “Treatment recommenda-
tion: general” appears 84 times), and “Treatment recommendation: energy” 60 times (see 
Table 25). 
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Table 25: New indices of the frame element “treatment recommendation” 
Treatment recommendation 
New indices Includes the following frame sub-dimensions Number of 
cases   (n =) 
Data 
value 
“Treatment recommen-
dation: general” 
“Something has to be, in general” 
“No treatment required: there is no problem” 
No “Treatment recommendation: general” men-
tioned 
  81 
    3 
 
928 
 1 
-2 
 
 0 
“Treatment recommen-
dation: energy” 
“Smaller personal carbon footprint” 
“Reduction of using fossil fuels” 
“Use of renewable energies” 
“Nuclear energy helps to reduce emissions/fossil fuel 
quarrying” 
“Replacing/displacing one energy source with an-
other” 
No “Treatment recommendation: energy” mentioned 
  11 
    6 
  26 
  10 
 
    7 
 
957 
 1 
 1 
 1 
 1 
 
 1 
 
 0 
“Treatment recommen-
dation: national activi-
ties” 
“Rebuilding a natural environment” 
“General reduction of greenhouse gases – national 
focus” 
“Demand climate change policy – national focus” 
“Demand more responsibility of the government/pol-
iticians” 
“Rewarding climate-friendly behaviour” 
“Economic aspects must be changed because of cli-
mate change (including greenwashing)” 
“Something must be done, but should not influence 
economic growth” 
“No treatment required: the economy comes first”  
No “Treatment recommendation: national activities” 
mentioned 
    6 
  52 
 
  46 
  26 
   
    3 
  35 
 
    6 
 
    4 
882 
 
 1 
 1 
 
 1 
 1 
 
 1 
 1 
 
-1 
 
-2 
 0 
“Treatment recommen-
dation: international ac-
tivities” 
“General reduction of greenhouse gases – interna-
tional focus” 
“Demand climate change policy – international focus” 
No “Treatment recommendation: international activi-
ties” mentioned 
  46 
 
  40 
930 
 1 
 
 1 
 0 
“Treatment recommen-
dation: increased infor-
mation” 
“Increased knowledge about climate change” 
“Scientific development” 
“Ask (the media) to stop publishing climate-change-
sceptical positions” 
“Take measures to mitigate the effects of climate 
change” 
“Tips for preventing the effects of climate change” 
No “Treatment recommendation: increased infor-
mation” mentioned 
  18 
  30 
    5 
 
  38 
 
    7 
 
891 
 1 
 1 
 1 
 
 1 
 
 1 
 
 0 
The number of articles is higher than 1,012, because 21 articles contain more than one “Treatment recom-
mendation: energy”, 10 articles more than one “Treatment recommendation: national activities”, 5 articles 
more than one “Treatment recommendation: international”, and 3 articles more than one “Treatment rec-
ommendation: increased information”. 
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Second, the actors who appear in Germany’s and Australia’s climate change coverage are 
consolidated. This results in six index groups of actors: scientists, politicians, journalists, 
members of civil society (for example, the public, the church, writers, artists), international 
actors (for example, politicians in the US, Russia, Europe), and economic actors (for exam-
ple, the oil industry, insurance companies, and investors). If one of these six index group of 
actors appear, it is coded with the data value “1”. If it does not appear, the data value is “0”. 
If two or even more actors have a say in an climate change article, each of these actors is 
coded with the data value “1”. The three most active actors are journalists (380 times), pol-
iticians (228 times), and scientists (222 times) (see Table 26). 
 
Table 26: New indices of actors appearing in climate change coverage 
Actors 
New indices Includes the following frame sub-dimensions Number of 
cases (n=) 
Data 
value 
Scientists Scientists Germany, Scientist Australia, Scientists USA, Scien-
tists Brussels/EU, Scientists UK/Ireland, Scientists India, Scien-
tists Canada, Scientists Serbia, Scientists international groups, 
Scientific institutions, Scientist Ross Garnault/Climate change 
adviser, Scientists climate-sceptic, Scientific institutions which 
advise the Australian govt. (CSIRO, The Climate Group), British 
economist Nicolas Stern, Institutions which advise the German 
government in the context of climate change (WBGU, 
Klimasekretariat), Studies/Reports from scientists 
No “Scientists” mentioned 
222 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
794 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0 
Politicians Prime Minister of Australia (Gillard, Howard, Rudd), Chancel-
lor/President of Germany (Merkel, Köhler), German Federal 
Ministers (Development, Agriculture, Environment, Interna-
tional Affairs, Science), Australian Federal Ministers (Climate 
Change, Environment), Australian Government including their 
committees, State Government/Parliament, Other politicians, 
National Party, Labor Party, Die Grünen/The Greens, Liberal 
Party, The Independents 
No ”Politicians” mentioned 
228 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
797 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0 
Journalists Journalists 
No “Journalists” mentioned 
380 
632 
1 
0 
Members of 
civil society 
Writers, Artists, Australian of the Year, the Church, Environ-
mental Organisations, Welfare Groups 
No “Members of the civil society” mentioned 
105 
 
911 
1 
 
0 
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Actors 
New indices Includes the following frame sub-dimensions Number of 
cases (n=) 
Data 
value 
International 
actors 
United National, United Nations Climate Change Conference, 
International Panel of Climate Change (IPCC), Key Players USA, 
Key Players South America, Key Players UK, Key Players Italia, 
Key Players Danmark, Key Players Spain, Key Players Sweden, 
Key Players France, Key Players Island, Key Players Russia, Key 
Players India, Key Players Iran, Key Players Tibet, Key Players 
Japan, Key Players China, Key Players Mongolia, Key Players In-
donesia, Key Players Africa, Key Players New Zealand 
No “International actors” mentioned 
139 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
916 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0 
Economic ac-
tors 
Economic Investors, Economic Industries, Oil Industry, Manag-
ers, Insurance Companies, Consulting Firms, Funding Firms, 
Media Owners 
No “Economic actors” mentioned 
111 
 
 
958 
1 
 
 
0 
The number of actors is higher than 1012, because 11 articles contain more than one “Scientists”, 19 arti-
cles contain more than one “Politicians”, 9 articles more than one “Members of the civil society”, 9 articles 
more than one “International actors”, and 3 articles more than one “Economic actors”. 
Third, the frequencies of “commenting” or “informing” articles were identified. Table 27 
shows that 171 out of 375 German articles (45.6 per cent) and 233 out of 637 Australian 
articles (36.6 per cent) were “commenting”. A total of 204 out of 357 articles (54.4 per cent) 
of the German climate change coverage and 404 out of 637 articles (63.4 per cent) of the 
Australian climate change coverage were “informing” during the period covered by the re-
search. 
So, in both countries informing articles represented the dominant writing style. 
 
Table 27: Articles are commenting/informing 
 Germany 
(n = 357) 
 Australia 
(n = 637) 
Commenting 171 (45.6 %)  233 (36.6 %) 
Informing 204 (54.4 %)  404 (63.4 %) 
 
Fourth, to identify frames of climate change, a two-step cluster analysis was used. The fol-
lowing indices were used: “Problem definition”, “Causes of climate change”, “Effects on 
nature”, “Effects on weather”, “Effects on humans”, “Effects on the economy”, “Treatment 
recommendation: energy”, “Treatment recommendation: national activities”, “Treatment 
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recommendation: international activities” and “Treatment recommendation: increased infor-
mation”. The index “Treatment recommendation: general” is not considered in the cluster 
analysis because it does not include concrete statements about climate change, but only gen-
eral messages. In addition, the index “Responsibility” is not considered for the cluster anal-
ysis due to its low incidence. 
Because cluster analyses often react to different orders of the data used, it was first explored 
whether a change of data would influence the results of the clusters. However, all orders 
produced the same result: a seven-cluster solution was found with “good” quality. 
The first cluster is called “Disconnected problem definition”. This index refers mainly to 
“Problem definition” and, thus, just includes the general message that there is an issue called 
“climate change” (1.00) (see Table 28). This cluster also involves a few voices that see pos-
itive “Effects on the economy” (-.03) while referring marginally to “Effects on nature” (.19). 
This cluster “Disconnected problem definition” appears 416 times (41.1 per cent). 
The second cluster is “Focus on consequences excluding effects on the economy”. It appears 
182 times (17.9 per cent) and includes consequences of climate change, except those refer-
ring to the economy. Looking at this second cluster in more detail, it considers all indices 
that look at the ecological effects of climate change, i. e. “Causes of climate change” (mean: 
.29), as well as “Effects on nature” (mean: .22), “Effects on weather” (mean: 42) and “Effects 
on humans” (mean: .32). “Effects on the economy” is not a topic in this second cluster. This 
aspect is the central one in the third cluster. 
The third cluster is “Economic consequences” and it appears 81 times (8.0 per cent). It con-
centrates clearly on “Effects on the economy” (mean: 1.00) and also includes “Problem def-
inition” (mean: 1.00). So, this cluster expresses the influence of climate change on economic 
aspects. 
The fourth cluster is “Treatment recommendation national” and it refers to all treatment rec-
ommendations with a national focus (mean: 1.18). “Problem definition” (data value ranges 
from “-2” to “1”) also has a high data value in this cluster (mean: .98) and it shows that it is 
accepted that climate change is a problem. This fourth cluster appears 93 times (9.2 per cent). 
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Table 28: Distribution of indices in the seven clusters 
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The fifth cluster is “Treatment recommendation international” and it appears 79 times 
(7.8 per cent). This cluster mainly includes treatment recommendations with an international 
focus (mean: 1.04), so statements from international politicians and scientists demanding 
climate change action. In addition, this cluster refers to “Effects on the economy” (mean: 
.10). Because “Effects on the economy” has the data values “1” and “0”, this result shows 
that some 10.0 per cent of articles included economic effects as a topic. 
The sixth cluster is “Focus on treatment information”. This cluster considers all treatment 
recommendations which demand more information about climate change from scientists, the 
government etc. (mean: 1.03). These broadly refer to “Causes of climate change” (mean: 
.07), “Effects on nature” (mean: .17), “Effects on weather” (mean: .09), and “Effects on the 
economy” (mean: .10). 
The seventh cluster is “Sceptics”. It mainly includes sceptical positions appearing in “Prob-
lem definition” (-1.1111). It appears 81 times (8.0 per cent). 
Four cases were identified as outliers. They were excluded and not assigned to any cluster. 
Therefore, all analyses including the results of the cluster analysis, are based on 1008 cases.  
The seven clusters correspond to Entman’s (1933) definition of framing and, thus, offer 
broad opportunities to illustrate German and Australian climate change coverage: on the one 
hand, it represents the priorities of economic and non-economic consequences, and, one the 
other hand, it illustrates the demand for action in terms of climate change on a national as 
well as international basis and the demand for more information about climate change, so 
the demand for better understanding climate change as an issue. In addition, the clusters 
“Disconnected problem definition” and “Sceptics” stand for two mindsets related to climate 
change, which just define the issue “climate change” as existing or not existing without being 
concrete. 
Table 29 introduces the seven clusters by showing their name, their appearance as well as 
their characteristics. In addition, this table includes examples from the four newspapers, cit-
ing extracts of articles which show how each of the clusters are represented in climate change 
coverage. 
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Table 29: Seven clusters of climate change coverage 
Name of  
Cluster 
Appearance Characteris-
tics 
Examples 
“Disconnected 
problem defi-
nition”  
416 times  
(41.1 %).  
Articles includ-
ing mainly the 
frame element 
“problem defi-
nition”. 
1. “Australia’s major cities are lagging behind those in 
Europe, South Africa and the United States in roll-
ing out programs to tackle climate change, a new 
global report reveals.” (The Age, 12.06.2012) 
2. “Insbesondere die Folgen des Klimawandels und 
eingeschleppte Arten sind nach IUCN-Angaben nur 
schwer rückgängig zu machen.” (FAZ, 19.06.2012)” 
3. “Two geoscience professors from Pennsylvania 
State University, Kevin Furlong and Charles Am-
mon, use natural disaster movies to help teach 
students about climate change and environmental 
disasters.” (SMH, 28.03.2011) 
“Focus on con-
sequences ex-
cluding effects 
on the econ-
omy”  
182 times  
(17.9 %) 
Consequences 
of climate 
change, ex-
cept those re-
ferring to the 
economy. 
1. “The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
predicts a sea-level rise of up to 59 centimetres 
over the next century, a level that would inundate 
most of the Maldives’ inhabited atolls.” (SMH, 
07.01.2012) 
2. “Stern predicted global warming of between 
three and 10 degrees this century unless green-
house gas emissions were reduced.” (The Age, 
12.12.2007) 
3. “‘Now there are warnings that with climate change 
triggering higher seas and fiercer, more frequent 
storms, we may soon need to buffer Sydney’s 
beaches from erosion by ‘nourishing’ them with 
sand mined from the sea floor. If we don’t, within 
30 years we are going to see houses falling into the 
beach,’ warns Dr Ian Turner, a University of NSW 
scientist.” (SMH, 08.01.2008) 
“Economic 
conse-
quences” 
81 times  
(8.0 %) 
Conse-
quences of 
climate 
change, fo-
cusing on the 
economy. 
1. “Auch bei Finanzierungszusagen für ärmere Län-
der, die den Kampf gegen den Klimawandel und 
seine Folgen aus eigener Kraft nicht bewältigen 
können, müsse die EU mit gutem Beispiel voran-
gehen.” (SZ, 05.11.2009) 
2. “Nach den Berechnungen der Umweltökonomin 
könnte der Klimawandel in den kommenden 50 
Jahren durchschnittlich zu gesamtwirtschaftlichen 
Wachstumseinbußen von 0,5 Prozentpunkten pro 
Jahr führen.” (SZ, 17.05.2010) 
3.  “But it took until 1987 for countries to agree to 
limit the production of CFCs by international 
treaty – a process opposed vigorously by the 
chemical industry.” (SMH, 18.02.2011)  
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Name of  
Cluster 
Appearance Characteris-
tics 
Examples 
“Treatment 
recommenda-
tion national”  
93 times  
(9.2 %) 
 
Refers to all 
treatment 
recommen-
dations with 
a national fo-
cus – includ-
ing voices of 
national poli-
ticians and 
scientists etc. 
as well as a 
demand for 
national ac-
tion against 
climate 
change. 
1.  “We know that the majority of people want ac-
tion on climate change and want a sensible, ra-
tional approach to change.” (SMH, 24.03.2011) 
2. “Deacons Lawyers said councils would have to en-
sure risks from climate change in flood-con-
strained coastal areas had been addressed by de-
velopers and that they considered such risks in 
their decisions.” (SMH, 08.01.2008) 
3. “Sie [Angela Merkel] lehnt allzu verbindliche 
Verpflichtungen im Kampf gegen die 
Erderwärmung ab, die der Industrie schaden 
könnten.” (SZ, 30.09.2009) 
“Treatment 
recommenda-
tion interna-
tional” 
79 times 
(7.8 %) 
Includes 
voices of in-
ternational 
politicians 
and scientists 
etc. as well 
as interna-
tional action 
against cli-
mate change. 
1. “So sollen im Kampf gegen den Klimawandel die 
Industriestaaten finanzielle und technologische 
Hilfe leisten.” (FAZ, 30.11.2009) 
2. “Die Länder, die das Kyoto-Protokoll ratifiziert 
haben, stehen für 30 Prozent aller globalen 
Emissionen. Das zeigt, dass wir den Klimawandel 
nicht alleine aufhalten können.” (FAZ, 26.05.2010) 
3. “The IPCC report will be released Saturday in Spain 
at the meeting attended by the UN Secretary-Gen-
eral, Ban Ki-moon, and is expected to carry a di-
rect warning that without urgent action over the 
next five to 10 years, the world’s leaders risk cli-
mate change accelerating at dangerous levels.” 
(SZ, 15.11.2007) 
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Name of  
Cluster 
Appearance Characteris-
tics 
Examples 
“Focus on 
treatment in-
formation”  
76 times  
(7.6 %) 
Considers all 
treatment 
recommen-
dations 
which de-
mand more 
information 
about cli-
mate change. 
1. “Tackling the challenges of climate change will re-
quire us all to understand not just the science of 
climate change but also what options we have to 
respond to it and mitigate further change. … We 
must be clear about what is happening now, and 
that information must be available to everyone.” 
(The Age, 13.07.2010)  
2. “There is a lot more Brown and the Greens want if 
Labor wins: mandated zero greenhouse gas emis-
sion, the effective end of coal-fired power genera-
tion, phasing out of coal exports, a ban on news 
coalmines or power stations, removal of GM 
crops, and active discouragement of cars.” (SMH, 
24.07.2010) 
3. “The existence of dissenting voices is a mark of de-
mocracy, but this does not mean that balance in 
reporting scientific and policy debates is achieved 
by giving opposing sides equal weight when that 
‘balance’ does not remotely resemble the weight 
of scientific support for human-caused climate 
change.” (The Age, 29.03.2011)  
“Sceptical 
views” 
81 times  
(8.0 %) 
Includes all 
sceptical po-
sitions, for 
example arti-
cles that 
question the 
existence of 
climate 
change, that 
claim that it 
is man-made, 
and the sci-
entific results 
of climate 
change  
1. “He believes climate change is a pagan supersti-
tion and that global temperatures were, in fact, 
higher in Roman times and the Middle Ages.” 
(SMH, 19.03.2011) 
2. “The clear impression is that Asian-driven coal de-
mand is a more powerful juggernaut than climate 
change. As one English delegate put it: ‘The Chi-
nese don’t give a stuff about greenhouse emis-
sions, and nor do I.” (The Age, 14.11.2010) 
3. “The opening session set the tone. Fred Palmer, 
vice-president of Peabody Energy, the world’s larg-
est coal company, noted that since the ‘great de-
bate’ on climate change began, coals consump-
tion had gone from 3.6 billion tonnes a year to 
almost 7 billion tonnes.” (The Age, 14.11.2010) 
 
The results of this cluster analysis confirm that the theoretical discussion about climate 
change in Chapters 2 and 3 introduces the right hypotheses. By the analysis of the clusters 
the hypotheses can be tested and the research questions can be answered. For example it can 
be verified whether Australia’s climate change coverage focuses on frames of causes and 
effects of climate change as well as on climate change action (hypothesis 1). Moreover, the 
expectations from the theoretical findings are that there is a common representation of the 
climate-change-sceptical viewpoint in Australian climate change coverage, whereas it is not 
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part of the German climate change coverage (for example, hypothesis 3). The cluster “Scep-
tics” gives an answer to this assumption. Additionally, the seven clusters can answer the 
question whether German newspapers might represent a broader variety of perspectives on 
climate change than Australian newspapers do (for example, hypothesis 4a). 
The following analysis, in addition, is based on three questions which guide all the hypoth-
eses. These are: 
1. Which similarities/differences are found in the climate change coverage of Ger-
many and Australia when comparing the two countries and how can the observed 
differences be explained? 
2. Which similarities/differences are are found in the climate change coverage of Ger-
many and Australia when comparing the election and the environmental disaster 
and how can the observed differences be explained? 
3. Which similarities/differences are are found in the climate change coverage of Ger-
many and Australia when comparing the time before and after the respective events 
and how can the observed differences be explained?  
Within these three comparative sub research questions three aspects are examined: 
1. Do the frames/frame sub-dimensions differ between the quality newspapers in the 
countries?  
2. Which actors represent the climate change frames/frame sub-dimensions?  
3. Which form of expression (commenting/informing) is more frequently used com-
paring the countries and the two events?  
6.2. Testing the hypotheses and sub research questions 
This chapter is structured according to the three questions which guide all the hypotheses 
and sub research questions. The first part tests the hypotheses and sub research questions 
which compare the climate change coverage in Germany with that in Australia. The second 
part focuses on a comparison of the election and the environmental disaster. And the third 
part includes all hypotheses and sub research questions comparing the time before and after 
the two events. All issues are tested in terms of frames/frame sub-dimensions, actors, and 
form of expression – as long as this is reasonable. 
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6.2.1. Comparisons between Germany and Australia 
The first part of the hypotheses test compares the framing of German climate change cover-
age with the framing of Australian climate change coverage. This is why it uses the indices 
(see Table 21 to Table 26) and the results of the cluster analysis (see Table 29) presented in 
the first part of this chapter. 
Hypothesis 1: Australia’s climate change coverage is dominated by frames of causes and 
effects as well as of action. Germany’s climate change coverage remains unspecific, just 
defining the problem. 
For this first hypothesis, the result of the cluster analysis is used. For the German part of the 
hypothesis, the cluster “Disconnected problem definition” is relevant, because it represents 
unspecific climate change coverage and, thus, operationalises the German part of the hy-
pothesis. The Australian part of the hypothesis is operationalised by, on the one hand, “Focus 
on consequences excluding effects on the economy” and “Economic consequences”, repre-
senting frames of causes and effects. On the other hand, the clusters “Treatment recommen-
dation – national”, “Treatment recommendation – international” and “Focus on treatment 
information” stand for frames of action. 
To test hypothesis 1, the five clusters which represent the Australian climate change cover-
age are summarised in a new cluster “Climate effects and action”. “Disconnected problem 
definition” remains, as it represents the German climate change coverage. The cluster “Scep-
tics” is excluded from this test. 
The contingency table (Table 30) shows that the percentage of “Disconnected problem def-
inition” in Germany was higher (50.6 per cent) than in Australia (41.5 per cent). In Australia, 
the percentage of the new cluster “Climate Effects and Action” was higher (58.5 per cent) 
than in Germany (49.4 per cent). 
The difference between the two countries is significant (p < .01). Hypothesis 1 is correct. 
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Table 30: Dominant clusters in German and Australian climate change coverage 
Cluster  German  
Media 
Australian  
Media 
 n= 342 585 
“Disconnected problem 
definition” 
Number of articles (n) 
Percentage within a country 
173 
50.6 
243 
41.5 
“Climate effects and ac-
tion” 
Number of articles (n) 
Percentage within a country 
169 
49.4 
342 
58.5 
Chi2 value 7.1 Significance p < .01 
 
Hypothesis 2: Politicians in Australia have a greater stake in the representation of the na-
tional climate change discussion than those in Germany. They are more often mentioned in 
the country’s newspapers than German politicians in German newspapers. 
Hypothesis 2 uses the index “Politicians” (see Table 26) to compare the appearance of poli-
tical actors in the two countries. This is why political actors are given the data value “1”, 
while other actors are given value “0”. Table 31 confirms this hypothesis, showing that Aust-
ralia’s politicians are the senders of 28.9 per cent of all climate change news, whereas in 
Germany only 11.7 per cent of all actors involved in climate change coverage are politicians. 
This difference between the two countries is significant (p < .001). 
 
Table 31: Appearance of politicians in German and Australian climate change coverage 
  Germany Australia 
 n= 375 637 
“Politicians” Number of articles (n) 
Percentage  
44 
11.7 
184 
28.9 
No “Politicians” 
mentioned 
Number of articles (n) 
Percentage 
331 
88.3 
453 
71.1 
Chi2 value 39.8 Significance p < .001 
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Hypothesis 3: In Australia, the representation of climate-change-sceptic viewpoints is a nor-
mal aspect of climate change coverage. German newspapers rarely give space to such scep-
tical voices. 
To test hypothesis 3, the six clusters which do not represent sceptical viewpoints on climate 
change are summarised in a new cluster “Non-sceptics”, representing the German climate 
change coverage in terms of hypothesis 3. “Sceptics” remains as it represents the Australian 
climate change coverage.  
The contingency table (Table 32) shows that the percentage of articles presenting “Sceptical 
views” is similar in both countries. The small difference between the two countries is not 
significant (p = .49).  
Hypothesis 3 is not substantiated. 
 
Table 32: “Sceptical” viewpoints in German and Australian climate change coverage 
Cluster  German  
Media 
Australian  
Media 
 n= 375 633 
“Sceptics” Number of articles (n) 
Percentage  
33 
8.8 
48 
7.6 
“Non-sceptics” Number of articles (n) 
Percentage  
342 
91.2 
585 
92.4 
Chi2 value  0.5 Significance p = .49 
 
Hypothesis 4a: German newspapers represent a broad variety of perspectives on climate 
change. The diversity of frame sub-dimensions is high. In Australia, the variety of perspec-
tives on climate change is low. 
To test Hypothesis 4a, all indices introduced in Table 21 to Table 25 are used, but the index 
“Problem definition”. It is excluded because “Problem definition”, at least, has to appear in 
each article and is, thus, not a sign for variety.  
Then, all indices with a negative data value are consolidated in a new index group represent-
ing non-human-induced climate change: “Denying that humans cause climate change” (data 
value: -1) and “Natural causes” (data value: -1) from the index “Causes of climate change” 
as well as “Effects on nature: changes in biodiversity – positive consequences” (data value: 
-1) from the index “Effects on nature”, “Effects on the economy: economic benefits” (data 
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value: -1) from the index “Effects on the economy”, “No treatment required: there is no 
problem” (data value: -2) from the index “Treatment recommendation: general”, “Something 
must be done, but should not influence economic growth” (data value: -1) and “No treatment 
required: the economy comes first” (data value: -2) from the index “Treatment recommen-
dation: national focus” are summarised to this new index group. So, all frame sub dimensions 
which see climate change as natural or having positive consequences are now together in 
this new index group. 
Second, all frame sub dimensions from the above-mentioned indices as well as from the 
indices “Effects on the weather”, “Effects on humans”, “Treatment recommendation: inter-
national focus”, “Treatment recommendation: energy”, and “Treatment recommendation: 
increased information” having a positive data value, so all frame sub dimensions which iden-
tify climate change as a challenge, are summarise in another group. 
Variety is found when one article includes more than one of these indices. So, when looking 
at hypothesis 4a, German newspapers are expected to represent more of these indices – so a 
broader variety – in their articles, whereas the expectation for the Australian climate change 
articles is that they mostly include only one index – so a low variety of perspectives. 
An examination of the frequencies in both countries shows that 45.9 per cent of all articles 
have a low variety because they just include one of the indices. 14.0 per cent contain two 
indices, 4.9 per cent three and 2.0 per cent four indices, which represents a high variety. The 
new index group representing non-human-induced climate change and, thus, representing 
climate change as natural or having positive consequences, appears in 0.4 per cent of all 
articles. A total of 37.7 per cent of the articles just include a “Problem definition” and are, 
therefore, not part of this hypothesis test. 
Comparing the variety of perspectives in Germany and Australia with the support of a t-test, 
the mean in Germany has a value of 0.83, while the mean in Australia has a value of 1.10. 
Thus, the Australian climate change coverage has a broader variety than the climate change 
coverage in Germany. The difference between the two countries is significant (p < .001) (see 
Table 33). 
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Table 33: Variety of climate change coverage in Germany and Australia 
 Germany  Australia  
n =  375 637  
 Mean (SD) Mean (SD) t-value / significance 
Variety of climate 
change coverage 
0.83 (0.84) 1.08 (1.00) - 4.3 / p < .001 
The scale ranges from 0 to 5. 
 
Hypothesis 4b: The variety of actors in German newspapers is higher than the variety of 
actors in Australian newspapers.  
This is why the indices of actors – who are “scientists”, “politicians”, “journalists”, “mem-
bers of civil society”, “international actors”, and “economic actors” (see Table 26) – are 
used. A variety of actors is found when more than one of these indices, for example a scien-
tist and a politician, are quoted in the same article. 
An examination of the frequencies in both countries shows that 87.2 per cent of all articles 
only include one actor, so do not have a variety of actors. A variety of actors was found in 
10.8 per cent of the articles with two actors, 1.1 per cent with three actors, and 0.1 per cent 
with four actors. 
As Table 34 shows, a t-test identifies the fact that the variety of actors was higher in Aus-
tralian than in German media. This difference is also significant (p < .001). So, the Australian 
newspapers examined in this research do not only have a broader variety of perspectives on 
climate change, but also a broader variety of actors included in their climate change articles. 
 
Table 34: Variety of actors involved in climate change coverage 
 Germany  Australia  
n =  375 637  
 Mean (SD) Mean (SD) t-value / significance 
Variety of actors in cli-
mate change coverage 
1.05 (0.28) 1.16 (0.44) -4.9 / p < .001 
Each article could include a maximum of 4 actors. The scale ranges from 0 to 4. 
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Hypothesis 5: German journalists use an informing writing style for climate change cover-
age, while Australian journalists use a commenting one. 
This hypothesis refers only to the actor group “Journalists”. Using the index “Journalists”, 
380 articles are identified as having a journalist as an actor in German and Australian climate 
change coverage. A total of 167 of these articles (44.5 per cent) are found in German (n = 
357) and 213 articles (33.4 per cent) in Australian newspapers (n = 637).  
Looking at the form of expression of these articles – i. e. whether they are commenting or 
informing – a contingency table reveals that 52.1 per cent of all German articles with a jour-
nalist as an actor were informing and 47.9 per cent were commenting. In Australia, 55.4 per 
cent were informing and 44.6 per cent were commenting (see Table 35). The difference be-
tween the two countries is not significant (p = .52). 
 
Table 35: Journalist use a commenting/informing writing style 
  Germany Australia 
 n= 167 213 
Informing Number of articles (n) 
Percentage  
87 
52.1  
118 
55.4 
Commenting Number of articles (n) 
Percentage  
80 
47.9 
95 
44.6 
Chi2 value 0.4 Significance p = .52 
 
Hypothesis 6: German as well as Australian climate change coverage asks national politi-
cians to tackle climate change.  
This hypothesis was deduced from the public’s attitude to climate change: The literature 
about the public’s attitude to climate change states that in Germany as well as in Australia 
people “say others are responsible” and name “politicians” as accountable for tackling cli-
mate change. The public in both nations expects national politicians to act against climate 
change. 
The frame element “Treatment recommendation” is used to test this hypothesis, because it 
contains frame sub-dimensions which involve asking national as well as international poli-
ticians to act. 
The frame sub-dimensions which ask national political actors to take action are “Rebuilding 
a natural environment”, “General reduction of greenhouse gases – national focus”, “Demand 
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climate change policy – national focus”, “Demand more responsibility by the govern-
ment/politicians”, “Reward climate-friendly behaviour”, “Economic aspects must be 
changed because of climate change (including greenwashing)”, “Something must be done, 
but should not influence economic growth”, and “No treatment required: the economy comes 
first”. These frame sub-dimensions are given the positive data value “1”. The frame sub-
dimensions which ask international political actors to tackle climate change include “Reduc-
tion of greenhouse gases – international” and “Demand climate change policy – interna-
tional”. They get a negative data value “-1”. 
To arrive at a useful variable, the international frame sub-dimensions are derived from the 
national ones: (“Rebuilding a natural environment” + “General reduction of greenhouse 
gases – national focus” + “Demand climate change policy – national focus” + “Demand 
more responsibility by the government/politicians” + “Reward climate-friendly behaviour” 
+ “Economic aspects need to be changed because of climate change (including greenwash-
ing)” + “Something must be done, but should not influence economic growth” + and “No 
treatment required: the economy comes first”) – (“Reduction of greenhouse gases – interna-
tional” + “Demand climate change policy – international”). This new variable “Treatment 
recommendation – national versus international” is used for a t-test. 
Table 36 illustrates that the German media has an international reference (Mean: -0.04), 
whereas the media in Australia concentrates on national action in terms of climate change 
(Mean: 0.17). The difference between Germany and Australia in terms of “Treatment rec-
ommendation – national versus international” is significant (p < .001). 
 
Table 36: “Treatment recommendation – national versus international” in Germany and 
Australia 
 Germany Australia  
n =  357 637  
 Mean (SD) Mean (SD) t-value / significance 
“Treatment  
recommendation – na-
tional versus  
international” 
-0.04 (0.41) 0.17 (0.59) -6.5 / p < .001 
The scale ranges from -2 (Treatment recommendation: international frame sub dimensions) to 3 (Treatment 
recommendation: national frame sub dimensions) . 
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This finding, nevertheless, shows that the public’s attitude to climate change – the German 
as well as the Australian people expect national politicians to take action against climate 
change – is not fully represented in the media. What was published in the newspapers in 
Germany was actually the opposite. 
Hypothesis 7: German climate change coverage contains very few frame sub-dimensions 
related to the effects of climate change. In Australia, the media widely covers the effects of 
climate change. 
Hypothesis 7 is deduced from the literature about the public’s attitudes and it is concerned 
with the impact climate change has on the people’s life. 
To test this hypothesis, the frame element “Causal Interpretation (effects of climate change)” 
is used. Bear in mind that this frame element was operationalized by four indices: 1. Effects 
on nature, 2. Effects on the weather, 3. Effects on humans, and 4. Effects on the economy. 
Two indices have a negative data value: “Effects on nature: Changes in biodiversity – posi-
tive consequences” and “Effects on the economy: economic benefits”; both have a data value 
of “-1”. 
A t-test shows that only the difference regarding the index “Effects on the weather” is sig-
nificant (p < .01). 
Because this hypothesis does not examine the effects of climate change in detail, but rather 
ask generally whether the effects of climate change are mentioned, the four indices are, in 
addition, summarised in one index. Testing this new index “Effects of climate change, in 
general” with a t-test, we find a small but significant difference (p < .05) (see Table 37). 
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Table 37: “Causal interpretation (effects of climate change)” in Germany and Australia 
 Germany Australia 
n = 375 637 
 Mean (SD)  Mean (SD) t-value / 
significance 
“Effects on nature” .13 (.42)  .17 (.46) -1.2 / 
p = .24 
“Effects on the 
weather” 
.07 (.29)  .13 (.39) -2.9 / 
p < .01 
“Effects on hu-
mans” 
.08 (.29)  .07 (.28) 0.5 / 
p = .59 
“Effects on the 
economy” 
.07 (.35)  .11 (.36) -1.5 / 
p = .13 
“Effects of climate 
change, in general” 
.09 (.20)  .12 (22) -2.2 / 
p < .05 
“Effects on nature”: scale ranges from -1 to 3;  “Effects on the weather”: scale ranges from 0 to 2 ; “Effects 
on humans”: scale ranges from 0 to 2 ; “Effects on the economy”: scale ranges from -1 to 1 ; “Effects of climate 
change, in general”: scale ranges from -0.25 to 1.25 
 
6.2.2. Comparisons between the two events 
The second part of the hypotheses test compares the framing of the two events. So, it inves-
tigates dominant frames/frame elements in the media coverage around the election and the 
environmental disaster, and it examines the depiction of the two events. 
Sub research question 1: Does coverage during the environmental disaster emphasise na-
tional activities, whereas coverage during the election emphasises international activities? 
A t-test uses the new variable „Treatment recommendation – national versus international” 
from Hypothesis 6 to find out whether coverage during the environmental disaster supports 
national activities and coverage during the election advocates international activities. This is 
why, on one the one hand, the time after the environmental disaster – the flooding – has 
happened is analysed. Because it is a national event, the assumption is that the newspaper 
coverage might discuss this environmental disaster in a national context. On the other hand, 
the time before the election is examined, i. e. the time during the election period when cli-
mate change might be used for propaganda reasons. 
Table 38 demonstrates that the assumption of sub research question 1 is right: the climate 
change coverage before the election demanded almost as much national as international ac-
tion (Mean: 0.09), while the coverage after the environmental disaster focused on national 
action (Mean: 0.20). The finding is significant (p < .05). 
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Table 38: “Treatment recommendation – national versus international” in the context of 
the election and the environmental disaster  
 Before Election After Environmental  
disaster 
 
n =  287 168  
 Mean (SD) Mean (SD) t-value / significance 
“Treatment recommen-
dation – national ver-
sus international” 
0.09 (.50) 0.20 (.53) 2.4 / p < .05 
Scale: -2 = ”Treatment recommendation international” / 3 = “Treatment recommendation national” 
 
To provide more detailed results on when “causal interpretation (effects of climate change)” 
(see Hypothesis 7) is part of the media discussion around the two events, the data set – again 
the time after the environmental disaster and the time before the election – is examined. 
Sub research question 2: Does “causal interpretation (effects of climate change)”appear 
more often during the environmental disaster than during the political election? 
The results of a t-test which concentrates on the two time periods – the time after the envi-
ronmental disaster and the time before the political election – show that the four indices of 
“Causal interpretation (effects of climate change)” as well as the summarised index “Effects 
of climate change, in general” reveal no major differences  (see Table 39). 
 
Table 39: “Causal interpretation (effects of climate change)” before the political election 
and after the environmental disaster 
 Before Election After Environmental  
disaster 
 
n =  287 168  
 Mean (SD) Mean (SD) t-value / significance 
“Effects on nature” 0.18 (.50) 0.14 (.42) - 0.9 / p = .35 
“Effects on the 
weather” 
0.10 (.37) 0.16 (.40)   1.6 / p = .12 
“Effects on humans” 0.06 (.26) 0.04 (.19) - 1.1 / p = .27 
“Effects on the econ-
omy” 
0.10 (.38) 0.07 (.34) - 0.9 / p = .39 
“Effects on climate 
change, in general” 
0.36 (.57) 0.38 (.63)   0.4 / p = .71 
Effects on nature:  scale ranges from -1 to 3; . Effects on the weather: scale ranges from 0 to 2 ; Effects on 
humans: scale ranges from 0 to 2 ; Effects on the economy: scale ranges from -1 to 1 ; Effects of cli-mate 
change in general: scale ranges from -0.25 to 1.25 
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Hypothesis 8: Whereas the newspaper coverage before the election demands action, the me-
dia informs the public about the consequences of climate change after the time of the envi-
ronmental disaster. 
The assumption is that the newspaper coverage before the election is characterised by the 
clusters “Treatment recommendation – national, “Treatment recommendation – interna-
tional” and “Focus on treatment information”, i. e. the three frames which stand for climate 
change action. The clusters “Focus on consequences excluding effects on the economy” and 
“Economic consequences” illustrate the consequences of climate change and, thus, are ex-
pected to be emphasised after the time of the environmental disaster. 
Again the clusters are summarised to test hypothesis 8: “Treatment recommendation – na-
tional, “Treatment recommendation – international” and “Focus on treatment information” 
into the cluster “Climate action coverage”, “Focus on consequences excluding effects on the 
economy” and “Economic consequences” into the cluster “Climate consequences coverage”. 
The contingency table shows that the percentage in “Climate action coverage” and “Climate 
consequences coverage” is very similar. “Climate action coverage” appears in 49.6 per cent 
of all articles during the time of the election and 45.6 per cent during the time of the envi-
ronmental disaster. “Climate consequences coverage” is represented in 50.4 per cent of the 
climate change coverage around the election and in 54.4 per cent of all climate change cov-
erage referring to the environmental disaster. The difference is not significant (p = .55). Hy-
pothesis 8 is not substantiated (see Table 40). 
 
Table 40: Comparison of “climate action coverage” and “climate consequences 
coverage” during the time of the election/environmental disaster 
Cluster  Before Election  After Environmental dis-
aster  
 n= 137 90 
“Climate ac-
tion cover-
age”  
Number of articles (n) 
Percentage  
68 
49.6 
41 
45.6 
“Climate con-
sequences 
coverage” 
Number of articles (n) 
Percentage  
69 
50.4 
49 
54.4 
Chi2 value 0.4 Significance p = .55 
 
6 Analysis 177 
Sub research question 3: Is the newspaper coverage of climate change around the election 
commenting and is it informing during the time of the environmental disaster? 
This sub research question is based on two assumptions: 1. That politicians increase their 
public relations activities during the election period, which is reflected in commenting arti-
cles in the media, and 2. that an environmental disaster encourages journalists to provide 
facts and data to the public about climate change issues. 
This is why the election period as well as the time after the environmental disaster are ex-
amined with a contingency table.  
The contingency table demonstrates that none of the events has a major effect on the form 
of expression. A total of 61.9 per cent of all articles published during the election period 
were informing and 62.7 per cent after the environmental disaster. Only 37.3 per cent of the 
articles published before the election and 38.1 per cent of the articles examined during the 
time after the environmental disaster were commenting. There is no significant difference 
between these results (p = .86) (see Table 41). 
 
Table 41: Commenting/informing writing style before the election/after the environmental 
disaster 
Cluster  Before Election  After Environmental 
Disaster 
 n= 287 168 
Informing Number of articles (n) 
Percentage  
107 
37.3 
64 
38.1 
Commenting Number of articles (n) 
Percentage  
180 
62.7 
104 
61.9 
Chi2 value 0.0 Significance p= .86 
 
In the discussion about the differences between the two events, the following sub research 
question about the actors arises. 
Sub research question 4: Are political actors dominant during the time of the political elec-
tion, whereas other actors are dominant during the time of the environmental disaster? 
A conclusion concerning the dominance of either “political actors” or “other actors” arises 
from the two events themselves: “political actors” are assigned to the political election, while 
the “other actors” are assigned to the environmental disaster. 
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To test this sub research question , the indices “Politicians” and “International actors” – are 
summarised, on the one hand. On the other hand, all other actors, i. e. the indices “Members 
of civil society”, “Economic actors” and “Scientists”, are summed up. The index “Journal-
ists” is excluded from the data set, because journalists are not cited in the coverage, but are 
the authors of the articles. 
Then the “other actors” (indices “Members of civil society” + “economic actors” + “scien-
tists”) are subtracted from the “political actors” (indices “politicians” + “international ac-
tors”), resulting in a new index “Dominance of political actors”. A positive mean of this new 
index “Political actors” vs. “others actors” would signify the dominance of political actors, 
while a negative mean would signify the dominance of “other actors”. 
Using the new index and assigning it to the two events, a t-test shows that “political actors” 
appear a bit more during the political elections (Mean: -.02). However, during the environ-
mental disaster, political actors are not considerably less evident (Mean:  
-.06). This result might appear because politicians have to do something in the context of an 
environmental disaster when they are expected to (at least) offer sympathy and organize 
rescue operations. The difference between the two events is not significant (p = .54) (see 
Table 42). 
 
Table 42: ”Political actors” vs. “others” in German/Australian climate change coverage 
 Election  Environmental  
disaster 
 
n =  620 392  
 Mean (SD) Mean (SD) t-value / significance 
Dominance of political 
actors 
-.02 (0.92) -.06 (1.00) 0.62 / p = .54 
Scale: -3 = dominance of “Other actors” / +4  = dominance of “Political actors” 
 
6.2.3. Comparisons before/after the event 
The third part of this chapter compares the timeframes before and after the election and the 
environmental disaster. Each timeframe consists of data collected six months before and six 
months after the events. 
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Hypothesis 9: Australia’s climate change coverage before the election was strongly domi-
nated by frames of causes and effects as well as of action. After the election, the frames are 
more diverse. 
Comparing the climate change coverage before and after the election in Australia, the clus-
ters “Focus on consequences excluding effects on the economy” and “Economic conse-
quences” again stand for the frames of causes and effects. The clusters “Treatment recom-
mendation national”, “Treatment recommendation international” and “Focus on treatment 
information” illustrate climate change action. 
To test hypothesis 9, the cluster “Climate effects and action” from hypothesis 1 which sum-
marises these five clusters is used. The other two frames “Disconnected problem definition” 
and “Sceptics” are summarised as well; this new cluster is called “General climate change 
coverage”. The assumption in terms of hypothesis 9 is that the percentage of the cluster 
“Climate effects and action” will be higher before the political election, having a significant 
difference to the percentage appearing after election day. 
Table 43 indicates that the percentages of the two periods in terms of “Climate Effects and 
Action” as well as “General Climate change coverage” were very similar: Before election 
day, the cluster “Climate Effects and Action” appeared 52.1 per cent and 55.3 per cent after 
election day. The cluster “General climate change coverage” had a percentage of 47.9 per 
cent before and 44.7 per cent after election day. Accordingly, the difference is not significant 
(p = .94). Hypothesis 9 is not substantiated. 
 
Table 43:  Australia: dominant clusters before and after the election compared – coverage 
during climate change conferences included 
Cluster  Before the  
Election  
After the  
Election 
 n= 188 206 
“Climate ef-
fects and ac-
tion” 
Number of articles (n) 
Percentage  
98 
52.1 
114 
55.3 
“General cli-
mate change 
coverage” 
Number of articles (n) 
Percentage  
90 
47.9 
92 
44.7 
Chi2 value 0.0 Significance p = .94 
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Whether this hypothesis also relates to the German political election is the next sub research 
question. 
Sub research question 5: Which of the defined frames from Hypothesis 9 were dominant 
before and after the German election? 
For sub research question 5, the clusters “Climate effects and action” and “General climate 
change coverage” are used for examining the German climate change coverage. 
The picture is, however, the same as in Australia: before election day, the cluster “Climate 
effects and action” appears 50.0 per cent and 44.7 per cent after election day. The cluster 
“General climate change coverage” has a percentage of 50.0 per cent before and 55.3 per 
cent after election day. The difference is also not significant (p = .48) (see Table 44). 
 
Table 44:  Germany: dominant clusters before and after the election and the environmental 
disaster compared  
Cluster  Before the  
Election  
After the  
Election 
 n= 78 103 
“Climate ef-
fects and ac-
tion” 
Number of articles (n) 
Percentage  
39 
50.0 
46 
44.7 
“General cli-
mate change 
coverage” 
Number of articles (n) 
Percentage  
39 
50.0 
57 
55.3 
Chi2 value 0.5 Significance p = .48 
 
Hypothesis 10: Critical and sceptical voices accompanied the 2007 election before the Aus-
tralian election day. After the election, the prominence of critical and sceptical voices was 
clearly reduced. 
To test hypothesis 10, the two clusters from hypothesis 3 are taken – “Sceptics” and “Non-
sceptics”.  
In general, the frequency of sceptical voices is low during the 2007 election in Australia. 
Before the election the percentage is 6.5 per cent, after the political election, the percentage 
is 4.6 per cent. The difference is not significant (p = .41) (see Table 45). 
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Table 45: Australia: “Sceptics” before and after the election compared 
Cluster  Before the  
Election  
After the  
Election 
 n= 201 216 
“Sceptical 
views” 
Number of articles (n) 
Percentage  
13 
6.5 
10 
4.6 
“Non-Sceptical 
views” 
Number of articles (n) 
Percentage  
188 
93.5 
206 
95.4 
Chi2 value 0.67 Significance p = .41 
 
Hypothesis 11a: After the Queensland floods, the Australian newspaper coverage of climate 
change concentrates on the frame element “Causal interpretation (effects of climate 
change)”, in general.  
Hypothesis 11b: After the Oder floods, the German newspaper coverage of climate change 
concentrates on negative effects regarding the frame element “Causal interpretation (effects 
of climate change)”. 
As illustrated in Table 23, the frame element “Causal interpretation (effects of climate 
change)” consists of four indices: 1. “Effects on nature”, 2. “Effects on the weather”, 3. “Ef-
fects on humans” and 4. “Effects on the economy”. Bear in mind that “Effects on nature” 
and “Effects on the economy” include a frame sub-dimension with a negative data value 
each (“Effects on nature: Changes in biodiversity – positive consequences” and “Effects on 
the economy: economic benefits”). 
To test this hypothesis, the two negative values (“Effects on nature: Changes in biodiversity 
– positive consequences” and “Effects on the economy: economic benefits”) are summarised 
in a new index “Climate change has positive effects”. All positive values are summarised to 
a new index “Climate change has negative effects”. In addition, the index “Effects of climate 
change, in general”, with all indices from hypothesis 7, is used. Table 46 show that there 
were no significant differences in each of the three indices in the two countries before and 
after the environmental disaster (“Climate change has positive effects” (p = .60), “Climate 
change has negative effects” (p = .35), “Effects of climate change, in general” (p = .37)). 
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Table 46: Appearance of “causal interpretation (effects of climate change)”during the 
environmental disaster 
 Germany   Australia  
Cluster Before en-
vironmen-
tal disaster 
After envi-
ronmental 
disaster 
 Before en-
vironmen-
tal disaster 
After envi-
ronmental 
disaster 
 
 n = 112 n = 63  n = 112 n = 105  
 Mean (SD) Mean (SD) t-value/ 
significance 
Mean (SD) Mean (SD) t-value/ 
significance 
“Climate change 
has positive ef-
fects” 
.03 
(.16) 
.01 
(.30) 
1.7 
p = .09 
.02 
(.13) 
.03 
(.17) 
-0.5 
p = .60 
“Climate change 
has negative ef-
fects” 
.40 
(.70) 
.32 
(.59) 
0.85 
p = .40 
.44 
(.83) 
.54 
(.84) 
-0.9 
p = .35 
“Effects of cli-
mate change, in 
general” 
.36 
(.64) 
.27 
(.48) 
1.0 
p = .31 
.37 
(.64) 
.45 
(.69) 
-0.9 
p = .37 
 
The hypotheses and sub research questions presented so far do not analyse the newspapers 
separately. This is why the last sub research question in this chapter focus on the frames and 
actors represented in each of the newspapers examined. 
Sub research question 6: Was there a difference in framing of climate change in the four 
newspapers examined? 
The seven clusters are now analysed to look at each of the four newspapers examined. The 
data demonstrates that Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, on the one hand, clearly used a 
higher percentage of “Disconnected problem definition” than Süddeutsche Zeitung (49.0 per 
cent; Süddeutsche Zeitung: 42.9 per cent) as well as of “Sceptical Views” (11.1 per cent; 
Süddeutsche Zeitung: 6.2 per cent). Although the results of the literature review (see Chapter 
3) show that the German way of dealing with critical voices in the climate change debate is 
usually ignoring them, because the German media agrees with the scientific consensus, 
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung does provide more space for these voices. Comparing the 
“Sceptical views” cluster of Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung with the results of the two Aus-
tralian newspapers – bear in mind that the theoretical findings show that the representation 
of climate-change-sceptical voices is common in Australian media –, Frankfurter Allge-
meine Zeitung includes the cluster “Sceptics” more often (The Sydney Morning Herald: 8.1 
percent; The Age: 7.2 per cent). 
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Süddeutsche Zeitung, on the other hand, demands “Focus on treatment information” (7.9 per 
cent; Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung: 4.0 per cent) and “Treatment recommendation inter-
national (13.0 per cent; Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung: 8.1 per cent), i. e. calls for action 
on climate change stating that more information about climate change is needed and that the 
global community needs to tackle climate change. 
In Australia, the greatest difference in percentage terms relates to “Focus on consequences, 
excluding effects on the economy” which appears in The Sydney Morning Herald in 22.1 per 
cent of articles (The Age: 14.3 per cent). Moreover, The Sydney Morning Herald referred 
more often to “Treatment recommendation national” (13.1 per cent; The Age: 11.0 per cent). 
The Age, in contrast, prefers to refer to “Economic consequences”, with 10.7 per cent of 
media coverage with this frame (The Sydney Morning Herald: 7.0 per cent). Also “Discon-
nected problem definition” has a higher percentage in The Age (40.9 per cent; The Sydney 
Morning Herald: 35.6 per cent). The cluster “Treatment recommendation international” oc-
curs slightly more often in The Age (6.6 per cent; The Sydney Morning Herald: 6.0 per cent). 
These results show that the two newspapers have a different emphasis, although both belong 
to the same media group: the The Sydney Morning Herald focuses on national activities and 
preferably represents causes and effects of climate change. The Age focuses on economic 
issues regarding climate change and a bit more on international action. The difference be-
tween the newspapers is highly significant (p <.001). Table 47 displays the results of all four 
newspapers examined for all seven clusters. 
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Table 47: The representation of climate change frames in the four newspapers examined 
Cluster  Germany  Australia  
 n= 177  198 298 335 
  Süd-
deutsche 
Zeitung 
Frankfur-
ter Allge-
meine 
Zeitung 
The Syd-
ney Morn-
ing Herald 
The Age 
“Disconnected 
problem defini-
tion”  
Number of articles (n) 
Percentage within a country 
76 
42.9 
97 
49.0 
106 
35.6 
137 
40.9 
“Focus on conse-
quences exclud-
ing effects on the 
economy”  
Number of articles (n) 
Percentage within a country 
34 
19.2 
33 
16.7 
66 
22.1 
48 
14.3 
“Economic Con-
sequences”  
Number of articles (n) 
Percentage within a country 
10 
5.6 
14 
7.1 
21 
7.0 
36 
10.7 
“Treatment rec-
ommendation 
national”  
Number of articles (n) 
Percentage within a country 
9 
5.1 
8 
4.0 
39 
13.1 
37 
11.0 
“Treatment rec-
ommendation 
international”  
Number of articles (n) 
Percentage within a country 
23 
13.0 
16 
8.1 
18 
6.0 
22 
6.6 
“Focus on treat-
ment infor-
mation”  
Number of articles (n) 
Percentage within a country 
14 
7.9 
8 
4.0 
24 
8.1 
31 
9.3 
“Sceptics” Number of articles (n) 
Percentage within a country 
12 
6.2 
22 
11.1 
24 
8.1 
24 
7.2 
Chi2value 46.2 Significance p <.001 
 
Sub research question 7: Which actors were covered in the context of climate change in the 
four newspapers examined? 
In Germany and Australia, there is little difference in actors representing climate change. In 
the coverage in Süddeutsche Zeitung and Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung in Germany as 
well as The Sydney Morning Herald and The Age in Australia there are similar frequencies 
of references to actors (see Table 48). Only in Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung there is a 
significant difference concerning “International actors” (p < .01). Thus, Frankfurter Allge-
meine Zeitung sets climate change issues on the international political agenda. 
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Table 48: Climate change actors represented in the four newspapers 
 Newspaper Germany   Newspaper Australia  
n =   375   637  
  Mean (SD) t-value/ 
significance 
 Mean (SD) t-value/ 
significance 
“Scien-
tists” 
Süddeutsche 
Zeitung 
 
Frankfurter 
Allgemeine 
Zeitung 
.16 (.39) 
 
 
.12 (.32) 
1.3  
(p = .19) 
 
 
 
The Sydney 
Morning 
Herald 
 
The Age 
.25 (.47) 
 
 
 
.24 (.49) 
.26  
(p = .79) 
“Politi-
cians” 
Süddeutsche 
Zeitung 
 
Frankfurter 
Allgemeine 
Zeitung 
.11 (.31) 
 
 
.13 (.33) 
-0.6  
(p = .57) 
The Sydney 
Morning 
Herald 
 
The Age 
.30 (.53) 
 
 
 
.34 (.54) 
-1.0  
(p = .33) 
“Journal-
ists” 
Süddeutsche 
Zeitung 
 
Frankfurter 
Allgemeine 
Zeitung 
.47 (.50) 
 
 
.42 (.50) 
0.9  
(p = .38) 
The Sydney 
Morning 
Herald 
 
The Age 
.34 (.47) 
 
 
 
.33 (.47) 
-0.1  
(p = .90) 
“Economic 
actors” 
Süddeutsche 
Zeitung 
 
Frankfurter 
Allgemeine 
Zeitung 
.10 (.30) 
 
 
.08 (.27) 
0.7  
(p = .48) 
The Sydney 
Morning 
Herald 
 
The Age 
.12 (.33) 
 
 
 
.11 (.33) 
0.4 
(p = .70) 
“Interna-
tional ac-
tors” 
Süddeutsche 
Zeitung 
 
Frankfurter 
Allgemeine 
Zeitung 
.14 (.37) 
 
 
.12 (.52) 
-3.0  
(p < .01) 
The Sydney 
Morning 
Herald 
 
The Age 
.08 (.28) 
 
 
 
.10 (.30) 
-0.5  
(p = 61) 
“Civil soci-
ety” 
Süddeutsche 
Zeitung 
 
Frankfurter 
Allgemeine 
Zeitung 
.09 (.29) 
 
 
.06 (.26) 
1.0  
(p = .29) 
The Sydney 
Morning 
Herald 
 
The Age 
.11 (.34) 
 
 
 
.15 (.40) 
-1.5  
(p = .12) 
“Scientists”: scale from 0-3; “Politicians”: scale from 0-3; “Journalists” scale from 0-1; “Economic actors”: 
scale from 0-2; “International actors”: scale from 0-4; “Civil society”: scale from 0-2 
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7. Climate change research since 2011 
The findings presented in the last Chapter  show the situation in the years 2007 to 2011. 
Since then a variety of research has been published. This chapter examines these research 
activities in Germany and Australia. The goal of this chapter is to classify the results of this 
research in the current research context. 
Analysing the research on climate change after 2011, it appears that there was less research 
on climate change coverage. The research interest shifted to the public’s attitudes to climate 
change and to online media (see, for example, Metag et al. 2015, Lörcher and Taddicken 
2017, Morrison et al. 2013, Jang and Heart 2015). 
German climate change studies are first discussed, followed by a review of Australian re-
search since 2011. 
7.1. German climate change studies since 2011 
In their research, Metag et al. (2015) and Lörcher and Taddicken (2017) focus on the public`s 
attitude to climate change. However, they used different methods for their analysis. 
Based on Maibach et al.’s (2011) “Global Warming’s Six Americas”, Metag et al. (2015) 
conducted a nationwide computer-assisted telephone interview with 3,000 Germans aged 18 
and older, asking during a period of moderate social interest in climate change about their 
attitude to this issue (p. 5). Based on 39 questions (Metag et al. 2015, p. 6) the results were 
condensed to 26 items representing seven factors (Metag et al. 2015, p. 9). These seven 
factors, covering 1,943 cases, were used for a cluster analysis resulting in five clusters rep-
resenting types of attitudes among the German population: the Alarmed (n=459, 24 per cent) 
who are “…strongly concerned about climate change as well as the environment in general”, 
the Concerned Activists (n = 349, 18 per cent) who “…are concerned about climate change 
– albeit less so than the Alarmed – and translate this concern in to action”, the Cautious 
(n = 543, 28 per cent), “…their concern is not strong and does not translate into action”, the 
Disengaged (n = 389, 20 per cent) who “…are concerned about climate change but show the 
lowest environmental concern…” and the Doubtful (n = 201, 10 per cent) who “…are not 
concerned about climate change at all and are sceptical that it exists or that it is caused by 
humans” (Metag et al. 2015, pp. 10 f.). 
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Metag et al. (2015) also analysed the sources of information that these five types of attitudes 
are based on: The Alarmed use television, believing that it is the most reliable medium be-
cause it is up-to-date and precise (p. 11), the Concerned Activists mainly use television, fol-
lowed by newspapers and radio as well as the internet (p. 11), the Cautious use television 
and their use is average (pp. 11 f.), the Disengaged “…do not seek information about climate 
change very often. If they do, they mainly use TV and tabloid newspapers” (p. 12), and the 
Doubtful scored the lowest on seeking information about climate change, but if they do re-
ceive information, it reaches them via TV, the daily newspaper, or the radio (p. 13). 
Metag et al.’s (2015) results related to sources of information identify the Concerned Activ-
ists, the Disengaged, and the Doubtful as newspaper readers (p. 10). For this research, which 
examines quality newspapers, only the Concerned Activists and the Doubtful seem to be 
important groups, i. e. groups which prefer daily newspapers for information – daily news-
papers are also analysed in this research – and either call for climate change action or profess 
ignorance of climate change. These two positions are, however, only rudimentarily repre-
sented in the four newspapers which are examined for this research. This could mean two 
things: first, that the climate change coverage might not have any effect or, second, that 
climate change coverage has changed since the period in which this research was carried out. 
The latter would, however, mean that climate change coverage has changed in two con-
trasting ways since the research period ended: on the one hand, those who are concerned 
about climate change and want to tackle it are represented in coverage, while, on the other 
hand, climate change sceptics are also heard. 
Lörcher and Taddicken (2017) analysed the public’s climate change discourse on the inter-
net, using a quantitative manual and automated online content analyses, examining the mass 
media arenas Spiegel.de, Welt.de, the expert arenas Klimazwiebel as well as Klimalounge 
and the mass-media-induced discussion arenas Comments Spiegel.de and Comments Welt.de 
(pp. 6-7). The research started from one week prior until one week after the release of the 
IPCC report (16 September 2013 to 7 October 2013), a period which was chosen by the 
authors because “…it triggers huge levels of public attention” (Lörcher and Taddicken 2017, 
p. 6). The relevant posts were identified via a web-crawler developed for this research project 
and were manually controlled before the analysis; 5,301 units of investigation were found 
(Lörcher and Taddicken 2017, p. 7). The authors used these units to identify the “Plurality 
of topics”, “Causes, consequences, mitigation and adaptation measures”, “Climate change 
Skepticism”, and “(Un)certainty and (lack of) credibility” (Lörcher and Taddicken 2017, 
pp. 10 f.). 
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Concerning the “Plurality of topics”, the authors discovered that the mass media mainly refer 
to the “IPCC report” itself (49 per cent), followed by “Climate Policy” (39 per cent), “Cli-
mate Science” (22 per cent), “Economy and Climate Change” (10 per cent), “Citizen activity 
and Climate Change” (7 per cent), “Media/culture/arts/celebrity and climate change” (5 per 
cent) and “Topic without reference to Climate Change” (2 per cent) (Lörcher and Taddicken 
2017, p. 10). The expert arena mainly examined “climate science” (54 per cent), the “IPCC 
report” itself (30 per cent) and “Media/culture/arts/celebrity and climate change” (16 per 
cent) (Lörcher and Taddicken 2017, p. 10). And the mass-media-induced discussion arena 
concentrated on “Science and Climate Change” (37 per cent), “Topic without reference to 
Climate Change” (17 per cent), “Economy and Climate Change” as well as “Citizen activity 
and Climate Change” (16 per cent each), “Media/culture/arts/celebrity and climate change” 
(13 per cent) and “IPCC report” (10 per cent) (Lörcher and Taddicken 2017, p. 10). 
Looking at “Causes, consequences, mitigation and adaptation measures”, Lörcher and Tad-
dicken (2017) found this issue most frequently mentioned in the mass media arena (Causes: 
68 per cent, Consequences: 61 per cent, Mitigation/adaptation measures: 71 per cent), then 
in the expert arena (Causes: 20 per cent, Consequences: 39 per cent, Mitigation/adaptation 
measures: 7 per cent), and last frequently in the mass-media-induced discussion arena 
(Causes: 5 per cent, Consequences: 5 per cent, Mitigation/adaptation measures: 6 per cent) 
(p. 11). 
“Climate change Skepticism” was mostly found in the mass-media-induced discussion arena 
(Existence of climate change: 37 per cent, Anthropogenic climate change: 9 per cent, Eval-
uation of consequences: 2 per cent), whereas the communicators in the mass media (Exist-
ence of climate change: 88 per cent, Anthropogenic climate change: 68 per cent, Evaluation 
of consequences: 58 per cent) and the expert arena (Existence of climate change: 39 per cent, 
Anthropogenic climate change: 21 per cent, Evaluation of consequences: 13 per cent) are 
convinced of anthropogenic climate change and its negative consequences (Lörcher and Tad-
dicken 2017, p. 11). 
In terms of “(Un)certainty and (lack of) credibility”, Lörcher and Taddicken (2017) discov-
ered that the mass media arena included a high degree of (un)certainty (87 per cent; (Lack 
of) credibility: 33 per cent), followed by the mass-media-induced discussion arena ((Un)cer-
tainty: 53 per cent; (Lack of) credibility: 55 per cent), and the expert arena ((Un)certainty: 
28 per cent; (Lack of) credibility: 25 per cent) (p. 12). 
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For Lörcher and Taddicken (2017), these results show “…that climate change is mainly dis-
cussed as a scientific issue” and that “…German online climate change communication re-
flects the consensus on anthropogenic climate change” (p. 14). The authors, however, also 
say that “there is a greater diversity of topics in the mass-media induced discussion arena” 
(Lörcher and Taddicken 2017, p. 14). More concretely, they say that “…laypeople have their 
own way of ‘down-scaling’ the scientific issue climate change” and that “most climate 
change scepticism… was found in the mass-media-induced discussion arena – more pre-
cisely in Welt.de user comments” (Lörcher and Taddicken 2017, p. 14). 
Concentrating on the mass media arena, which is mostly comparable with the newspapers 
analysed in this research, it has the highest amount of coverage related to “Plurality of top-
ics” and “Causes, consequences, mitigation and adaptation measures” whereas “Climate 
change Skepticism” only plays a minor role. These results are similar to those found in this 
research. Regarding “(Un)certainty and (lack of) credibility”, the mass media arena is also 
ranked first. However, this discourse is not transparent enough to get an impression of what 
this result really means: the question whether there is certainty or uncertainty, credibility or 
lack of credibility when it comes to climate change is not answered. 
More comparable to this research is the work of Brüggemann and Engesser (2017) and of 
Kaiser and Rhomberg (2016). 
Brüggemann and Engesser (2017) analysed how the IPCC stance on climate change and its 
challenges are covered in the media of Germany, India, the United Kingdom, the United 
States and Switzerland (p. 58). The authors define the IPCC stance on climate change as 
follows: 
“(1) Global warming represents an extraordinary rise in average global temperatures 
since the industrial revolution. (2) It is mainly caused by human-induced emissions of 
CO2 and other greenhouse gases. (3) It creates problems for both ecosystems and hu-
manity. (4) Emissions need to be reduced to avoid future damage” (Brüggemann and 
Engesser 2017, p. 59). 
The study is based on a content analysis published in two upmarket newspapers (right lean-
ing as well as left leaning), one mass market or midmarket newspaper, one regional news-
paper from a complementary metropolitan area, and one major online news outlet (Brügge-
mann and Engesser 2017, pp. 58 and 61). It includes all types of content, all kinds of 
contributors of news content and examines articles published online as well as paper formats 
from 1 January 2011 to 31 December 2012 (Brüggemann and Engesser 2017, pp. 60 f.). 
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Three research questions are discussed: 1. To what degree is the climate change frame chal-
lenged in international media coverage by expressing contrarian viewpoints? 2. How do 
journalists treat contrarians as voices in journalistic coverage (quotes and evaluations)? And 
3. How can (a) different degrees of challenging the climate change consensus and (b) differ-
ent ways of dealing with contrarians in journalistic coverage be explained? (Brüggemann 
and Engesser 2017, p. 60). 
The research done by Brüggemann and Engesser (2017) identifyed the authors of climate 
change articles as specialised journalists as well as those who occasionally wrote about the 
topic and then searching for the keywords ‘climate change’ or ‘global warming’ or ‘green-
house effect’ (and their equivalents in German) online as well as in the print versions of the 
chosen newspapers, using LexisNexis and Factiva (p. 61). The search generated a sample of 
170 climate journalists, who were invited by email to participate in the bilingual (English 
and German) online survey (27 September to 10 October 2012); a sample of 62 journalists 
completed the questionnaire (Brüggemann and Engesser 2017, p. 61). Then the authors 
matched the survey respondents with their articles, resulting in a sample of 936 articles 
(Brüggemann and Engesser 2017, p. 61). This sample of the content analysis (n = 936) cov-
ered the years 2011 and 2012, “… which represents a period of modest and routine coverage 
of climate change” (Brüggemann and Engesser 2017, p. 61), including two UN climate sum-
mits, COP 17 and COP 18, two special IPCC reports, a couple of extreme weather events, 
such as a hot summer in the United States in 2011 and a hot spring in Europe in 2011, as 
well as hurricanes Irene and Katia (Brüggemann and Engesser 2017, p. 61). By analysing 
the amount of coverage, Brüggemann and Engesser (2017) discovered that “…the most im-
portant news pegs were the publication of scientific studies (32%) and…the actions of do-
mestic governments (16%)” (n = 936 articles) (p. 61). Other stimuli for climate change cov-
erage were the COPs which received 18 per cent coverage and weather events which were 
reported in 6 per cent of the articles reviewed, whereas the special IPCC reports (1 per cent 
coverage) were mostly ignored (Brüggemann and Engesser 2017, p. 61). 
For Germany, Brüggemann and Engesser (2017) examined the newspapers Frankfurter 
Allgemeine Zeitung and Süddeutsche Zeitung (Upmarket newspaper), Bild-Zeitung (Mass-/ 
midmarket newspaper), Berliner Zeitung (Regional newspaper), and Spiegel-Online (Major 
online news outlet) (p. 61). 
Brüggemann and Engesser (2017) conducted a content analysis and coded whether any of 
the above-mentioned statements was explicitly ‘challenged’ (data value = -1), ‘balanced/not 
mentioned’ (data value = 0), or ‘mentioned/supported’ (data value = 1), summarising the 
results in an “IPCC index” (p. 61). The authors found an “IPCC index” of .60 of all cases 
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and evaluated a stance of -.04 in terms of contrarian voices (Brüggemann and Engesser 2017, 
p. 63). Bild-Zeitung, in particular, raised doubts about climate change, represented, for ex-
ample, by the views of the former German politician Fritz Vahrenholt, with more than 10 
per cent of the articles challenging the climate change consensus (Brüggemann and Engesser 
2017, p. 64). Only 4 per cent of the German articles included contrarian voices (Brüggemann 
and Engesser 2017, p. 63). In addition, the authors discovered that the contrarian voices 
challenged “Anthropogenity” as well as “Risks” in 4 per cent of all articles, “Emission re-
duction” in 2 per cent and “Global warming” in 1 per cent of all articles (n = 201 articles) 
(Brüggemann and Engesser 2017, p. 63). 
The findings of Brüggemann and Engesser (2017) corroborate the results introduced from 
Metag et al. (2015) 10 per cent of their respondents are Doubtful and “…are sceptical that it 
[climate change] exists or that it [climate change] is caused by humans” (Metag et al. 2015, 
pp. 10 f.). This research, in addition, shows that there are no differences in terms of sceptical 
voices in Germany and Australia, although Australian newspapers were expected to give 
sceptics more of a say in the media. 
Kaiser and Rhomberg (2016) used a broader range of German print media in their study 
about climate-change scepticism in Germany during the COP 17 (p. 557). The authors con-
ducted an explorative content analysis “…to demonstrate 1. how sceptical arguments and 
critical undertones are reported and 2. to identify possible sceptical frames” (Kaiser and 
Rhomberg 2016, p. 558). For Kaiser and Rhomberg (2016) climate scepticism is understood 
“…as either the questioning of the existence of climate change, its anthropogenic cause, its 
dangerous impacts or the science behind it, or any combination of these factors” (p. 559). 
As a method, Kaiser and Rhomberg (2016) used a two-step content analysis with, first, a 
qualitative coding process and then quantitative content analysis of the media debate 
(p. 561). An explorative approach helps to identify elements of ideas, which are aggregated 
to frames and, then, abstracted to media packages (Kaiser and Rhomberg 2016, p. 561). 
“Each idea element is attached to one frame and each frame is attached to one media pack-
age. …The packages provide meaning to an issue” (Kaiser and Rhomberg 2016, p. 561). 
The chosen newspapers were Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Süddeutsche Zeitung, Die 
Welt, die tageszeitung, Handelsblatt as well as Die Zeit and the weekly magazine Der Spie-
gel, including the online outlets of all media (Kaiser and Rhomberg 2016, p. 561). 
Kaiser and Rhomberg (2016) just used “Durban [Durban]” and “Klima [climate]” as search 
terms and collected articles from databases such as LexisNexis and the newspapers’ official 
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archives (p. 562). The articles were restricted to the period two weeks before and after the 
conference (14 November 2011 to 25 December 2011) (Kaiser and Rhomberg 2016, p. 652). 
For a first and explorative step of the content analysis, a random sample of 25 per cent 
(n = 95 articles) were examined in order to find sceptical statements about climate change 
or climate science, including journalists’ evaluations (Kaiser and Rhomberg 2016, p. 562). 
“This was in order to not overeagerly discard possible frames and additionally to present the 
variety of sceptical elements within the German news media’s reporting on COP17” (Kaiser 
and Rhomberg 2016, p. 562). The authors then clustered specific statements from the articles 
and transformed them into “idea elements” (Kaiser and Rhomberg 2016, p. 562). Moreover, 
Kaiser and Rhomberg (2016) added further prominent idea elements from the literature 
(p. 562). Altogether, the authors found 379 articles which were coded by three coders (Kaiser 
and Rhomberg 2016, p. 562). 
Kaiser and Rhomberg’s results (2016) show that 52 articles out of 379 included 122 sceptical 
statements, which is 15 per cent of all articles (p. 563). The 122 sceptical statements were 
summarised, first, into 31 idea elements and, second, to seven frame packages, which are 
“Existence”, “Causes”, “Impact”, “Politicization”, “Uncertainty”, “Alarmism”, and “Con-
spiracy” (Kaiser and Rhomberg 2016, p. 563). These seven frame packages were then sum-
marised in two media packages, linking scepticism with 1. the phenomenon of climate 
change and 2. with climate science (Kaiser and Rhomberg 2016, p. 563). “We found 38 
articles with skeptical elements regarding the phenomenon of climate change, 28 with 
skeptical elements regarding climate science, and 14 that included both media pack-
ages” (Kaiser and Rhomberg 2016, p. 563). 
Because Kaiser and Rhomberg (2016) carried out an explorative study, the idea elements 
and frame packages were created by, first, identifying relevant statements which were scep-
tical of climate change or climate science, second, listing all relevant sentences and, third, 
discussing the list of quotes in a group until each idea element was identified (p. 563). 
The most prominent idea elements were “questioning climate change’s existence” (n = 12), 
“questioning mankind’s influence” (n = 10), “denial of climate change” (n = 8), and the idea 
that “CO2 is not to blame” (n = 8), which were mainly found in the print media (80 idea 
elements; while 42 idea elements were found in online articles) (Kaiser and Rhomberg 2016, 
p. 564). 
The two authors clustered the established idea elements into two frame packages: The first 
dealt with the questioning of the phenomenon of climate change (including the idea ele-
ments: “Existence”, “Causes”, “Impact”) (n = 48), and the second media package related to 
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scepticism with regard to climate science (including the idea elements: “Politicization”, “Un-
certainty”, “Alarmism”, and “Conspiracy”) (n = 46) (Kaiser and Rhomberg 2016, pp. 565 f.). 
A remarkable finding by Kaiser and Rhomberg (2016) is that the liberal Die Zeit included 
as many sceptical frames (n = 25) as the conservative daily Die Welt (n = 26). Die Welt and 
the tabloid Bild share the same media owner; however, Bild included just one sceptical voice 
(Kaiser and Rhomberg 2016, p. 565). Nevertheless, there are some obvious differences in 
the representation of climate-change-sceptical opinions: Die Zeit focused on the existence 
of climate change (n = 16), whereas Die Welt mainly discussed the causes of climate change 
(n = 14) evaluating climate-change-sceptical ideas positively (n = 36), Frankfurter Allge-
meine Zeitung also has a positive connotation relating to climate-change-sceptical ideas 
(n = 14), and Süddeutsche Zeitung evaluated six frames positively and six negatively (Kaiser 
and Rhomberg 2016, p. 566). Altogether, Kaiser and Rhomberg’s data set (2016) was – as 
it is also the case with the sceptical voices in this research – very small and might not produce 
reliable results. 
In addition to identify sceptical statements, Kaiser and Rhomberg (2016) also examined the 
evaluation of climate-change-sceptical opinion, discovering that 50 per cent of the state-
ments (n = 61) were evaluated positively, the sceptical message is, consequently, preferred, 
whereas 39.3 per cent of the statements (n = 48) were evaluated negatively, and 10.7 per 
cent (n = 13) were not evaluated clearly (p. 566).  
Looking at the differences between the analysed newspapers, the authors discovered that Die 
Welt evaluated none of all 40 idea elements negatively (4 neutrally and 36 positively) and 
is, thus, supportive of sceptical ideas, Die Zeit evaluated only 2 of 32 idea elements posi-
tively (3 neutrally, 27 negatively), Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung evaluated 14 of its 23 
sceptical idea elements positively (2 neutrally, 7 negatively), Süddeutsche Zeitung evaluated 
six idea elements positively and six negatively (Kaiser and Rhomberg 2016, p. 566). 
Kaiser and Rhomberg (2016) further claim that their results indicate that there was “…a 
slight correspondence between the political leaning of a media outlet and the use of sceptical 
frames” (p. 567) and, because they did not find any “genuine German sceptical idea elements 
or frames” (p. 568), they summarise that “…climate change scepticism is a transnational 
Western phenomenon embedded in the national context” (p. 568). This finding corresponds 
to the results of this research: although the literature predicted that Australia would have 
much more sceptical voices in climate change coverage than Germany, the analysis did not 
identify any differences between the two countries although their climate is that different 
(see Chapter 6.2.1/Hypothesis 3). Thus, there seems to be some kind of obligation to also 
represent sceptical voices in the climate change discussion.  
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Kaiser and Rhomberg (2016), however, remark that sceptical frame elements “…are rare 
and unequally distributed and thus hard to interpret” (p. 568). The findings of this research 
underpin the statement of Kaiser and Rhomberg (2016). With a percentage of 8.8 per cent 
of the German climate change coverage and 7.6 per cent of the Australian climate change 
coverage (see Chapter 6.2.1/Hypothesis 3), sceptical voices are rare. However, statements, 
such as “[Cardinal George] Pell, on the other hand, clings to the fashionable right-wing credo 
that global warming is fraud” (SMH, 19.3.2011) as well as “But a group of physicists with 
strong links to the Republican White House cherry-picked one section of a Hansen graph 
and used it to misleadingly claim in Washington that it showed the warming was solely due 
to the sun.” (The Age, 13.11.2009) (see all examples in Tables 15 to 19 and 29) can only be 
interpreted as sceptical. 
Wessler et al. (2016) ask for Germany: “To what degree does a unique global political media 
event such as a COP entice cross-national similarities in multimodal framing that supersede 
country-specific context factors?” (p. 424). To answer this question, the authors did an com-
parative multimodal frame analysis which consists, on the one hand, of an analysis of news 
visuals which are “…of great importance in globalized news production because they are 
often provided by globally operating news image agencies” (p. 425) and, on the other hand, 
an examination of written news texts “…for contextualizing news photos through the presen-
tation of speakers and arguments in line with national particularities” (Wessler et al. 2016, 
p. 426). 
The methodological approach taken in Wessler et al.’s (2016) content analysis included all 
three types of semiotic resources, i. e. 1. Textual-typographical (the written words of a news 
item), 2. Pictorial-representational (news photos), and 3. diagrammatic-representational 
(charts, diagrams, or maps) (p. 426). The research period covered the UN climate change 
conferences in Cancún, Mexico (COP 16, 2010), in Durban, South Africa (COP 17, 2011), 
in Doha, Qatar (COP 18, 2012), and in Warsaw, Poland (COP 19, 2013). Widely read daily 
newspapers in Brazil (Folha de Sao Paolo, O Globo), Germany (Süddeutsche Zeitung, 
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung), India (Times of India, The Hindu), South Africa (Daily 
Sun, The Star), and the United States (New York Times, Washington Post) were analysed 
(Wessler et al. 2016, p. 427). A requirement for selection was that an article either had to be 
highlighted by a layout element referring to a climate conference or had to mention one of 
the following keywords in the article’s headline, sub-headline, visual caption, or text body: 
climate change, global warming, Cancun, Durban, Doha, Warsaw, greenhouse effect, Kyoto 
Protocol, climate summit, climate conference, climate talks, climate politics, or climate sci-
ence (Wessler et al. 2016, p. 427). Altogether 1,311 text-based articles were found and three 
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strategies were used of which, in strategy 1, only those text-based articles that were illus-
trated by at least one photograph or photomontage (n = 432) were considered and, in strategy 
2, all text-based articles were taken (n = 1,311) to test whether the frame structure found in 
the multimodal articles re-emerged in the entire set of articles, or whether there were distinct 
nonvisual or text-only frames (Wessler et al. 2016, p. 428). In strategy 3, again the subsample 
of photo-illustrated articles (n = 432) were used to test for all five countries whether the 
frames – found across newspapers from five countries – could also be found when clustering 
articles within the country-specific subsamples (Wessler et al. 2016, p. 428). Each article 
was first segmented into statements attributed to actors (n = 5,561): “A statement contained 
either 1. an utterance made by an identifiable individual, collective, or institution (in a direct 
quote or indirectly paraphrased) or 2. information provided by the author of the article (most 
often a journalist)” (Wessler et al. 2016, p. 428). All statements were then coded in terms of 
the presence or absence of a predefined set of climate-change-related frame elements (Wess-
ler et al. 2016, p. 428). 
The coding was based on Entman’s definition for framing, using, first, the frame dimension 
“problem definition” for the consequences of climate change, such as increases in tempera-
ture, melting ice/glaciers, etc., second, identifying “causes” for issues, such as greenhouse 
gas emissions, deforestation and, third, “treatment recommendations” for remedies, such as 
clean energy, a global climate treaty, financial assistance to disadvantaged countries, etc. 
The frame dimension “moral evaluation” was used as contextual information only (Wessler 
et al. 2016, pp. 428 f.). 
When coding images, the coders had the opportunity to code multiple image content catego-
ries for a single visual (Wessler et al. 2016, p. 429). Six coders with near-native speaker 
status in at least two of the languages involved (English, German, and Portuguese) were 
trained (Wessler et al. 2016, p. 429). Hierarchical cluster analyses of the textual and visual 
content data were conducted to explore the coverage for distinct multimodal frames of cli-
mate change, using “0” for “frame element absent in article” and “1” for “frame element 
present in article”, and, for strategy 3, frequency analyses were conducted for each country 
subsample separately (Wessler et al. 2016, p. 430). 
For each of the three strategies a separate hierarchical cluster analysis was conducted which 
– to determine the structural compositions of these clusters, i. e. the news frames – cross-
tabulated the cluster affiliations of the articles with the individual frame elements (Wessler 
et al. 2016, p. 430). 
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The results of strategy 1 were 432 photo-accompanied articles, including four multimodal 
frames:  
1. the “global warming victims” frame (36 per cent), which emphasises all possible 
consequences of climate change, with the increase in temperature appearing most 
prominently (71 percent), 
2. the “civil society demands” frame (29 per cent), focusing on the full range of poten-
tial remedies for climate change effects: from the mention or explicit endorsement of 
clean energy (61 percent) through financial help for disadvantaged countries (48 per-
cent) and the adoption of a new binding global treaty to reduce carbon emissions (44 
percent) to reforestation/prevention of further deforestation (21 percent), 
3. the “political negotiations” frame (12 per cent), emphasising issues, with clean en-
ergy being the most salient (40 percent) alongside the adoption of a new binding 
treaty (28 percent), while the explicit endorsement of financial help for disadvan-
taged countries stands out in this frame (26 percent), as does the call for action in 
general (22 percent), and  
4. the “sustainable energy” frame (23 per cent), looking at the core narrative of the 
climate change debate, in which fossil fuels and the resulting greenhouse gas emis-
sions are the central cause (72 percent) of an increase in temperature (29 percent) 
(Wessler et al. 2016, p. 430). 
Concentrating on the results for Germany when looking at the appearance of these frames in 
the 432 photo-accompanied articles, which were examined, altogether 127 articles were an-
alysed in the two German newspapers with 42.5 per cent (n = 54) of articles with a “global 
warming victims” frame, 22.8 per cent (n = 29) of articles with a “civil society demands” 
frame, 10.2 per cent (n = 13) of articles with a “political negotiation” frame, and 24.4 per 
cent (n = 31) of articles with a “sustainable energy” frame (Wessler et al. 2016, p. 434). 
The most predominant German frame – the “global warming victims” frame – as well as the 
second dominant frame – the “sustainable energy” frame – both deal with the issue of tem-
perature increase, either as an increase in temperature as a consequence of climate change 
or as an increase in temperature due to a certain reason, for example, greenhouse gas emis-
sions. This work also looks at frames/frame sub-dimensions of causes and effects (see hy-
pothesis 1: Germany: n=169, Australia: n = 342) (see Chapter 6.2.1). With its hypotheses 1, 
8, 10 as well as sub research question 5, it examines how these frame sub-dimensions (partly 
clustered to frames or summarised to new indices) appear in the articles analysed. In this 
work, the findings, however, show that Germany’s climate change coverage, compared to 
that in Australia, did not indicate a significant difference between frames for climate causes 
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and consequences. But Wessler et al.’s (2016) findings are not comparable to the results of 
this research because this would entail a comparison between visual and textual frames.  
Strategy 2 produced 1,311 articles which were also clustered in four frames. The “global 
warming victims” frame and the “sustainable energy” frame remained virtually unchanged 
in terms of the composition of frame elements (Wessler et al. 2016, p. 433). However, the 
“civil society demands” and the “political negotiations” frames appeared as one new frame 
– the “political dispute” frame, and a new fourth frame emerged, which was described as the 
“common sense” frame (Wessler et al. 2016, p. 433). This was least distinctive due to only 
three out of 34 frame elements appearing in more than 20 per cent of all examined articles 
(Wessler et al. 2016, p. 433). Articles in this cluster were shorter, contained fewer visual 
elements (26.5 per cent vs. 43 per cent of articles in the other clusters), and were opinion 
(27 per cent) rather than fact-based (17 per cent) (Wessler et al. 2016, p. 434). The distribu-
tion of the four frames was relatively similar across the five very different countries, which 
Wessler et al. (2016) considered an important result, because the authors discovered that 
about 85 per cent of the multimodal articles were originally produced by staff members of 
each newspaper (pp. 434 f.). 
The overall frame distribution pattern becomes clearer when computing and comparing 
country-specific cluster solutions with a hierarchical cluster analysis (strategy 3). The “…re-
sults vary across countries as regards the number of statistically recommended frames as 
well as their specific configurations. The Indian and the U.S. subsamples show the strongest 
similarities…” (Wessler et al. 2016, p. 435). 
With strategy 3, the German sample resulted in only three cluster solutions (Brazil had the 
most cluster solutions, i. e. six frames) which were “victims and remedies” (60 per cent), 
including the issues fossil fuels, increase in temperature, clean energy endorsed, new treaty 
endorsed, no action rejected and new treaty mentioned, “global warming victims” (48 per 
cent), including increase in temperature, natural landscape (from the visual frame analysis), 
clean energy endorsed, melting ice/rising sea levels, extreme weather and societal conse-
quences, and “sustainable energy” (44 per cent), including clean energy mentioned, fossil 
fuels, clean energy endorsed, increase in temperature, financial assistance mentioned, new 
treaty mentioned (Wessler et al. 2016, pp. 436 ff.). 
Summarising Wessler et al.’s (2016) “victims and remedies” frame explains the conse-
quences as well as the action needed to tackle climate change, while their “global warming 
victims” frame mainly discussed the negative consequences of climate change, and their 
“sustainable energy” frame referred to energy sources, costs and policies. So, like Lörcher 
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and Taddicken (2017), Wessler et al. (2016) identified frames which refer to climate change 
effects, consequences and action in the German media.  
This work also looks at climate effects, consequences and action. Its cluster “Climate Effects 
and Action” (Hypothesis 1), however, focuses on other aspects than Wessler et al. (2016). 
One the one hand, it differentiates between a climate change perspective with the frame 
“Focus on consequences excluding effects on the economy” (including “Causes of climate 
change”, “Effects on nature”, “Effects on weather”, and “Effects on humans”) and an eco-
nomic perspective on climate change with the frame “Effects on the economy”. So, climate 
change and economic aspects are not mixed up as in Wessler et al.’s “victims and remedies” 
and “sustainable energy” frame. On the other hand, it includes climate action frames asking 
for national action (“Treatment recommendation – national”), international action (“Treat-
ment recommendation – international”) as well as for more information about climate 
change (“Focus on treatment information”). These different perspectives of action are not 
identified by Wessler et al. (2016). 
However, a conspicuous finding by Wessler et al. (2016) is that “…the national context in 
which multimodal articles on the climate conferences are produced does not automatically 
lead to vastly different national framings” (p. 440) and that “…the cross-national similarity 
… can be interpreted as the outcome of a shared globalized production environment that 
journalists encounter at global events” (p. 440). As the results of this research only show 
minor differences in the climate change coverage between Germany and Australia, this state-
ment by Wessler et al. (2016) can be extended to assume that there is a general shared glob-
alised production environment when it comes to climate change coverage.  
Extending Wessler et al.’s (2016) research, Lück et al. (2018) look for similarities and dif-
ferences in the media coverage of climate change in Brazil, Germany, India, South Africa, 
and the USA during various United Nations Climate Change Conferences (COP’s) looking 
at issue frames and narratives. (p. 3). “We argue that issue frames may be more similar across 
countries than narratives” (Lück et al. 2018, p. 3), because, different to frames, narratives 
are connected with the country’s culture (Lück et al. 2018, p. 4). Lück et al. (2018) emphasise 
that there is a connection between frames and narratives which is dyamic and non-determin-
istic (p. 7), but that it is not clear whether there these relationsships are similar across all 
defined countries (p. 8).  
Lück at al. (2018) look at frames and narratives during the COP’s in Cancún, Mexico, Dur-
ban, South Africa, and Doha, Qatar (p. 10), all international events, which are assumed as 
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having the same media attention worldwide (p. 9). In addition, the authors say that the jour-
nalists, who work at these international COP’s, get the same information as well as work in 
the same setting, facing several interest groups who want to get their strategic interests into 
the media to gain public attention  (Lück et al. 2018,p. 9).    
Therefore, Lück et al. (2018) analyse the newspapers “Folha de São Paulo” and “O Globo” 
for Brazil, “Süddeutsche Zeitung” and “Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung” for Germany, 
“Times of India” and “The Hindu” for India, “Daily Sun” and “The Star” for South Africa, 
as well as “The New York Times” and “The Washington Post” for the United States of 
America (p. 10), 1,311 articles altogether (p. 11), testing the following hypotheses:   
“H1: The narrative story types used in COP coverage will be more distinct between countries 
than the issue frames applied.  
H2: A particular issue frame will be combined with different story types in different coun-
tries, reflecting country-specific patterns of narrative coloring even for the same issue frame” 
(p. 9). 
To answer these hypotheses, Lück et al. (2018) coded “all actor-statements (including state-
ments of the article’s authors, mostly journalists)” (p. 11) looking at the frame elements – 
according to Entman’s (1993) definition – “problem definition (here: consequences of cli-
mate change, such as increases in temperature, melting ice/glaciers, etc.)”, “identification of 
causes (e.g., greenhouse gas emissions, deforestation)”, and “treatment recommendations 
(remedies, such as clean energy, financial assistance to disadvantaged countries etc.)” 
(n=5,561) (p. 11).  
Narratives were coded in terms of “degree of narrativity”, “story type”, and “narrative roles”: 
the “degree of narrativity” identifys “dramatization”, “emotion”, “narrative personalization” 
as well as “fictionalization” (Lück et al. 2018, p. 12). The “story type” consists of “overall 
theme”, “tone” and “outcome”, the “narrative roles” could be “one hero”, “one victim” and 
“one villain” per article and looks at the type of actor as he/she is “individual”, “organiza-
tional”, or “institutional”, the name of the acter and his/her activities in terms of climate 
change (Lück et al. 2018, p. 12). 
Generally, Lück et al. (2018) found out that the degree of narrativity is the highest in Brazil, 
followed by Germany, the United States of America, South Africa, and India (p. 13). The 
narrative variables were then clustered resulting in the clusters “Ongoing Conflict” (32.4 per 
cent of all articles), “Catastrophe” (20.9 per cent), “Hopeful Struggle” (17.8 per cent), “Busi-
ness as Usual” (14.0 per cent), and “Stories of Success” (13 per cent) (p. 14). “Political or 
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social conflicts dominate the theme variable in the ‘Ongoing Conflict’ narrative” (Lück et 
al. 2018, p. 14). Almost all articles with the  “Catastrophe” narrative are pessimistic (Lück 
et al. 2018, p. 15). The “Hopeful Struggle” narrative refers to the hope to tackle climate 
change (Lück et al. 2018, p. 15). The “Business as Usual” cluster conveys the image of 
climate change as a routine business, using an unexcited or neutral tone (Lück et al. 2018, p. 
15). And the “Success Stories” cluster includes articles talking about climate change con-
flicts which are solved in the end (Lück et al. 2018, p. 15 f). For Germany, 348 articles were 
identified of which 36.5 per cent include the “Ongoing Conflict” story type, 19.0 per cent 
the “Catastrophe” story type, 14.4 per cent the “Hopeful Struggle” story type, 19.3 per cent 
the “Business as Usual” story type, and 10.9 per cent the “Success Stories” story type (Lück 
et al. 2018, p. 32) 
Looking at Germany regarding the “narrative role”, victims as well as villains are “others”, 
such as  developing countries, other countries, poor countries an so forth: “…responsibility 
is generally assigned to someone else but the own country” (Lück et al. 2018, p. 17), whereas 
the “one hero” are Western countries or individuals (Lück et al. 2018, p. 17).  
For examining the framing, Lück et al. (2018) use the identified 22 text-based and 12 visual 
frame elements for another cluster analysis with four clusters as a result:  the “Global Warm-
ing Victims” frame, the “Political Dispute” frame, the “Sustainable Energy” frame, and  the 
“Common Sense” frame (p. 18).  
73 per cent of the “Global Warming Victims” talk about the consequences of global warm-
ing, focussing on extreme weather and societal consequences (50 per cent) (Lück et al. 2018, 
p. 18). The “Political Dispute” frame looks at political activities and policies in the context 
of the COP’s (Lück et al. 2018, p. 19). The “Sustainable Energy” frame identifies fossil fuels 
as a cause of climate change in 50 per cent of all articles and asks for clean energy (Lück et 
al. 2018, p. 19). And the “Common Sense” frame stands for common issues, for example, 
temperature increase as a consequence of climate change, fossil fuels as a cause of climate 
change, and clean energy as an activity to tackle climate change (Lück et al. 2018, p. 19). 
These findings of Lück et al. (2018) show that “…hypothesis 1, according to which country 
differences in framing should be smaller than differences in story types used, is well sup-
ported” (p. 20). 
At the end of their research, Lück et al. (2018) looks at the relationship between the found 
narrative and frame clusters. The “Global Warming Victims” frame is connected with the 
“Ongoing Conflict” narrative in 35.1 per cent of all articles  (Lück et al. 2018, p. 20 and 34). 
In the two German newspapers (n = 74), the “Ongoing Conflict” narrative refers to other 
7 Climate change research since 2011 201 
countries (Lück et al. 2018, pp. 20 and 34). The “Hopeful Struggle” narrative is used by all 
countries almost to the same extent (Germany: 21.2 per cent) (Lück et al. 2018, p. 21). All 
other narratives appear on a very low level.   
In the German coverage the “Political Dispute” frame also mainly includes the “Ongoing 
Conflict” narrative (39.0 per cent) (Lück et al. 2018, pp. 22 and 34). The “Business as Usual” 
narrative (22.0 per cent) and the “Catastroph” narrative (20.7 per cent) appear equally in 
Germany (Lück et al. 2018, p. 34).  
Within the “Sustainable Energy” frame, the “Ongoing Conflict” narrative is also the most 
often used narrative in Germany (28.9 per cent) (Lück et al. 2018, p. 22). “For Germany, 
having to face the ongoing challenge of the ‘Energiewende’ (energy turnaround), issues of 
sustainable energy are still a matter of political conflict…” (Lück et al. 2018, p. 22).  
The “Common Sense” frame is the most dominant frame (Germany: n = 142) with the “On-
going Conflict” narrative as a main issue, as well; Germany rank this narrative highest with 
35.5 per cent, second is the “Hopeful Struggle” narrative (26.1 per cent) (Lück et al. 2018, 
p. 23).  
The authors, moreover, conclude that differences in narratives are based on the journalistic 
traditions of a country, the story type identifies national views on climate change and climate 
politics (Lück et al. 2018, p. 23). Framing, however, is not that strong connected with a 
country: “It transcends cultural borders especially in cases like the COP’s that are focal 
points for global attention to an issue…” (p. 24). This finding is confirmed by this work due 
to the fact that the differences in framing between Germany and Australia are only little.  
With their findings about narratives and issue frames, Lück et al. (2018) “…observe a trend 
towards homogenization of content production…” (p. 24) – or as Wessler et al. (2016) said 
“a general shared globalised production environment” (p. 440) – as well as “…national par-
ticularities in news reporting with which information is made culturally resonant for a spe-
cific audience”, an aspect which bases on national journalistic practices (p. 24).  
To get a deeper inside in journalistic practices, Lück et al. (2015) has also examined the role 
of journalists in climate change coverage and assume professional networks between jour-
nalists and public relations practitioners from environmental non-governmental organiza-
tions (p. 1) “…that either side establishes and maintains” (p. 10). To investigate these copro-
duction processes, Lück et al. (2015) conducted three comprehensive case studies during the 
United Nations Climate Change Summits in Cancún 2010, Doha 2012, and Warsaw 2013 
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using semi-standardized interviews for questioning 36 journalists from nine countries (Ger-
many, the United States, South Africa, Brazil, India, Britain, Mexico, Qatar, Poland), trans-
national news agencies (AP, Reuters, Bloomberg), and 16 representatives from transnational 
NGOs (Climate Action Network, Friends of the Earth, Climate Analytics, Global Call for 
Climate Action, Greenpeace International, One World, Oxfam and WWF International) (p. 
11). Altogether, 78 interviews were realised (p. 11). 
One finding of Lück et al. (2015) is that most of the interviewed journalists (21 out of 36) 
are environmental journalists, 15 out of 36 are more general news reporters (p. 13). Moreo-
ver, they found out that 19 from the 21 environmental journalists and 6 from the 15 general 
news journalists cultivate contacts with NGO representatives (Lück et al. 2015, p. 14). Be-
sides, Lück et al. (2015) identified four different kind of coproduction networks between 
journalists and NGOs:  
1. Network: Transnational media and global ENGOs  
Four environmental journalists from transnational media and eight communicators of global 
ENGOs (for example, Climate Action Network International, Friends of the Earth Interna-
tional, or the Worldwide Fund for Nature) are part of this first network (p. 14). All network 
users from network 1 are able to influence decision-making by directly corresponding with 
people who are involved and/or highly interested in climate change issues, such as policy-
makers or national politicians (p. 14 f). “Within this network journalists and NGO represent-
atives tend to have long-lasting trustful personal relationships” (Lück et al. 2015, p. 15).   
The journalists referring to network 1 see themselves as information providers and, there-
fore, need information from ENGO representative, although they know about their strategic 
orientation (Lück et al. 2015, p. 15). Lück et al. (2015), moreover, identify similarities in 
interpretation between the two network users: “In Warsaw, the three transnational journalists 
named “loss and damage” as well as “finance” as the central aspects. Both topics were also 
named by the ENGOs as central for them” (p. 16).  
2. Network: National media and national ENGO branches 
14 journalists from national media and nine people from ENGO member organizations and 
local, regional or national branches and bureaus are part of network 2 (Lück et al. 2015, p. 
17). As a result, mostly national media is served from this network group (Lück et al. 2015, 
p. 17). The ENGOs in this network provide information for a national audience and help 
journalists to understand and interprete the climate change conferences as it is relevant for 
the respective countries (Lück et al. 2015, p. 17). 
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Lück et al. (2015) found a major difference in comparison with the first network group: 
“Assessments on the main story of the COP differ among the journalists and NGO repre-
sentatives in this network as well as between both groups” (p. 19).  
3. Network: International news agencies and (global and national) ENGOs  
Three political reporters from international news agencies as well as ENGO representatives 
(global communicators and representatives from regional or national branches) are part of 
this network group, having the task to provide information about the topic for international 
news agencies (Lück et al. 2015, p. 20). Therefore, the journalists contact the ENGO repre-
sentatives, however, they are clearly not their only information source (Lück et al. 2015, p. 
20). “ENGO interviewees reported to us that it counts as a great success to place a story with 
one of the international wire services” (Lück et al. 2015, p. 20). Lück et al. (2015) found out 
that news agency journalists use ENGOs for getting contrasting positions to political and 
business actors (p. 21).  
4. Network: Business media and global ENGOs  
Five reporters from business newspapers are part of this fourth network analysing the con-
sequences of climate change conferences for economies and markets nationally and globally 
(Lück et al. 2015, p. 21). As the journalists in the first two networks, also these journalists 
look for the expertise and insider knowledge of ENGO’s (Lück et al. 2015, p. 21).  
In addition to these four networks, Lück et al. (2015) found eleven journalists without or 
with only few connections to get information from ENGOs (p. 21). As a reason for that, 
these journalists prefer first-hand information from individual sources as they do not like the 
influential practices of ENGOs (Lück et al. 2015, p. 22). “They certainly keep an eye on 
NGO activity, e.g. protests and public statements, and sometimes include a paragraph on a 
demonstration in their writing” (Lück et al. 2015, p. 22).  
Lück et al. (2015), furthermore, explain that the climate change conferences support copro-
duction between journalists and ENGO representatives, because it is not daily business of 
both actor groups (p. 23). For Lück et al. (2015), their findings about journalistic work shows 
that there are “…production processes that shape the global image of the climate change 
conferences in much greater detail” (p. 23) and “…that the journalistic beat is influential as 
is the type of media outlet for which journalists work” (p. 23). In addition, the authors say 
that  ENGO’s focus “…on setting the media agenda and determining media imagery” (Lück 
et al. 2015, p. 23) with the support of direct lobbying “…toward expert communication and 
thus toward specialized journalists and delegations…” (Lück et al. 2015, p. 24).  
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With these findings, Lück et al. (2015) discusss two issues, which could not be considered 
by this work and, thus, take the results of this work further in two ways: first, they intensively 
analyse the practices of journalists, an actor group which was identified as central referring 
to climate change coverage (see Table 26), in the context of a climate change-related event. 
And, second, they broaden the literate on lobbyism in terms of climate change, a field that 
is sparsly examined, so far, due to the fact that lobby groups are very secretive about the way 
they exert influence.   
Schäfer and O’Neill (2017) gives an overview and classifies framing approaches as well as 
literature on climate change. Concentrating on their thoughts on framing climate change 
coverage, the authors, one the one hand, introduce stakeholder framing, so views from sci-
entists, industry, policymakers, and non-governmental organizations who try to influence 
the public arena with their framing on climate change. On the other hand, they introduce 
journalist frames; journalists are the producers of climate change framing (Schäfer and 
O’Neill 2017, p. 12 ff). 
Concerning stakeholder framing, Schäfer and O’Neill (2017) make the point that most ex-
isting studies focus on Western countries, an aspect which does not allow comparisons be-
tween countries with different economic and societal backgrounds (p. 13). In addition, the 
authors recognise that political decision-makers and institutions as well as scientists are ne-
glected in the framing literature about climate change, so far (Schäfer and O’Neill 2017, p. 
14). This issue is not common in political science (Schäfer and O’Neill 2017, p. 14). Looking 
at journalist frames, Schäfer and O’Neill (2017) say that – even though journalists are influ-
enced from different normative, organisational and social rules – analyses on journalists’ 
framing of climate change are rare (p. 15).  
Besides identifying climate change frames, this work has coded actors of climate change and 
examined their dominance within the analysed articles; it identifies politicians as important 
actors of climate change (Hypothesis 2), it looks at the variety of actors (Hypothesis 4b), and 
at the appearance of all actors (Sub research question 7), but it cannot go into detail about 
the frames the different actors produced.  
Moreover, Schäfer and O’Neill (2017) make clear that most existing studies refer to frame 
building; analysis that covers “issue framing” are rare (p. 15). However, for Schäfer and 
O’Neill (2017) “issue framing” puts a new perspective on framing (p. 16) and, thus, might 
reveal different strengths and weaknesses of framing (p. 17). In addition, Schäfer and 
O’Neill (2017) make clear that most of the existing framing studies on climate change ignore 
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visuals or multimodal coverage (p. 20). Just lately, research has started to address these as-
pects (Schäfer and O’Neill 2017, p. 21).  
So, Schäfer and O’Neill (2017) have several requirements in terms of framing research on 
climate change: they ask for framing more broadcast media and online climate change cov-
erage (p. 22 f) as well as visuals and multimodal coverage (p. 23), to look at countries, other 
than Western ones (p. 23), to make sure that framing research is comparable (p. 23), and to 
examine “…how frames come to exist in the world…” (p. 23) and “…how people connect 
the ways they frame climate change in their minds…” (p. 23). Moreover, the authors require 
to increase the perspectives concerning framing studies on climate change to other scientific 
disciplines, such as political sciences (Schäfer and O’Neill 2017, p. 24). 
7.2. Australian climate change studies since 2011 
In Australia as well, the public’s attitude to climate change was of interest for researchers 
after 2011 (see, for example, Morrison et al. 2013, Jang and Heart 2015). 
Similar to Metag et al. (2015), Morrison et al. (2013) also used the approach of the “Global 
Warming’s Six Americas” study by Maibach et al. (2011) to identify people’s attitudes to 
climate change in Australia (p. 3). 
Morrison et al. (2013) analysed data derived from 1,927 Australians with a mean age of 47.4 
years using an online questionnaire (p. 4). The Australian participants answered the same 36 
questions asked by Maibach et al. (2011) as well as questions about preferences for climate 
change polices, energy-use behaviours, knowledge of climate science, appropriate commu-
nication channels, psychographics (personality, value and attitude information) and socio-
demographics (Morrison et al. 2013, p. 4). 
The Australian results show a small sample of Alarmed (10.8 per cent) and Concerned about 
global warming (22.5 per cent), whereas more than 40 per cent are Disengaged, Doubtful or 
Dismissive of climate change (Morrison et al. 2013, p. 3). Across the entire Australian sam-
ple, 44.9 per cent of respondents think that global warming is mainly man-made (Morrison 
et al. 2013, p. 6). Moreover, the Australian Alarmed (34 per cent), Concerned (28 per cent) 
and Cautious (25 per cent) groups believe that global warming will harm them personally 
and all Australian segments state that the impacts of global warming will affect them more 
quickly (Morrison et al. 2013, p. 6). In addition, Australians place a high priority on compa-
nies and citizens when it comes to taking action to tackle climate change (Morrison et al. 
2013, p. 13). So, the authors discovered that the public sees itself as well as companies as 
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responsible for climate change. In the context of this research about Germany and Australia, 
this finding is striking, because responsibility frames are only rarely mentioned. Another 
finding is that the Disengaged (20 per cent), the Doubtful (13 per cent) and the Dismissive 
(10 per cent) say that the Prime Minister and the government are not the responsible for 
taking action to reduce climate change (Morrison et al. 2013, p. 13). This finding is also 
remarkable, because this research identifies the dominance of political actors in the climate 
change discussion in Australia. So, the question arises whether public opinion is sufficiently 
represented in the print media. As hypothesis 6 of this research shows: sometimes the oppo-
site of the public’s demands is represented in the media. 
Jang and Hart (2015) analysed frames in social media content from 1 July 2012 to 30 June 
2014, using Twitter data from four English-speaking countries (US, UK, Canada, and Aus-
tralia) (p. 12). The authors decided that any messages had to mention “climate change” or 
“global warming” and 1. “real” or “fact” for “real frames”, 2. “hoax frames” including the 
terms “hoax” or “lie” or “fraud”, 3. “impact frames” including the terms “impact” or “im-
pacts” or “threat” or “threats” or “consequences” or “effects” or “affect” or “affects” or “dis-
aster”, 4. “cause frames” including the terms “cause” or “causes” or “fuel” or “carbon” or 
“CO2” or “human”, and 5. “action frames” including the terms “act” or “action” or “stop” or 
“fight” or “policy” or “policies” (Jang and Hart 2015, p. 14). On a normal day, the people of 
the four nations generated 6,085 (US), 1,041 (UK), 639 (Canada), and 641 (Australia) tweets 
that mentioned either “climate change” or “global warming” (Jang and Hart 2015, p. 14). 
The results show that “cause frames” as well as “action frames” are very popular in Aus-
tralia, a finding which is attributed by the authors to a new carbon law with which the Aus-
tralian government recently puts a price on greenhouse gas emissions (Jang and Hart 2015, 
p. 14): “The coupling of cause and action frames may reflect this ongoing political landscape 
in Australia given that the government action was accompanied by heated debates about the 
cause of climate change (human activities vs. nature)” (Jang and Hart 2015, p. 14). This 
finding, that causes and action dominate the Australian climate change discussion is a result 
that corresponds with the findings of this research in which the frame “Climate effects and 
action” were found with significant frequency.  
Findings show that the terms “climate change” and “global warming” were used equally, 
higher values indicate that “global warming” was more likely to be associated with “hoax 
frames” and “cause frames” than “climate change”. In Australia, as in all other countries, 
“climate change” was used more frequently than “global warming” on Twitter, “hoax 
frames” excluded (Australia: 1.18) (Jang and Hart 2015, p. 15). So, “hoax frames” which 
refer to “lies” and “fraud” (Jang and Hart 2015, p. 15) in the climate change discussion 
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mainly look at “global warming” as a “hoax”, i. e. the increase in temperature and its causes,  
but not on the consequences of “climate change”. 
Gurney (2014) compared the level of climate change coverage in three Australian elections: 
in 2007, when Kevin Rudd became Prime Minister, in 2010, when Julia Gillard was elected 
and, in 2013, when Tony Abbott took office (p. 3). To do this, she used three initial searches 
in the ProQuest ANZ Newstand database using the search terms “climate change” and “cli-
mate change” + “moral” and “climate change” + “carbon tax” (Gurney 2014, p. 3). The 
search term ‘moral’ was especially used to capture the extent to which Rudd’s ‘greatest 
moral challenge’ catchphrase was cited in discussions about the topic and to find out whether 
the coverage discussed the moral or ethical implications of climate change politics (Gurney 
2014, p. 3). The time period ranges used were from the formal announcement of the election 
to polling day (Gurney 2014, p. 3). So, Gurney (2014) did not look at a broader timeframe 
before and after election day, as it is done in this research, but just concentrated on the im-
mediate period of the election. 
Reviewing the purely quantitative count of news stories, Gurney stated that “...there was a 
dramatic decrease (almost 40%) in the raw number of stories mentioning the phrase ‘climate 
change’ between the 2007 and 2013 elections” (2014, p. 4). And she found a 50 per cent 
decrease in articles which included both the words “climate change” and “moral” between 
2007 and 2013 (2014, p. 4). The use of the terms “climate change” and “carbon tax” de-
creased between 2010 and 2013 by approximately 8 per cent (Gurney 2014, p. 4). So, all 
topics relating to climate change were less discussed in the 2013 election in which Tony 
Abbott – who stated that climate change is “crap” (Readfearn 2014) – won against Kevin 
Rudd. 
In order to identify the main themes of climate change coverage during the 2013 elections, 
1,568 news stories that used the keywords “climate change” between 5 August and 7 Sep-
tember 2013 – the official election period – were downloaded from the ProQuest ANZ 
Newstand database (Gurney 2014, p. 5). In contrast to this research, which was manually 
coded – the texts were uploaded into the Leximancer text analytics and data mining software 
to map the conceptual relationships (Gurney 2014, p. 6).  
With the Leximancer analysis, Gurney (2014) showed, both quantitatively and qualitatively, 
that climate change policy and issues were largely set in the context of carbon tax by all 
political parties, including the Australian Greens (2014, p. 13). The aspect “carbon tax” was 
not identified as a frame sub-dimension in this research, because it was introduced after the 
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election in 2007, i. e. during the years after 2010 by Prime Minister Julia Gillard (see Ta-
ble 4). Thus, this finding by Gurney (2014) presented a new issue in the Australian climate 
change discussion. 
Abbott’s success during the time in which Julia Gillard was in office was based on framing 
the carbon pricing scheme as a ‘tax’ and her reaction on this impeachment (Gurney 2014, p. 
13). Gurney (2014), moreover, adds that “both, Rudd and Gillard, chose to construct their 
carbon pricing policy defences within Abbott’s “tax” frame, giving it added power and cre-
dence” (p. 16). Within this discussion, the media narrowed the frame about climate change 
to the political drama around political leaders, shifting the public discussion away from the 
science of climate change (Gurney 2014, p. 16). Gurney (2014) also wrote that “despite 
increasing evidence that the prophesied impacts of global warming are already being felt, it 
would seem that both major political parties chose the ‘small target’ approach to climate 
change policy for different reasons” (p. 16). 
Similar to this research, Gurney (2014) showed how much impact politics has had on the 
climate change discussion in Australia. The climate change issue is often simplified as a 
matter of carbon tax and of impeding economic growth; the carbon pricing scheme and the 
carbon tax could place a burden on the economy and impede economic development. It also 
shows that news values, in this case the news value “conflict” in relation to the discussion 
around the carbon tax, is sometimes preferred by the media instead of emphasising the im-
portance of the topic itself. 
In comparison to this research, Gurney (2014) found a new issue in the climate change dis-
cussion of Australia, that is to say the “carbon tax” but missed other frames/frame sub-di-
mensions related to the three political elections in Australia. The broader approach taken in 
this research might have revealed changes in other political discussions about climate 
change, for example in terms of its economic consequences. 
Lidberg (2018) carried out a comparative study on the media coverage around COP 15 and 
COP 21 (p. 70). To do this, he analysed the content of the print and online editions of The 
Sydney Morning Herald, which is owned by Fairfax Media Limited, as well as Daily Tele-
graph, owned by News Corp, which controls 60 per cent of the Australian newspaper market 
(Lidberg 2018, p. 74). He was interested in their different approaches to reporting on climate 
change (Lidberg 2018, p. 72). 
For the content analysis, Lidberg (2018) asked two questions: 1. How much coverage of 
climate change did the COPs generate? And 2. Which voices/sources did the journalists use 
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in their stories? (p. 72). A total of 247 articles were examined around the COP 15 event and 
273 around COP 21 (Lidberg 2008, p. 73). 
From 12 to 22 December 2009, the articles around COP 15 were identified using the key-
words “Copenhagen” or “climate” or “global warming”, while the media coverage around 
COP 21 was studied between 25 November and 16 December 2015, using the keywords 
“Paris” or “climate” or “global warming” (Lidberg 2018, p. 75). In both research periods, 
Lidberg (2018) used Factiva as a primary and ProQuest as a secondary database to increase 
the validity of the sample (p. 75). The content analysis of COP 21 was complemented by 
semi-structured interviews with five senior Australian reporters in the lead up to and after 
COP 21 (Lidberg 2018, p. 75). 
Lidberg’s (2018) first finding was the fact that the Daily Telegraph (n = 79) published less 
than half of the coverage of COP 15 compared to The Sydney Morning Herald (n = 168) 
during COP 21 (p. 76). 
Looking at the types of stories, both newspapers preferred “news”, second was “edito-
rial/opinion”, and third was “features/in-depth”. These results are comparable to the findings 
of this research in terms of form of expression: if “news” is “informing” and “editorial/opin-
ion”, “features/in-depth” and “others” are classified as “commenting”, there was a slight 
predominance of informing/news articles in the contest of climate change/climate change 
policy events. 
For Lidberg (2018) the decreasing number of “editorial/opinion” stories was the result of a 
decline in the influence of climate sceptics and he reminds us that – after COP 21 – Australia 
was one of the 190 countries that signed up to the goal of keeping further global warming to 
a maximum of 1.5 degrees (p. 82). 
Lidberg (2018) also identified the voices representing the two COPs. These results are also 
comparable with this research, identifying political systems – national as well as interna-
tional – as the most dominant actors (COP 15: 64 per cent; COP 21: 54 per cent) followed 
by “science/expert” during the COP 15 (20 per cent) and civil society during COP 21 (22 per 
cent) (Lidberg 2018, p. 78). 
The semi-structured interviews with five senior Australian reporters took place before 
COP 21 (October and November 2015) and during January and February 2016 (Lidberg 
2018, p. 79). In this context, three findings were highlighted by Lidberg (2018): 1. The cli-
mate-change-sceptic lobby refused to be interviewed, 2. There was a consensus that the new 
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and growing alliance between environmental groups, NGOs and business and venture capi-
talists is a potent force for rapid change and action on climate change, and 3. That the diver-
sity of sources – national as well as international – became more important for journalists 
(p. 82). 
Although Lidberg (2018) did not analyse the framing of the two COPs and the results of the 
interviews are based on a small sample size, the findings from the interviews are nevertheless 
relevant for the context of this research. Comparing the political event of the COPs with the 
2007 election, the climate-change-sceptical position remained at a relatively low level and 
there was no difference between before and after the election (see Hypothesis 10). Whether 
the identified decline of the sceptical position results from the new and growing alliance 
between environmental groups, NGOs as well as business and venture capitalists after 
COP 15 or from a general decline in climate change coverage due to a change of political 
leaders (see, for example,  Gurney 2014) still needs to be verified. That there are a broad 
range of sources in Australian climate change coverage was also identified in this research 
(Hypothesis 4b). There seems to be a constant demand for broad perspectives in the climate 
change coverage in Australia. 
Shea et al. (2020) want to know about the presence of climate change articles about Pacific 
Islands in English speaking countries, and, therefore, asked two research questions: 
1. How does the volume and strength of focus of coverage of Pacific Islands and climate 
change vary over time and between newspapers? 
2. Which different narratives in reporting on Pacific Islands and climate change are pre-
sent? (p. 3) 
To answer these questions, Shea et al. (2020) analyses volume, content, and dominant nar-
ratives in the American (The New York Times, 12.4 per cent, The Washington Post, 7.2 per 
cent) the British (The Guardian, 26.0 per cent, The Times/The Sunday Times, 7.1 per cent), 
and the Australian (The Sydney Morning Herald/The Sun Herald, 25.2 per cent, The Aus-
tralian, 22.1 per cent) press from January 1999 to December 2018 (p. 5). The articles (n = 
709: United Kingdom (n = 234), the United States of America (n = 139), Australia (n = 336)) 
were found with using Factiva and were examined using a code book, developed inductively 
(Shea et al. 2020, p. 4 f). In addition, Shea at al. (2020) did semi-structured interviews with 
international journalists (n = 9), Pacific journalists (n = 5) as well as Pacific stakeholders (n 
= 9), so people who create stories about and are interested in a certain representation of 
Pacific Islands in the context of climate change (p. 5).  
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The strength of focus on Pacific Islands and climate change – so whether it is “brief men-
tioned”, a “minor focus article” or a “main focus article”  (Shea et al. 2020, p. 5) – was coded 
to answer research question 1. For research question 2, the dominant narrative was coded, 
so whether there is “no impact”, “vulnerability”, “solutions/responses”, and “contribution” 
(Shea et al. 2020, p. 5 f).  
Shea et al. (2020) found out that from 1999 to 2018 only 0.0084 per cent of all articles 
represent Pacific Islands in the context of climate change with “…a large jump in the number 
of articles published on Pacific Islands and climate change in 2015…” (Shea et al. 2020, p. 
7). Looking at the narratives, Australian newspapers, as being of interest in the context of 
this work, having about 60 per cent of the “vulnerability narrative” in all articles (Shea et al. 
2020, p. 9 f). “Since 2015, the proportion of vulnerability narratives has significantly de-
creased in favor of solution/response narratives…” (Shea et al. 2020, p. 10). In addition, 
Australia – more specifically the newspaper The Australian – has 12.1 per cent “no impact” 
article, an outstanding result in comparison to the other newspapers examined (Shea et al. 
2020, p. 10).  
Shea et al. (2020) conclude that over the examined decade, Pacific Islands and climate 
change are only rarely a topic in the analysed newspapers with an increase in coverage since 
2015 (p. 13). The vulnerability narrative is most dominant in the analysed newspapers and 
refers to climate impacts, a focus that is approved by both, journalists and Pacific stakehold-
ers, in the interviews (Shea et al. 2020, p. 13). For Shea et al. (2020), there is, however, “…a 
conflict between the power of drowning island language as a journalistic tool for highlighting 
climate impacts and the implications of those representations” (p. 14).  
With this research, Shea et al. (2020) show that Australian journalists and stakeholders refer 
only little to the issue of sinking or drowning Pacific islands in the context of climate change 
coverage. As some Australian newspaper, such as The Australian, even say that climate 
change has no consequences for Pacific islands, it seems that international climate change 
issues are not of interest for some Australian newspaper owners – in this case News Corp. 
As discussed in Chapter 3.3, Josephi (2011) says that when it comes to climate change, the 
decision about whether a story is published, or not, is made by media outlets with national 
news values in mind (p. 20). For Australia, national news issues are of high interest as  this 
research also shows (Hypothesis 6).  
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8. Discussion 
This chapter discusses the results of this research related to the hypotheses and sub research 
questions. It examines the differences and similiarities in terms of climate change and offers 
some conclusions. In addition, it explains how these results might influence further research. 
At the end of this chapter, the development in climate change research described in Chapter 
7: Climate change research since 2011 is considered in relation to the hypotheses. 
8.1. Discussion: comparing the coverage in Germany and Australia 
The comparison between coverage in Germany and Australia identifies whether there are 
differences or similiarities in the representation of climate change coverage in terms of 
frames/frame sub dimensions, actors and writing style. 
Looking at the results of the frames, in Germany, the coverage creates a general picture of 
climate change; the frame “Disconnected problem definition” is predominant. In Australia, 
climate change coverage is more concrete, focusing on “Climate effects and action” (Hy-
pothesis 1). In terms of “Sceptical views”, i. e. the representation of voices that are sceptical 
of climate change, the coverage in the two countries is similar (Hypothesis 3). 
The variety of perspectives on climate change was – contrary to the assumption defined in 
hypothesis 4a – broader in Australia than in Germany. Australian climate change coverage 
includes more perspectives on climate change in a single article than Germany. 
In addition, the German media refers to international climate change action. When analysing 
the frame element “Treatment recommendation”, international climate change action is sig-
nificantly predominant in the coverage, whereas the media in Australia concentrates on na-
tional action related to climate change (Hypothesis 6). Looking at the four indices of the 
effects of climate change – 1. Effects on nature, 2. Effects on the weather, 3. Effects on 
humans, and 4. Effects on the economy –, there was only a significant difference for “Effects 
on the weather”. Summarising all four effects indices to a new index “Effects of climate 
change, in general”, a small but significant difference was identified (Hypothesis 7). 
Based on these findings, the following conclusions can be drawn. 
Hypothesis 1 is confirmed and this leads to the assumption that the journalists writing for 
German newspapers suppose that no differentiated coverage is necessary in a country in 
which the climate change issue is – as Tilly (2007) wrote – securely established in the public 
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discourse (p. 361). Based on the results related to Hypothesis 4a, which predicted that the 
perspectives on climate change per article would be significantly lower in Germany than in 
Australia, the question arises whether this kind of climate change coverage creates space for 
more climate-change-critical or climate-change-sceptical positions in Germany, in future. 
This is supported by the fact that there are (at least) 5,000 lobbyists in Berlin (see Bülow 
2010) who represent their economic interests in the Deutsche Bundestag [German parlia-
ment] and, thus, can also indirectly influence media reporting of climate change. So, it would 
be of interest for further research to identify whether there was a return of differentiated 
climate change coverage after the end of the period in which this research was carried out or 
whether an increase in the influence of economic interests and conservative think tanks can 
be identified. 
Two of the studies described in Chapter 7: Climate change research since 2011 support the 
former: Lörcher and Taddicken (2017) wrote that “there is a greater diversity of topics in the 
mass-media-induced discussion arena” (p. 14), including “causes” (68 per cent), “conse-
quences” (61 per cent), and “mitigation/adaptation measures” (71 per cent) (p. 11). Wessler 
et al. (2016) identified frames which refer to climate change effects, consequences and action 
in the German media (pp. 436 ff.). So, there seems to be a return of a climate change dis-
course. 
In Australia climate change coverage mainly discusses “Climate effects and action” (Hy-
pothesis 1) and introduces a significantly broader variety of perspectives on climate change 
than it is the case in Germany (Hypothesis 4a). The question is now whether this type of 
climate change coverage was a temporary phenomenon based on the research period that 
was chosen. Finally, climate change was on the political agenda in Australia during the re-
search period. But – as McDonald (2012) wrote – “of all states in global politics, there are 
few that could lay claim to being as inconsistent on global climate change as Australia” 
(p. 579). Thus, attitudes to climate change as expressed in Australian newspapers have al-
ready changed due to the different climate change mindset of the current Australian govern-
ment. For Jang and Hart (2015) (see Chapter 7: Climate change research since 2011) this is, 
however, not the case. In their study, they confirm the findings in this research some years 
after the period in which it was carried out, writing that “cause frames” as well as “action 
frames” are very popular in Australia because the media likes to encourage government ac-
tion by initiating debates about the causes of climate change (human activities vs. nature) 
(p. 14). So, further research might support the preference of Australian media for cause and 
action frames in terms of climate change. 
214 8 Discussion 
The effects of climate change – 1. Effects on nature, 2. Effects on the weather, 3. Effects on 
humans, and 4. Effects on the economy – are analysed in detail in this research (Hypothesis 
7). There only appears to be one significant difference for “Effects on the weather”, which 
had a higher mean frequency in Australia. This result reflects the climate situation in Aus-
tralia: Australia’s climate has warmed by 0.9 °C since 1910, and the frequency of extreme 
weather has increased, with more extreme heatwaves, fewer cool extremes and a decline in 
rainfall, especially in the southwest, dominated by reduced winter rainfall (see, for example, 
Australian Bureau of Meteorology and CSIRO 2014, p. 3). In addition, the the four indices 
are summarised in one index “Effects of climate change” to get a general overview on cli-
mate change effects in the climate change coverage of the two countries. This general index 
shows a small but significant difference with Australia having more climate change effects 
in their coverage. Therefore, hypothesis 7 shows that, in Australia, the media would be more 
likely to frequently represent the effects of climate change.  
Concerning sceptic voices, it is a surprise that hypothesis 3 – “In Australia, the representation 
of sceptical viewpoints is a normal aspect of climate change coverage. German newspapers 
consider sceptical voices only rarely.” – is not confirmed. Remembering the literature used 
to identify this hypothesis: McGaurr et al. (2013) wrote that the “uncertainty” frame is pre-
dominant in Australia’s news media (p. 27), while Arlt and Wolling (2012) reported that the 
“uncertainty discourse” is rarely mentioned in Germany (p. 291). So, is German climate 
change coverage already “sceptisised”? 
This question makes sense in so far as the results of this research refer to events – an election 
and an environmental disaster – which do not only focus on climate change. The agenda of 
an election programme includes several topics, so an environmental disaster is not only con-
nected with climate change, but also with issues such as human fortunes and insurance as-
pects. Contrary to this, Arlt and Wolling (2012) examined the reporting during the Copen-
hagen Climate Change Conference and McGaurr et al. (2013) analysed the media reporting 
of the IPCC’s first two reports in 2007. Thus, one conclusion of the fact that hypothesis 3 
was not substantiated is that climate change coverage without clear references to a climate-
change-related policy event creates space for critical opinions about the existence of climate 
change in both countries. 
It is of course reasonable that, due to the availability of a broader data set, events such as the 
climate change conferences should be used for climate change research. In Chapter 7: Cli-
mate change research since 2011, Lörcher and Taddicken (2017) confirm that the mass me-
dia arena mainly refers to the “IPCC report” itself (49 per cent), followed by “Climate Pol-
icy” (39 per cent) (p. 10). So, most climate change coverage focused on climate-change-
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related policy events. Nevertheless, it is of further interest to know the agenda of print and 
other media in terms of climate-change-sceptical positions outside events such as these. 
As Chapter 7: Climate change research since 2011 shows that a number of studies about 
climate scepticism were published since the period in which this research was carried out 
(see, for example, Lörcher and Taddicken 2017, Brüggemann and Engesser 2017, Kaiser 
and Rhomberg 2016). Lörcher and Taddicken (2017) discovered that 88 per cent of the mass 
media claim “climate change exists” and deduce from this fact that the 12 per cent who doubt 
the existence of climate change are climate-change-sceptical voices (p. 11). Brüggemann 
and Engesser (2017) identified 4 per cent of contrarian voices in German newspapers (p. 
63). In addition, the authors discovered that the contrarian voices challenge “Anthropogen-
ity” as well as “Risks” in 4 per cent of all articles, “Emission reduction” in 2 per cent and 
“Global warming” in 1 per cent of all articles (n = 201 articles) (Brüggemann and Engesser 
2017, p. 63). Kaiser and Rhomberg (2016) reported that 52 out of 379 articles included 122 
sceptical statements, which is 15 per cent of all articles (p. 563). The authors also studied 
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung and Süddeutsche Zeitung and stated that Frankfurter Allge-
meine Zeitung used positive connotations when referring to climate-change-sceptical ideas, 
while Süddeutsche Zeitung was more balanced (Kaiser and Rhomberg 2016, p. 566). More-
over, the authors introduced an interesting thought, stating that climate change scepticism is 
a transnational Western phenomenon embedded in the national context (Kaiser and Rhom-
berg 2016, p. 568). This statement would support the results of this research which did not 
identify any difference in terms of climate change scepticism. 
In addition, the climate change discussion is highly dependent on the national government’s 
opinion in Australia. So, the picture might be different when comparing the political elec-
tions in 2013, when Tony Abbott became Prime Minister in Australia, saying that anthropo-
genic climate change was “crap” (Readfearn 2014) with the time when the CDU/CSU took 
office with the SPD in Germany. This assumption, too, should be examined in further re-
search. 
Gurney’s (2014) study of climate change’ during the 2007 and 2013 Australian elections, 
presented in Chapter 7: Climate change research since 2011, supports this assumption. She 
identified “...a dramatic decrease (almost 40%) in the raw number of stories mentioning the 
phrase ‘climate change’ between the 2007 and 2013 elections” (Gurney 2014, p. 4). And she 
found a 50 per cent decrease in articles which included both the terms “climate change” and 
“moral” between 2007 and 2013 (2014, p. 4). Use of the terms “climate change” and “carbon 
tax” decreased between 2010 and 2013 by approximately 8 per cent (Gurney 2014, p. 4). So, 
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all topics relating to climate change were discussed less in the 2013 election in which Tony 
Abbott won against Kevin Rudd. 
Hypothesis 6 was developed from the literature about the public’s attitude to climate change. 
It was expected that the media in both countries make national politicians responsible for 
tackling climate change. The results, however, show that German climate change coverage 
expects international politicians to tackle climate change. In Australia, the media – as as-
sumed in Hypothesis 6 – says national politicians are responsible. One reason for the oppo-
site result in Germany might be that the agenda of the climate change coverage in both coun-
tries is independent of public opinion. Further research could identify whether this 
phenomenon of not considering public opinion can also be identified in a different contexts 
and/or in different media, in Germany. 
Discussing results in terms of actors involved in climate change coverage, Australia’s poli-
ticians are significantly more influential as senders of climate change coverage than those in 
Germany (see Hypothesis 2). Moreover, the variety of actors is higher in Australian than in 
German media (Hypothesis 4b). So, in Australia, there are more articles which include more 
than one actor, for example a scientist and a politician who contribute to the same article. 
This finding was also confirmed by Lidberg (2018) in his study about COP 15 and COP 21 
(see Chapter 7: Climate change research since 2011). 
These findings lead to the following conclusions. 
Australia’s politicians have a major influence on the country’s climate change coverage. For 
example, Gurney (2014) (see Chapter 7: Climate change research since 2011) explained the 
influence of Australian politicians in terms of media coverage, revealing that, between the 
Australian elections in 2007 and 2013, the media narrowed the climate change frame to the 
political drama around the various political leaders, shifting the public’s attitude away from 
the science of climate change (p. 16). This fact also supports the assumption in hypothesis 3 
that there might be a different picture in terms of sceptical voices in a different research 
period. However, the results of Hypothesis 4b show that, in Australia, politicians are often 
not the only senders of climate change issues, but a variety of actors. The question is, now, 
whether the additional senders support the opinion of the political actors or whether they 
present a different viewpoint on climate change. Remembering Boykoff and Boykoff’s 
(2004) statement about balance-as-bias news reporting (p. 350), which is a journalistic prac-
tice in Australia, opposing opinions may be presented in a single article. This, on the one 
hand, means that a sceptical politician may be confronted with a scientist who presents sci-
entific results that climate change exists in the same article. On the other hand, this also 
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means that a politician who believes that climate change is happening is cited in the same 
article alongside a business person with a sceptical viewpoint. So, it might be of interest to 
know how the readers or spectators of climate change information in the media assess the 
importance of the different climate change senders: is the politician seen as more reliable or 
the scientist? Is a member of civil society or the journalist who wrote an article based on 
his/her own knowledge seen as a climate change expert? It would be interesting to research 
the prevalence of opinions held by different senders involved in climate change coverage. 
Concerning the writing style of articles written by journalists, no differences were identified. 
German and Australian climate change coverage includes an equal number of informing and 
commenting articles (Hypothesis 5). 
The following conclusions are drawn from this finding. 
Bear in mind that the self-concept of German journalists includes being an informer and 
criticiser, whereas the self-concept of Australian journalists involves being a watchdog and 
an analyst (see Chapter 3.4.3.). The assumption that these self-concepts result in German 
journalists using an informing writing style and Australian journalists using a commenting 
one is, however, not confirmed (Hypothesis 5). Defining an informing writing style as more 
credible and, thus, as the preferred writing style for conveying climate change issues, the 
result of hypothesis 5 is good news. German as well as Australian journalists write their 
climate change coverage with necessary diligence – the percentage using the informing writ-
ing style is higher in both countries (Germany: 52.1 per cent; Australia: 55.4 per cent) –, 
nevertheless, climate change is also represented as an emotional and individual topic (com-
menting writing style in Germany: 47.9 per cent; in Australia: 44.6 per cent). Thus, the state-
ment by Lünenborg and Berghofer (2010) that the Australian self-concept “watchdog” seems 
to reflect a much more investigative approach to journalism with a focus of the political and 
economic elites of the country (p. 37) as well as Rodrigues’ (2008) finding that illegal prac-
tices are occasionally used in Australia to strengthen their role (p. 117) is not verified. It 
might, nevertheless, be of interest to analyse whether there is more sensational or captious 
news coverage in Australia due to a greater aspiration to play the role of a watchdog, with a 
larger data set of articles only having journalists as actors involved in climate change cover-
age. 
For Germany, the result based on hypothesis 5 means that the self-assessment of journalists 
represented in the results of Weischenberg et al. (2006) (76.4 per cent of German journalists 
say they “inform the public neutrally and precisely” (p. 356)) and Lünenborg and Berghofer 
(2010) (82.7 per cent say they “inform the public neutrally and precisely” (p. 38)) can also 
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not be verified. If this self-assessment reflected reality, Germany would have had signifi-
cantly more articles with an informing writing style. But this is not the case. Thus, further 
study could explore what the words “neutrally” and “precisely” mean for German journalists 
in the context of writing about climate change. In addition, a further look at the socialisation 
and self-concept of the editors-in-chief and the media owners who edit and approve Ger-
many’s media coverage, respectively, might be of interest for further research.  
Table 49 provides an overview of all hypotheses and sub research questions that were used 
to compare German and Australian climate change coverage. 
 
Table 49: Overview of all hypotheses/sub research questions comparing Germany and 
Australia 
Hypothesis Cluster/Index Germany 
(percentage or 
mean)  
Australia 
(percentage or 
mean) 
Hypothesis 1 “Disconnected problem def-
inition” 
higher lower 
Hypothesis 1 “Climate effects and action” lower higher 
Hypothesis 2 “Politicians” lower higher 
Hypothesis 3 “Sceptics“/“Non-sceptics” nsd nsd 
Hypothesis 4a Variety of climate change 
coverage 
lower higher 
Hypothesis 4b Variety of actors involved in 
climate change coverage 
lower higher 
Hypothesis 5 “Commenting”/“Informing” nsd nsd 
Hypothesis 6 “Treatment recommenda-
tion – national versus inter-
national” 
higher 
international focus 
lower 
international focus 
Hypothesis 6 “Treatment recommenda-
tion – national versus inter-
national” 
lower 
national focus 
higher 
national focus 
Hypothesis 7 “Effects on nature” nsd nsd 
Hypothesis 7 “Effects on the weather” lower higher 
Hypothesis 7 “Effects on humans” nsd nsd 
Hypothesis 7 “Effects on the economy” nsd nsd 
Hypothesis 7 “Effects on climate change, 
in general” 
lower higher 
nsd: No significant differences between the two countries.  
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8.2. Discussion: comparing the coverage of the two climate-related events 
This second part of Chapter 8 discusses comparisons between the climate change coverage 
of the two events. 
Looking at the frames first, the environmental disaster and the election were both analysed 
in terms of their predominance among coverage of national and international activities. This 
is why, on the one hand, the time after the environmental disaster – the flood – happened is 
analysed. Because it was a national event, the assumption was that the newspaper coverage 
might discuss this environmental disaster in a national context. On the other hand, the period 
before the election was examined, i. e. the time during the election period, in which the issue 
of climate change might be used for election campaigning demanding for international cli-
mate change activities. These assumptions were right with a significant difference: the cli-
mate change coverage during the election mainly demanded international action, while cov-
erage of the environmental disaster emphasised national action (Sub research question 1). 
Testing whether the same time periods are dominated by the five indices of effects intro-
duced in hypothesis 7 – i. e. 1. Effects on nature, 2. Effects on the weather, 3. Effects on 
humans, and 4. Effects on the economy, and 5. the summarised index “Effects of climate 
change, in general” –, the results show no differences (Sub research question 2). 
The hypothesis that the newspaper coverage around the election would demand action and 
that the media would refer to the consequences of climate change during the time of the 
environmental disaster is not substantiated (Hypothesis 8). The clusters “Treatment recom-
mendation national”, “Treatment recommendation international” and “Focus on treatment 
information”, representing the election in a new cluster “Climate action coverage”, and the 
clusters “Focus on consequences excluding effects on the economy” and “Economic conse-
quences”, representing the time after the environmental disaster in a new cluster “Climate 
consequences coverage”, show no significant difference. 
Based on these findings, the following conclusions can be drawn. 
The results related to sub research question 1 confirm the assumption that coverage during 
the time after the environmental disaster mainly demanded national action, while, in the pe-
riod before the election, it emphasised international action. This result confirms general ex-
pectations because there were issues such as crafting an international climate protection 
agreement on the political agenda, whereas the activities which result from an environmental 
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disaster, such as providing financial means, are tasks of the national government. Nonethe-
less, there is an unanswered question, especially in the context of an environmental disaster: 
besides climate change, which frames are connected with such events? 
This question arises when looking at all other hypothesis and sub research questions com-
paring the election and the environmental disaster in this part of the chapter, because there 
are no more differences. This result was unexpected.   
Accordingly, the question “why is the environmental disaster – in comparison to the election 
– not stronger connected with the effects and consequences of climate change?” arises. An 
answer for this question may result from the discussion of hypothesis 3 in the previous chap-
ter: an environmental disaster is not only connected with climate change, but also with issues 
such as human fortunes or insurance aspects. In addition, news values, which are identified 
as quite similar in the two countries (see Chapter 3.6), might play a role in this discussion, 
guiding news in a different direction. Thus, it is of interest to get a full perspective on the 
framing of an environmental disaster and the role climate change plays in it. 
In terms of actors involved in climate change coverage, politicians play a major role in cli-
mate change coverage – especially in Australia. Sub research question 4 asks whether polit-
ical actors are predominant during political elections, whereas other actors are predominant 
during environmental disasters. However, the difference between the way politicians relate 
to the two events is not significant. 
This finding leads to the conclusion that, during both events, a number of different actors 
discussed climate change in the media. As a consequence, it might be difficult to include 
climate change in political agendas during election campaigns and it could be difficult to be 
seen promoting political activities designed to solve the issues that arise after an environ-
mental disaster. Thus, it might be of interest whether this is especially the case in Australia, 
where balance-as-bias news reporting is a common journalistic practice, while the variety of 
actors per article is significantly greater compared to those in Germany (see discussion in 
Chapter 8.1/Hypothesis 4b). For Germany, these results lead to the question whether all ac-
tors involved in the climate change discussion during the two events present platitudes, as 
summarised in the frame “Disconnected problem definition” (see the results in Chapter 
8.1/Hypothesis 1). 
Referring to the writing style, the assumption was that 1. politicians increase their public 
relations activities during the election period through commenting articles in the media, and 
2. an environmental disaster encourages journalists to inform the public about climate 
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change issues. Again, the election period as well as the period after the environmental dis-
aster was examined, however, without finding any significant differences. So, the journalists 
do not just draw on public relations pieces from politicians as well as do not writing more 
narrative stories during the election period. They, however, also do not significantly increase 
writing about facts and data, for example, quantity of flooded houses, during an environ-
mental disaster. 
The following conclusions are drawn from this finding. 
As already identified (see Chapter 8.1/Hypothesis 5), German as well as Australian journal-
ists write their climate change coverage with necessary diligence including facts and data 
(informing articles). This does not change when comparing the two events. So, although the 
self-concepts are different – “informer and criticiser” (German journalists) versus “watchdog 
and analyst” (Australian journalists) – there seems to be the same demand in terms climate 
change coverage. This finding might mean that the socialisation and the self-concept of Ger-
man and Australian journalists is comparable. This finding, however, needs to be verified by 
further analysis. 
Summarising the findings of all hypotheses and sub research questions that compare cover-
age of the election and the environmntal disaster, only one significant difference could be 
found out: the election period refers to international action in terms of climate change 
whereas the environmental disaster mention national climate change action. 
8.3. Discussion: comparing the coverage before/after the events 
This third part of Chapter 8 discusses the results when comparing the climate change cover-
age during the period before and after the election and the environmental disaster. 
Discussing the frames in terms of climate change coverage before and after the election in 
Australia, the cluster “Climate effects and action” from hypothesis 1, which summarises all 
relevant five frames of the cluster analysis, is used and compared with the two frames “Dis-
connected problem definition” and “Sceptics”, which are summarised in a new cluster called 
“General climate change coverage”. The assumption was that the percentage of the cluster 
“Climate effects and action” would be higher before the political election, and significantly 
different to the percentage appearing after the election day. The difference was, however, 
not significant (Hypothesis 9). Testing this assumption for Germany, the result is the same: 
there was no significant difference (Sub research question 5). In addition, the sceptical voices 
accompanying the Australian election were examined. The two clusters from hypothesis 3 
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are taken – “Sceptical views” and “Non-sceptical views” – testing whether critical and scep-
tical voices were represented less after election day. However, also here, no significant dif-
ferences were found (Hypothesis 10). 
Looking at the environmental disaster as an event, the assumption was that Australian cli-
mate change coverage would concentrate on “Effects of climate change, in general” whereas 
the German climate change coverage would focus on the negative effects of climate change. 
Testing this hypothesis with the indices “Effects of climate change – negative”, “Effects of 
climate change – positive”, and “Effects on climate change, in general”, introduced in hy-
pothesis 7, there were no significant differences in each of the three indices in the two coun-
tries before and after the environmental disaster (Hypotheses 11a and 11b). 
Based on these findings, the following conclusions can be drawn. 
The assumption was that, in Australia, the percentage of the cluster “Climate effects and 
action” would be higher before the election, and significantly different to the percentage 
appearing after election day (Hypothesis 9). The difference was, however, not significant. 
This result makes sense in terms of the theoretical discussion about the 2007 election in 
Australia: Kevin Rudd made climate change the defining issue in his political campaign after 
14 years without a vote on this issue (see, for example, Gascoigne 2008, Bongiorno 2008). 
And, after Rudd won the election, “the first action of the new Rudd Labor Government was 
to ratify the Kyoto Protocol – the first time that the first act of an Australian Government 
was to ratify a treaty” (Suter 2010, p. 268) and he was “…among the most active heads of 
state at the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) Confer-
ence of the Parties in Copenhagen in 2009, at which Australia had one of the largest delega-
tions“ (McDonald 2012, p. 579). So, during the research period – six months before and six 
months after Australia’s 2007 election – there was a lot of talk and action related to climate 
change. The result might be different if one examined a longer period after election day in 
2007, because, even though he referred to climate change as the “greatest moral challenge”, 
he then failed to push it through, just walking away from the issue (Suter 2010, p. 310). That 
climate change is less a topic in the media after Kevin Rudd took office, in 2007, was also a 
finding of Gurney (2014): she found a 50 per cent decrease in the climate change articles, 
she analysed (p. 4). 
Testing this assumption for Germany, there was also no significant difference (Sub research 
question 5). One reason for this might be that the new government did not do anything new 
in terms of climate change, but just extended the work of the former government (Koali-
tionsvertrag 2005). In addition, the election in 2009 was influenced by the financial crisis. 
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So, climate change was not the central, but just one of many issues in the political debate 
(Kuckartz 2011, pp. 130 f.). As climate change is securely established in the public discourse 
in Germany (see discussion concerning Hypothesis 1), it is not expected to be a central issue 
in future election campaigns in Germany. So, it is to be expected that the results of election 
campaigns in Germany are and will be similar when comparing the period before and after 
the election day in terms of “Climate effects and action”. 
In addition, there was no significant difference in terms of sceptical voices before and after 
thr election day (Hypothesis 10). This result – as discussed in Chapter 8.1 (Hypothesis 3) – 
might change when analysing a longer period after the election day as well as when studying 
a different election, such as the one in 2013 (see Gurney 2014, Chapter 7: Climate change 
research since 2011). 
Looking at the environmental disaster as an event, the hypothesis that Australian climate 
change coverage would concentrate on “Effects of climate change, in general” after the en-
vironmental disaster – the Queensland flood – whereas the German climate change coverage 
would focus on the negative effects of climate change after the Oder flood is not substanti-
ated (Hypotheses 11a and 11b). These environmental disasters did not seem to influence 
reporting on climate change effects. This result further supports the assumption that the issue 
of climate change is not central when reporting about an environmental disaster (see Hy-
pothesis 3, Sub research question 2 and Hypothesis 8). 
So, comparing the time period before and after the election and the environmental disaster, 
no differences could be identified. 
Finally, this chapter examines the newspapers separately. The seven frames are the basis for 
testing the representation of climate change. The climate change coverage in the four news-
papers show highly significant differences. Each newspaper has a different focus on climate 
change: Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung prefers “Disconnected problem definition” as well 
as “Sceptical Views”. Süddeutsche Zeitung demands “Focus on treatment information” and 
“Treatment recommendation international”. The Sydney Morning Herald mainly includes 
“Focus on consequences, excluding effects on the economy” as well as “Treatment recom-
mendation national”. The Age refers to “Economic consequences” and “Disconnected prob-
lem definition”  (Sub research question 6). 
This result is contrary to the idea that there is a common way of reporting on climate change 
in Western media (see, for example, Wessler et al. 2016). With its focus on “Disconnected 
problem definition” as well as “Sceptical Views”, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung’s climate 
change coverage is the most general. It just refers to the issue climate change saying that it 
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exists or not exists, but does not explain causes and consequences and does not ask for cli-
mate action. Süddeutsche Zeitung is very action-oriented. With concentrating on “Focus on 
treatment information” and “Treatment recommendation international”, it reveals missing 
information about climate change issues. Moreover, it asks for international action to tackle 
climate change. The Sydney Morning Herald offers information about causes and conse-
quences of climate change (frame “Focus on consequences, excluding effects on the econ-
omy”) as well as asks for national action to combat climate change (frame “Treatment rec-
ommendation national”). Contrarily to The Sydney Morning Herald, The Age acts as a 
spokesperson for the economy (frame “Economic consequences”) and gives general infor-
mation about climate change (frame “Disconnected problem definition”). That the results of 
this work are different to those of Wessler et al. (2016) might be based on the fact that Wess-
ler et al. (2016) base this conclusion on a study of climate change conferences, i. e. events 
where journalists are at the same location and get the same information and impressions. 
Because the four examined newspapers’ focus on climate change is very different, there must 
be another power of influence which, however, cannot be identified by this work. This as-
sumption, therefore, needs to be tested by further studies. 
A different picture appears when comparing the four newspapers in terms of actors. Only in 
the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung was a significant difference when it comes to citing “in-
ternational actors”, voices of politicians outside Germany, in comparison to Süddeutsche 
Zeitung. All other actors appear equally often, comparing Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 
with Süddeutsche Zeitung and The Sydney Morning Herald with The Age (Sub research 
question 7). 
Summarising the findings about the four newspapers, each newspaper has a significantly 
different focus on climate change when framing climate change. However, there is only one 
difference in terms of actors: Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung included significantly more 
international actors than the other newspapers. 
8.4. Matching the results and the theoretical framework 
As a theoretical framework, Bräuer and Wolling’s “Extended Sphere Model” (2014) was 
used. Based on the findings from the literature relating to all six spheres, 13 hypotheses and 
eight sub research questions were defined. This section reviews each of the six spheres as 
well as the results of their corresponding hypotheses and sub research questions to identify 
whether some of the spheres include more differences or consistencies than others. 
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The Subject sphere includes individual key issues for a journalist, such as political attitudes, 
topic selection and topic design (news bias, instrumental actualisation). The “Comparison of 
German and Australian journalism work attitude” is associated with this sphere as repre-
sented by interpretations of the two events (Hypothesis 9 and 11, Sub research question 5). 
However, no causes and effects or action frames were predominant in the climate change 
coverage during the two elections or the environmental disasters in Germany and Australia. 
There were no differences for all hypotheses. So, the way in which journalists interpret and, 
thus, represent climate change in the four selected newspapers was comparable. 
The Institutional sphere deals with influences from inside media conglomerates, such as 
organisational structure, ownership and editorial goals. Hypothesis 4a and Hypothesis 4b 
represent this sphere. They identify differences in terms of the variety of perspectives on 
climate change and of actors representing this issue: in both cases, Australia had a broader 
variety than Germany. So, presenting different perspectives on climate change is more com-
mon in Australian newsrooms. 
The Professional sphere consists of journalistic routines, such as differences in prioritisation 
of news values and quality indicators. The “Comparison of journalists’ self-concept” is part 
of this sphere. This sphere consists of hypothesis 5 and sub research question 3, testing 
whether German journalists use an informing writing style in climate change coverage and 
Australian journalists a commenting one, comparing the two countries, as well as the context 
of the election in the each country. In this sphere, too, no differences were found. So, the 
professional sphere and, thus, the routines were found to be alike in the two countries. 
The Societal sphere refers to cultural values as well as the institutional parameters of the 
political media system. So, the role of “The influence of lobbies on climate change politics” 
and “Comparison of the newspapers” is an issue in this sphere (Hypotheses 3 and 11, Sub 
research questions 6 and 7). The influence of lobbies is identified through the appearance of 
sceptical viewpoints in climate change coverage. However, no differences were found, either 
when comparing the two countries, or the period of the elections. The influence of lobby 
groups might be similarly in the two countries. Comparing the four newspapers in terms of 
frames, there are, however, highly significant differences: each of the four newspapers looks 
at climate change coverage with a different focus. In addition, in Frankfurter Allgemeine 
Zeitung was a difference in terms of international actors detected. All other actors appear to 
a similar extent.  
The Public sphere identifies public opinion as well as strategic communication activities 
(public relations). It deals with the public’s attitude to climate change (Hypotheses 6 and 7, 
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Sub research questions 1 and 2). The results show that there was a difference in terms poli-
ticians who should tackle climate change: Australia prefers national and Germany prefers 
international politicians to do so.  Moreover, a small but significant difference was found in 
terms of coverage that included the effects of climate change. Besides, the climate change 
coverage before the election demanded almost as much national as international action, 
while the coverage after the environmental disaster focused on national action. No signifi-
cant difference was found when looking effects of climate change after the environmental 
disaster and before the political election. 
The Sphere of structural parameters is most important for this research when looking at 
current events which might influence climate change coverage, such as in this case of an 
election and an environmental disaster (Hypotheses 1, 2 and 9, Sub research question 4). So, 
“Political influence on the German and Australian climate change discussion” as well as 
“Energy supply, resources, and climate in Germany and Australia” are part of this sphere. 
There were differences in terms of framing climate change (“general” versus “effects and 
action”) and in relation to the appearance of political actors in the two countries. No differ-
ences in framing climate change or actors, however, were found when comparing the two 
events. The sphere of structural parameters, consequently, shows that frames/frame sub-di-
mensions and actors are differently represented in the climate change coverage in the two 
countries. Comparing the events does not lead to any differences in relation to frames/frame 
sub-dimensions and actors. 
Table 50 provides an overview of Bräuer and Wolling’s (2014) six spheres, the correspond-
ing hypotheses as well as sub research questions and whether a difference or no differences 
are found.  
 
Table 50: Overview of Bräuer and Wolling’s (2014) six spheres and the corresponding 
hypotheses/sub research questions 
Subject sphere 
Comparison of German and Australian journalism 
 
Hypothesis Differences No differences 
Hypothesis 9: Australia’s climate change coverage before the 
election was strongly dominated by frames of causes and effects 
as well as of action. After the election, the frames are more di-
verse.  
 X 
 
Sub research question 5: Which of the two defined frames from 
Hypothesis 9 are predominant before and after the German elec-
tion? 
 X 
 
8 Discussion 227 
Subject sphere 
Comparison of German and Australian journalism 
 
Hypothesis Differences No differences 
Hypothesis 11a: After the Queensland floods, the Australian 
newspaper coverage of climate change concentrates on the 
frame element “Causal interpretation (effects of climate 
change)”, in general.  
 
 X  
 
Hypothesis 11b: After the Oder floods, the German newspaper 
coverage of climate change concentrates on negative effects re-
garding the frame element “Causal interpretation (effects of cli-
mate change)”. 
 X 
 
Institutional sphere 
Comparison of German and Australian newsrooms in terms of internal factors of influence 
 
Hypothesis Differences No differences 
Hypothesis 4a: German newspapers represent a wide variety of 
perspectives on climate change. The diversity of frame sub-di-
mensions is high. In Australia, the variety of perspectives on cli-
mate change is low. 
X  
 
Hypothesis 4b: The variety of actors in German newspapers is 
higher than the variety of actors in Australian newspapers.  
X  
 
 
Professional sphere 
Comparison of journalists’ self-concept  
Comparison of news values 
 
Hypothesis Differences No differences 
Hypothesis 5: German journalists use an informing writing style, 
while Australian journalists use a commenting one. 
 X 
 
Sub research question 3: Is the newspaper coverage of climate 
change around the election commenting and is it informing dur-
ing the time of the environmental disaster? 
 X 
 
 
Societal sphere 
The influence of lobbies on climate change politics 
Comparison of the newspapers 
 
Hypothesis Differences No differences 
Hypothesis 3: In Australia, the representation of sceptical view-
points is a normal aspect of climate change coverage. German 
newspapers rarely give space to such sceptical voices. 
 X 
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Hypothesis 10: Critical and sceptical voices accompanied the 
2007 Australian election (before election day). After the elec-
tion, the prominence of critical and sceptical voices was clearly 
reduced. 
 X 
 
Sub research question 6: Was there a difference in framing of 
climate change in the four newspapers examined? 
X  
Sub research question 7: Which actors were covered in the con-
text of climate change in the four newspapers examined?  
X  
 
Public sphere 
The public’s attitude to climate change  
 
Hypothesis Differences No differences 
Hypothesis 6: German as well as Australian climate change cov-
erage demands that national politicians tackle climate change. 
X  
Hypothesis 7: German climate change coverage contains few 
frame sub-dimensions of the effects of climate change. In Aus-
tralia, the media widely represents the effects of climate 
change. 
X  
Sub research question 1: Does the response to an environmen-
tal disaster emphasise national activities, whereas the discourse 
in an election emphasises international activities? 
X  
Sub research question 2: Does “Causal interpretation (effects of 
climate change)” appear more often during the environmental 
disaster than during the election? 
 X 
 
Sphere of structural parameters 
Political influence on the German and Australian climate change discussion  
energy supply, resources, and climate in Germany and Australia 
 
Hypothesis Differences No differences 
Hypothesis 1: Australia’s climate change coverage is dominated 
by frames of causes and effects as well as of action. Germany’s 
climate change coverage remains unspecific, just defining the 
problem. 
X  
Hypothesis 2: Politicians in Australia have a greater stake in the 
representation of the national climate change discussion than 
those in Germany. They are more often mentioned in the coun-
try’s newspapers than German politicians in German newspa-
pers. 
X  
Hypothesis 8: Whereas the newspaper coverage around the 
election demands action, the media informs the public about 
the consequences of climate change during the time of the envi-
ronmental disaster. 
 X 
Sub research question 4: Are political actors predominant dur-
ing the time of the political election, whereas other actors are 
predominant during the time of the environmental disaster? 
 X 
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Summarising these results, the Public sphere, so the publics attitude towards climate change, 
showed the most differences in terms of climate change coverage: it included differences 
regarding the politicians who should tackle climate change, the effects of climate change, 
and about climate action referring to an environmental disaster and a political election. The 
Societal Sphere and the Sphere of structural parameters included two hypotheses/sub re-
search questions with differences and two without: there is a significant difference in framing 
climate change in the four newspapers as well as in Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung which 
referred to international actors (Societal Sphere). Moreover, Australia framed climate 
change in terms of causes, effects as well as of action; Germany’s climate change coverage 
remains unspecific. Politicians were the dominant actors (Sphere of structural parameters)., 
No differences were found in terms of sceptical viewpoints (Societal Sphere) or in the fram-
ing and the actors involved in climate change when comparing the two events (Sphere of 
structural parameters).  
There were just one major differences relating to the Institutional sphere, with a broader 
variety of perspectives and actors in Australia than in Germany; this finding might be asso-
ciated with the journalistic practice of so-called “balanced” reporting (see Chapter 3.3). The 
hypotheses and sub research questions representing the Subject sphere and the Professional 
sphere reveal no differences. 
8.5. Appreciation of the results 
The results of this research show that the climate change debate in the media is still diverse: 
altogether 53 frame sub-dimensions, which are associated with the four – extended to five – 
frame elements identified by Entman (1993) were used. This variety of frame sub-dimen-
sions made it possible to test a broad range of hypotheses and sub research questions in order 
to identify differences and similarities in the two countries examined. In addition, the number 
of frame sub-dimensions made it possible to identify seven frames using a cluster analysis 
which also represent the diversity of ways in which climate change is framed in the media, 
ranging from general statements about the existence or absence of climate change to ecolog-
ical and economical aspects. In percentatge, the most commonly used frames for Germany 
are “Disconnected problem definition” as well as “Treatment recommendation: interna-
tional”, for Australia “Disconnected problem definition” as well as “Treatment recommen-
dation: national”. The possibility to test such a variety of frame sub-dimensions and frames 
might be associated with a research period which was not connected with a specific climate 
change event; situations in which climate change was not necessarily a key focus for the 
media were examined. 
230 8 Discussion 
Besides the framing, there is also considerable variety in the actors represented in the news-
papers examined: they are summarised in six groups of actors in which journalists as well as 
politicians play the most important role.  
The dominance of political actors, a key finding of this research, shows that the issue of 
climate change can be shaped by the media especially by choosing the right multipliers. This 
might be also the case in a country such as Germany, which should be able to resist such 
influences due to its established value system in terms of climate change (Weidner 2008, 
p. 24 f). Therefore, journalists have a great responsibility to keep a sharp focus on the climate 
change mindset of the ruling elites of their country and to consider how these elites areusing 
their influence.  
This is a challenge, as the journalists – the biggest group of actors reviewed in this research 
– are not as independent as they should be. There are factors from inside the media conglom-
erates which influence perspectives on climate change. Fairfax Media Limited, the Austral-
ian media conglomerate examined in this research, for example, demands diversity in terms 
of climate change coverage and actors representing it. However, the challenges of climate 
change, its causes and effects, as well as the action needed to tackle climate change become 
blurred with this demand. So, climate change coverage is open to interpretation and, conse-
quently, allows readers to avoid taking responsibility. 
Moreover, the informing writing style, which is based on facts and data, dominates the cli-
mate change coverage of German and Australian journalist. However, it does not fully pro-
tect climate change coverage from facts and data presented by climate-change-sceptical sci-
entists. 
The role of national as well as international actors in the climate change discussion is also 
analysed in this research. A connection was found between national activities in the context 
of the environmental disaster and international activities in the context of the election. More-
over, German climate change coverage asked international politicians to tackle climate 
change, whereas Australian climate change coverage want national politicians to do so.   
Summarising all results, the comparitive analysis of the two countries includes the most sig-
nificant differences. Hypotheses as well as Sub research questions in terms of frames/frame 
sub-dimensions and actors show some significant differences. An exclusion is the frame 
“Sceptical views”, which appears equally in the two countries, and – as already said – the 
form of expression with an informing writing style being most dominant. Comparing the two 
events as well as the time period before and after the election/the environmental disaster, 
mainly similarities are identified.  
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The Public sphere, the Societal Sphere and the Sphere of structural parameters include the 
most significant differences: they show differences in the representation of the publics atti-
tude in terms of climate change, in the framing of climate change in the four newspapers, 
and that frames of causes, effects and action as well as political actors dominate the Austral-
ian climate change coverage. 
Besides, the results of this research also show that environmental disasters are not repre-
sented as an effect of climate change in the newspapers of the two countries that were ana-
lysed. This was surprising due to the large extent of the damage the two floods caused. So, 
there must be one or more frames/frame sub-dimensions relating to environmental disasters 
which are given more importance in journalistic practice after such an event; news values 
might play a central role in framing such environmental disasters. 
The similarities in the climate change coverage in Germany and Australia, especially when 
comparing the two events as well as the research period before and after the election and the 
environmental disaster, at first, imply that issues are represented in a similar way in the me-
dia of the two countries. However, the analysis of the four examined newspapers show highly 
significant differences when looking at the identified frames.  
8.6. Limitations 
The results of chapter 8.3 to 8.5 make clear: the differences in climate change coverage in 
Germany and Australia are rather low, especially when comparing the events and time peri-
ods . And the question is, what might be the reasons for these results? 
One reason could be that climate change referring to an event representing social and eco-
nomical consequences (environmental disaster) as well as to an event representing political 
and medial consequences (election campaign) offers a lot of space for an agenda besides 
climate change. Journalists covering an environmental disaster might prefer to refer to a 
news value such as “Human interest”, “Conflict” or “Disaster” and a political election cam-
paign might refer to current national aspects. Thus, the two events are not necessary focussed 
on climate change as it is the case when analysing a COP. 
This work was built on 52 sub frame-dimensions, which were combined into 12 indices. 
Based on these dimensions seven frames were identified by a hierarchical cluster analysis. 
These indicators have been used for testing the hypotheses and answering the sub research 
questions. However, this approach might be too undifferentiated to provide a complete pic-
ture of the climate change coverage in the two countries. Indeed, the frames could have had 
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a higher priority in this research. A possible approach might be to examine the frames on a 
monthly basis over the time of the research period, to discover how the coverage developed.  
Looking at the limitations of the methodology/study design, as stated in Chapter 3.5, the 
newspapers were chosen because they had the highest circulation in each country and thus 
influence public opinion on a broad scale. For Australia, this decision, however, had the 
consequence that the two newspapers examined – The Sydney Morning Herald as well as 
The Age – are from the same media owner, i. e. Fairfax Media Limited. Although sub re-
search question 6 shows major differences in terms of framing, it can be assumed that these 
two newspapers have the same political orientation. For future research, it would be better 
to examine two newspapers with different media owners. 
Besides this aspect, there are factors that may have influenced the results of this research – 
mainly the climate conferences that take place in November each year. Moreover, for the 
2009 German election, the financial crisis might still have dominated the political agenda. 
In addition, the fact that only one coder was used for this examination is a limitation, alt-
hough the weighted average coefficient was 0.87, which is a good result. The coefficient for 
the actors was 0.87 as well, for the form of expression the coefficient was 0.89. Using only 
one coder could result in a one-sided view on the topic being analysed, because the coder 
might develop his or her own interpretation during the coding process. 
Looking at the discussion of the research results, it would have been of interest to make a 
connection between the framing of the articles and the climate change actors. This research 
could not identify which actor stands for which frame sub-dimension. This raises a number 
of questions for further research. 
In addition, this research cannot identify whether there are actors who take responsibility for 
tackling climate change. Findings concerning this aspect are, however, of major interest, 
because powerful political or scientific leaders who feel responsible for this issue are needed 
to get the international community to take action on climate change. It might be a useful 
indication that the responsibility frame does not appear sufficiently often. 
Last, it cannot be identified how much influence lobbyists or conservative think tanks have 
on the framing of scientific work or political statements. Therefore, the public relations ac-
tivities, for example those of the oil industry, with their framing of climate change need to 
be analysed and compared with the climate change frame sub-dimensions of the political or 
scientific actors referred to in the newspapers. 
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8.7. Recommendations for further research 
As mentioned in the discussion and in the limitations section, there are some issues which 
cannot be answered through this research. The following aspects of climate change, climate 
change actors, and writing style need to be examined in further research. 
First, the framing of climate change. 
One finding of this research was that there was no significant difference related to sceptical 
voices when analysing the climate change coverage in Germany and Australia. As a reason 
for this finding, it was assumed – contrary to much other climate change research – that this 
research would not explicitly analyse the coverage around a climate change conference. So, 
it is of further interest to compare the agenda of print, but also of other media in different 
countries, in terms of climate-change-sceptical positions beyond climate change policy re-
lated events. 
In addition, the framing after an environmental disaster might be of interest for further re-
search. The results of this research suggest that there are frames/frame sub-dimensions – 
other than those referring to climate change – accompanying the coverage of an environ-
mental disaster. Thus, it might be of interest to know the role climate change plays in the 
media discussion of an environmental disaster. And it would be valuable to get an impression 
of which frames/frame sub-dimensions are dominant in this kind of media discussion. 
Whether Western climate change coverage differs in terms of frames/frame sub-dimensions 
appearing in print and in other media is another aspect for further research. For this a number 
of different print and other media in Western countries should be studied. 
Second, this section examines the actors involved in climate change. 
An interesting aspect might be to investigate whether there is an increase of influence in 
terms of economic interests and conservative think tanks getting a voice in climate change 
coverage. This question is of special interest for Germany because this research identified a 
generalisation of climate change through the predominance of the frame “Disconnected 
problem definition”. The difficulty concerning this question is, however, the opaqueness of 
lobbyism in Germany and Australia. So, it must be considered that politicians might repre-
sent economic interests as the result of lobbyism. 
Another finding in this research revealed the influence of Australian politicians/the Austral-
ian government when it comes to climate change coverage. Whether this influence is as great 
as was identified in this research or whether – due to balanced reporting – enough other 
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voices are heard could not be clarified. Therefore, it would be of interest to identify the long-
term influence of the Australian government on the country’s media landscape in terms of 
climate change coverage by analysing more than one political election or even the period 
from one election to another. 
Third, the writing style offers opportunities for further research. 
Here, the self-awareness of Australian journalists being “watchdogs” – monitoring the gov-
ernment or business elites – leads to the question whether there is a highly captious news 
coverage due to a greater aspiration to play this role. A larger data set of articles that only 
has journalists as climate change actors might provide an answer to this question. 
Besides these recommendations for further research, this analysis identified further questions 
which are situated outside the field of content analysis. These questions are briefly intro-
duced below. 
Alongside politicians, journalists are a clearly important group in climate change coverage. 
This research discovered that the socialisation of climate change journalists in Germany and 
Australia is quite similar, although the self-concepts are different – “informer and criticiser” 
(German journalists) versus “watchdog and analyst” (Australian journalists). The impression 
that there seems to be the same demand for climate change coverage, has, however, to be 
verified by further analysis. In addition, a further look at the socialisation and self-concept 
of editors-in-chief and media owners who finally edit and approve the media coverage might 
be of interest for further research. 
Moreover, it would be interesting to find out which climate change actors are considered by 
the public to be most reliable. This is of special interest because of the sceptical voices on 
climate change, which have been identified to an equal extent in both countries. 
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